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EDITORS’ NOTE
Recently, scientists predicted that if fishing continues at itscurrent rate there could be a global collapse of all speciescurrently fished by the middle of the century.1 This dire
prediction was coupled with a glimmer of hope—the current
trend is still reversible.2
Disregarding the steady stream of new science demonstrat-
ing that our oceans are in trouble appears to be the trend of many
governments and policy makers. However, ignorance is no
longer an excuse and time is running out to repair our marine
resources. While we can argue about what percent of fish stocks
are being overfished and when the collapse of global fisheries
may actually occur, the bottom-line is that marine resources are
at risk and require intervention. 
To reverse this catastrophic trend a number of legal and pol-
icy solutions must be implemented. Specifically, illegal fishing
needs to be curtailed, marine pollution needs to be reduced,
destructive fishing practices must be stopped, protection should
be afforded to deep sea living resources, the high seas must
cease being a global commons, and an effective regime for the
conservation and management of international fish stocks needs
to be created. Of utmost importance, compliance and enforce-
ment must take center stage when exploring mechanisms to pro-
tect marine resources. 
Countries have recognized these responsibilities through the
creation of domestic regulations, as well as numerous regional
and multinational agreements. The impact and effectiveness of
these agreements has varied. For example, not enough has been
done to protect straddling fish stocks. It is clear that developing
new solutions for the gaps within the regulation of our oceans is
required, and the utilization of international law is vital to meet-
ing these challenges.
Education to prevent a catastrophic future of our marine
resources is essential. Countries must make ocean conservation
a priority and the public must understand the potential conse-
quences if this does not properly occur. We hope that this issue





1 Boris Worm, et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Ser-
vices, Science, Nov. 3, 2006, at 787–790, available at http://www.sciencemag.
org/cgi/content/abstract/314/5800/787 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006). 
2 Worm, id.
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ext year it will be a quarter of a century since the con-
clusion of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea and the signing of the final text of the Convention
(“LOSC”) in Montego Bay in December of 1982. These twenty-
five years have not been plain sailing. Before the Convention
could even come into force in 1994 a major “implementation”
agreement had to be signed adjusting key provisions on the
seabed régime and in 1995 a further implementation agreement,
prompted by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development, was concluded, relating to regulation of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks. Two major formal changes in
such a short time is not an auspicious record, especially to a
Convention that had been hailed as the new “Constitution of the
oceans.” Both changes however serve to show how quickly the
ocean governance agenda has moved on in the intervening years. 
For example, in the 1970s the mining of deep seabed man-
ganese nodules was seen as an important new economic oppor-
tunity, hence the LOSC contains a complex governance structure
under the International Seabed Authority. In 2006 however such
mining seems unlikely to be commercially viable, while the
more recent discovery of new deep-sea resources both living and
non-living, present issues never envisaged by the LOSC drafters.
Similarly, the seemingly insatiable demand for fish as well as for
fossil fuels have pressed exploration and exploitation into distant
and dangerous waters, posing threats to the integrity of ocean
ecosystems and biodiversity and unprecedented challenges to
the legal regime of the oceans. Innovative provisions in the
LOSC recognize that states acting multilaterally or through
“competent international organizations” can develop the LOSC
regime further. Nevertheless, new solutions for the problems of
regulation of our ocean space still need to be devised within the
broader system of international law, which will allow us to meet
these new challenges.
CURRENT THREATS TO OUR OCEANS
Twenty-five years ago marine pollution was seen as the
main threat to the oceans. Today pollution is still an important
concern, but it is the future of the world’s fisheries resources
which is center stage as a major concern for the international
community. This concern is no longer simply an issue of the eco-
nomic impact of the decrease of these resources but rising dis-
quiet in scientific circles over the potential long-term
significance of such depletion for marine ecosystems and biodi-
versity generally. 
Modern industrial fishing practices often involve a high
level of wastage including by-catch of non-commercial species.
Despite unequivocal evidence of over-fishing and declining fish
stocks, many coastal States continue to tolerate inefficient and
destructive fishing practices. Even more disturbing is the level of
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (“IUU”) fishing. IUU fish-
ing can undermine even the best-intentioned management
regime. Thus, serious efforts are being directed at curtailing IUU
fishing, including improved enforcement mechanisms. 
2
Sustainable Development Law & Policy (“SDLP”) is a publication
of American University’s Washington College of Law (“WCL”). No
portion of this publication may be reprinted without the express
written permission of SDLP. The views expressed in SDLP are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
SDLP staff or WCL. All correspondence, reprinting, and article
submissions may be sent to: SDLP, Washington College of Law,
American University, 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 631,
Washington, DC 20016. E-mail: sdlp@wcl.american.edu. Phone:
202.274.4057. Current and back issues are available on our website,
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment.
Please see the inside back cover for submissions and subscription
information.








Athena Kennedy, Meryl Eschen Mills, Frank Pigott, Jennifer
Rohleder, Ayako Sato, Matt Trumbull
Staff
Stephanie Atkinson, Daniel Brindis, John Cossa, Marcel De Armas,
Andrew Elligers, Christy Erickson, Jon Feldon, Kevin Gallagher,
Jane Garrido, Ernesto Gonzalez, Jessica Gordon, Salah Husseini,
Scott Johnson, Ursula Kazarian, Blase Kornacki, Pierre Lancelin,
Michael Lee, Chris McChesney, Abigail Okrent, Chiara Rocha,
Rahul Saksena, JC Sylvan, Chris Stefan, Bridget Van Buren,
Catherine Verdier, Lucy Wiggins, Mark Wilson, Daniel Winokur,
Julie Yeagle
Advisory Board:
Daniel Bradlow, David Hunter, Kenneth Markowitz, David New-
man, Marcos Orellana, William L. Thomas, Glenn Wiser, Durwood
Zaelke
© Copyright Sustainable Development 
Law & Policy, 2006. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING OUR OCEANS: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW SOLUTIONS
AN OVERVIEW OF THIS ISSUE
by David Freestone*
* David Freestone is the Deputy General Counsel, Advisory Services at The World
Bank. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and should not be taken to
represent the views of the World Bank. He is most grateful to Kelly Rain without
whose excellent help this paper would not have seen the light of day.
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ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND
UNREGULATED FISHING
The Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) has recog-
nized that its declared goal of sustainable utilization of world
fishery resources is unobtainable under existing “open access”
fishery regimes. Many international and regional fishery man-
agement organizations (“RFMOs”) lack the capability to moni-
tor their stocks effectively, the structure to make strong
science-based decisions on allowable catches, the powers to
police the decisions that they make, or to enforce them against
non-parties. However, such management decisions that RFMOs
do take are consistently undermined by rogue vessels flagged to
states that are not party to the treaty regimes or which simply
disobey the rules. In June 2001, the FAO Council endorsed an
International Plan of Action against IUU Fishing. It contains an
extensive “toolkit” of actions that states can take against such
vessels — but progress has been slow. In March this year the
OECD Ministerially-led Task Force on IUU Fishing on the High
Seas proposed a new action plan to address this “serious global
problem” which undermines sustainable fishery efforts and robs
the poorest states of more than $1 billion worth of fish a year.
The Action Plan aims to galva-
nize the political will in the
international community neces-
sary to take effective deterrent






pose a major threat to biodiver-
sity, despite technological
advances such as turtle excluder
devices in shrimping nets and developments in longline-setting
to avoid seabird catches. Nevertheless scientists are now warn-
ing that the sheer scale of fishing efforts as well as the targeting
of high value, mostly pelagic, species is resulting in a reduction
in the average size of many commercial species as well as fish-
ing down the trophic levels — targeting smaller and less valu-
able species. A number of marine species may be close to
commercial extinction. The unique litigation brought in 1999 by
Australia and New Zealand against Japan over the valuable
Southern Bluefin Tuna stocks highlights the important economic
as well as ecological interests involved. Such case studies have
lead to the growing awareness in the international community
that ocean fisheries will need to be managed as part of the larger
ecosystem rather than, as at present, simply species-by-species. 
These developments were not really envisaged by the
LOSC. While Article 116 accepts certain limitations on the
rights of all states for their nationals to fish on the high seas —
they are not clearly articulated. It was the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement that first proclaimed a general norm of ecosystem-
based management of highly migratory and straddling fish
stocks accompanied by a requirement (in Article 6) that states
take a precautionary approach — a concept that is an established
tool of international environmental policy. There is still wide-
spread confusion regarding what the precautionary approach
actually entails. Often it involves the reverse of the normal bur-
den of proof. Typically, the burden of proof would fall on those
arguing for conservation to prove definitively that stocks are
being threatened before conservation measures are put into
place. However, with the precautionary approach, a number of
stock management parameters are established ab initio and if
these are exceeded, then conservation measures will automati-
cally become applicable. Despite the well known opposition of
the U.S. to the precautionary principle in international forums,
many U.S. fisheries, such as the Alaskan Pollock Fishery, are in
fact already using rigorous precautionary methodologies. 
EXPLOITING DEEP SEA FISHERIES
All these concerns come together when we look at the
exploitation of deep sea living resources. Another lacuna in the
LOSC is its inability to date to be able to regulate deep sea trawl
fishing over deep ocean floor habitats designed to exploit species
such as orange roughy and tooth fish. Orange roughy
(hoplostethus atlanticus), for
example, was originally named
“Slimehead.” Discovered in the
deep waters off New Zealand in
the 1970s, it was quickly
renamed “orange roughy” to
become more commercially
appealing. This species was
heavily fished before it became
known that it has characteristics
that make it innately vulnerable
to overexploitation: it does not
reach sexual maturity until about
30 years old, it can live to 150, and does not breed every year.
Scientists know little about them except that catches have
dropped vertiginously after sustained exploitation, raising fears
that they face extinction without some form of strict regulatory
regime. 
Another example of the dangers of overexploiting the deep
seas can be found in the unique ecosystems surrounding deep-
sea hydrothermal vents, known as black smokers. Black smokers
support extraordinary ecosystems that are the only communities
currently known on earth whose immediate energy source is not
sunlight. These vents teem with a fascinating array of life that
can withstand extremely high temperatures. Studying the biodi-
versity of these vents has other promising technological applica-
tions, such as improving heat resistant clothing for firefighters.
These unique ecosystems exist outside national waters, and to
date there is no agreement on ways in which they and other
important high seas ocean areas, such as seamounts on which
deep-sea species often spawn, can be legally protected. Without
some form of effective international legal protection we face the
possibility that these unique ecosystems could be destroyed






EXOTIC SPECIES: THE BALLAST
WATER CONVENTION
Invasive aquatic species can have devastating economic,
environmental, and public health impacts. Although all the world
oceans are linked, many species function in localized ecosys-
tems that have evolved natural controls. The transfer of species
to a different marine environment can have disastrous outcomes.
A vivid example can be found in the Black Sea where the accu-
mulated biomass of a jellyfish-like species (mnemiopsis leidyi),
introduced from North America through tanker ballast water,
was in 2000 reported to be ten times the world’s annual global
fish catch. This form of impact of shipping was never envisaged
in 1982, and has required a customized response through the
2004 International Convention for the Control and Management
of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments. Yet to enter into force, it
envisages the introduction of mandatory ballast water manage-
ment from 2009, but no later than 2016, in order to eliminate the
common practice of vessels loading and discharging untreated
ballast water. 
NEW SOLUTIONS:
A CALL FOR A HOLISTIC
MARINE AGREEMENT
The current need is for the
international community to
develop an effective regime for
the conservation and manage-
ment of international fish stocks,
particularly in areas beyond
national jurisdiction. The 1995
UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
which introduced important new
concepts into the Law of the Sea
regime, was the result of a two
year negotiating process stimu-
lated by the 1992 UN Confer-
ence on Environment and Development. It is styled as an
“Implementation Agreement.” 
Members of the international community are now proposing
a new Implementation Agreement. In July 2006, Joe Borg, the
European Commissioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs,
addressing the 30th Virginia Law of the Sea Conference in
Dublin, outlined the aim of the June 2006 EU Green Paper. The
publication of the Green Paper launched a one-year consultation
on the European Union’s relations with the oceans and seas. The
underlying idea is to develop a comprehensive maritime policy
aimed at enhancing Europe’s maritime economy in a sustainable
manner. However, as Mr. Borg stressed, the EU will press in the
UN for a new “implementation agreement . . . regarding the pro-
tection of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion.” 
One issue directly related to a holistic approach to the con-
servation of marine diversity is the specific issue of compliance
and enforcement. Under LOSC mechanisms, enforcement of
obligations is predicated on two fundamental forms of jurisdic-
tion—flag State and coastal State jurisdiction. However the
LOSC does in certain situations recognize the jurisdiction of
port states. Another approach to improved compliance and
enforcement of fishery and other natural resource regimes is to
harness more centrally the potential of port State control
(“PSC”). PSC is the logical choice for verifying whether visiting
ships comply with certain types of international or national stan-
dards, or if they have engaged in certain types of behavior in the
port State’s own maritime zones and in the maritime zones of
other States or in the high seas. Although it is a sensitive issue,
we are witnessing a gradual broadening of the scope and rights
of port State jurisdiction: initially to further the interests of the
international community by ensuring safety at sea, but increas-
ingly for wider environmental and natural resource conservation
and management issues.
CONCLUSION: OVERVIEW OF THIS ISSUE
Many of the current controversies raised above are
addressed in more detail in this issue of Sustainable Develop-
ment Law & Policy. David Balton and Holly Koehler explore the
impacts and effectiveness of the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement par-
ticularly in relation to the need
to impose increasingly strict
obligations on States to prevent
damage to sea areas outside
national jurisdiction. Recogniz-
ing the importance of ecosys-
tem-based management is vital
as many aquatic species near
extinction: Virginia Gascón and
Rodolfo Werner explain the sta-
tus of the ecosystem-based man-
agement of Antarctic krill under
the Commission for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine Liv-
ing Resources. The absence of
coherent regulations to steward fishery resources and the intensi-
fied global attention to the pivotal role of the port State in com-
bating IUU fishing is explored by Judith Swan. Ray Purdy
discusses the legal implications of carbon capture and storage
under the seas. Magdalena Muir discusses oceans and climate
change science and policy issues at a global and Arctic level. A
criticism of aquaculture as an answer to resources management
is presented by Daniel Pauly, who argues that fishing subsidies
need to be cut and that we must essentially withdraw from the
ocean to rebuild overexploited ecosystems. Eric Bilsky looks to
the Magnuson-Stevens Act as a means to direct regional fishery
management councils to protect essential fish habitat. Jeremy
Firestone and James Corbett present ecological and economic
problems related to ballast water’s introduction of non-native
invasive species into ecosystems. Industry-driven sustain-
ability initiatives are explored by John Connelly and Daniel Lee,
who present an overview of sustainable fisheries management
guidelines and certification practices. Additionally, various other




lack the capability to
monitor their stocks
effectively.
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INTRODUCTION
L
ike a number of key stocks of fish in the world’s oceans,
good news on the subject of international fisheries has
become less plentiful. The international community has
grappled for years with growing concern over the state of the
marine environment, particularly the health of living marine
resources and their habitats. The conservation and management
of fish stocks whose ranges extend across the lines that separate
ocean areas under national jurisdiction and the high seas pose
particular challenges. Without cooperation among nations, there
can be no effective regulation of such resources, including for
so-called “straddling fish stocks” and “highly migratory fish
stocks.”1
In an effort to address these concerns, the United Nations
adopted the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (“UNFSA”) in 1995.2
Together with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation’s (“FAO”) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries3
and the High Seas Fishing Compliance Agreement,4 the UNFSA
has established robust international principles and standards at
the global level for the regulation of ocean fisheries. The
UNFSA entered into force in 2001 and now has 61 States Par-
ties. But how well is it working? How much impact is it having?
What more can be done to strengthen its implementation?
The States Parties to the UNFSA and other interested par-
ticipants met recently at the United Nations to answer these
questions. This article will summarize the outcomes of the
UNFSA Review Conference and will consider the prospects for
this vital treaty in dealing with marine fisheries.
THE REVIEW CONFERENCE PROCESS
Article 36 of the UNFSA provides that within four years of
the entry into force of the Agreement a conference would be
convened to review and assess the adequacy of the Agreement in
securing the conservation and management of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, and to propose means of
strengthening its implementation.5 This Review Conference
took place at the United Nations in New York from May 22–26,
2006. In preparation for the Conference, a fifth round of infor-
mal consultations of States Parties to the Agreement (“ICSPs”)
was held.6 During this fifth ICSP, two major and inter-related
sentiments emerged that would shape the tenor and structure of
the upcoming Review Conference: (1) that the review should be
robust, balanced, and result in outcomes based on a rigorous
assessment; and (2) that the Review Conference should consider
and try to address certain persistent concerns expressed by non-
parties regarding particular aspects of the Agreement.7
On the first point, many participants in the fifth ICSP, partic-
ularly States Parties to the Agreement, insisted that the Review
Conference proceed in a structured and focused manner. These
Parties were concerned that a haphazard review of the Agree-
ment would be counterproductive, yielding overly negative
results that unfairly blame the continued problems facing inter-
national fisheries on deficiencies in an agreement that had
entered into force only four years earlier. Participants also wor-
ried that an unstructured or unbalanced review would open the
door to premature proposals to amend the Agreement.8 As a
result, the fifth ICSP developed a program of work for the Con-
ference that laid out how the review and assessment component
of the meeting would be organized.9 To facilitate that process, it
also identified a series of framework questions and elements.10
The second issue — the concerns of non-parties — emerged
several months earlier during the negotiation of the annual UN
General Assembly resolution on sustainable fisheries.11 There,
several non-parties to the UNFSA argued that they should be
able to participate in the Review Conference process on an equal
footing with States Parties. A debate on this point took center
stage in the fifth ICSP, which had the mandate to prepare the
rules of procedure for the Review Conference. Views on this
issue quickly became polarized. Many non-parties considered
the Review Conference to be a United Nations meeting in which
all UN members had equal standing.12 Virtually all States Par-
ties, by contrast, saw the Review Conference as a meeting of
Parties to the Agreement: where others may also be invited, but
in which only States Parties had the ultimate say on matters
involving the implementation of a treaty to which only States
Parties are legally bound. States Parties were also concerned
with the public calls by some non-parties to either amend or
reinterpret certain provisions of the Agreement in order to sat-
isfy their specific concerns.13 These competing concerns shaped
the discussions at the Review Conference, the work of its draft-
ing committee, and the subsequent Conference results.
The United States played a leadership role in the Review
Conference, providing a positive and constructive mediating
presence. The United States chaired the Conference, as well as
the fifth ICSP and several other small informal working groups
during the preparatory phase. The United States also led efforts
REVIEWING THE UNITED NATIONS
FISH STOCKS TREATY
By David A. Balton and Holly R. Koehler*
* David A. Balton is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries at
the U.S Department of State. He also served as President of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement Review Conference. Holly R. Koehler is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the
Office of Marine Conservation at the U.S. Department of State. She also served on
the U.S. Delegation to the Review Conference. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State or of the U.S. Government generally.
6FALL 2006 
to craft compromises on a number of difficult issues, such as the
rules of procedure and further reviews of the UNFSA. 
As a result of the discussions at the fifth ICSP, the Review
Conference adopted a process to review and assess the adequacy
of the provisions of the Agreement and to propose means to
strengthen their implementation. To facilitate this process, the
fifth ICSP organized the assessment into four general cluster
areas, each based on the parts of the UNFSA: (1) Conservation
and management of stocks; (2) Mechanisms for international
cooperation; (3) Monitoring, control and surveillance, compli-
ance and enforcement; and (4) Developing states parties and
non-parties.
The following section will examine the major themes that
emerged from the review and assessment of each cluster area,
and will highlight recommenda-
tions made to strengthen the
implementation of the Agree-
ment.14
RESULTS OF THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE15
The  Conference  f i r s t
reviewed progress made by
States and regional f isheries
management organizations and
arrangements (“RFMOs”) in
conserving and managing highly
migratory stocks and straddling
fish stocks. While progress has
been made in this area since the
adoption of UNFSA, more must
be done to strengthen and rein-
force conservation and management measures. According to the
FAO, nearly 30 percent of the stocks of highly migratory tuna
and tuna-like species and nearly two-thirds of the straddling fish
stocks and the stocks of other high-seas fishery resources are
overexploited or depleted. In light of this information, the Con-
ference called for greater reliance on the precautionary approach
to manage fisheries in accordance with the best available scien-
tific information.16 The Conference found that timely and accu-
rate data collection remains a challenge and that the lack of good
data undermines scientific advice and sound management 
decisions. The Conference called for the elimination of fishing 
subsidies that result in over-fishing and illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing activities.17 The Conference also
acknowledged that two new RFMOs had been developed since
the adoption of the UNFSA, with negotiations underway for a
third in the South Pacific. However, a number of developing
States reported that the costs associated with participating in
RFMOs can be prohibitively high.18
Second, in the area of international cooperation, the Confer-
ence emphasized the importance of RFMOs in the conservation
and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks.
While progress has been made to strengthen the mandates of
RFMOs, particularly with respect to compliance and enforce-
ment, member States of these regional management organiza-
tions must do much more to modernize the functions of the
RFMOs and to enhance their performance. RFMOs are adopting
a range of measures to cooperate in the conservation and man-
agement of stocks under their purview, particularly in dealing
with IUU fishing. These measures include the establishment of
positive and negative vessel lists, market-related measures, catch
and trade documentation schemes, port control measures, satel-
lite vessel monitoring systems, and regulations for trans-
shipment.19 However gaps in RFMO coverage remain, both
geographically and with respect to the fisheries covered.20
Third, in the monitoring, control and surveillance, and com-
pliance and enforcement cluster area, the Conference noted that
both States and RFMOs have taken significant strides but, once
again, more work needs to be done by RFMOs and States that
either authorize vessels to fish
on the high seas or provide ports
and markets for fish and fish
products. The Conference fur-
ther recognized that significant
levels of IUU fishing continue
to occur due to ineffective con-
trol over vessels, inadequate
investigations of violations and
levels of penalties imposed, a
lack of enforcement capacity in
developing  count r ies ,  the
porous nature of some port State
control systems, and insufficient
cooperation and coordination
among States and RFMOs.
Finally, with regard to
developing States and non-
parties, the Conference underscored the importance of the
Agreement in achieving sustainable fisheries, but also empha-
sized the need to encourage additional States to adhere to the
Agreement. The Conference further recognized that developing
States require assistance to fulfill their obligations under the
Agreement. To participate effectively in RFMOs and implement
conservation and management measures domestically, develop-
ing States need assistance in the areas of human resource 
development, training, technology transfer, scientific stock
assessment and research, and implementing compliance and
enforcement measures. In addition, with respect to broadening
participation in the Agreement, several non-parties identified
certain concerns they have with provisions of the Agreement
itself, specifically Articles 7, 21, 22, and 23, that they view as
obstacles to their becoming a party.
The Review Conference agreed on a comprehensive set of
recommendations in each cluster area that called upon States,
RFMOs, and technical bodies of the United Nations to under-
take certain actions and initiatives to strengthen the substance
and methods of implementation of the Agreement. The recom-
mendations in each area serve to focus attention on particular
implementation needs, such as the enhanced use of science in




and standards at the
global level for the
regulation of ocean
fisheries.
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organizations, the incorporation of ecosystem considerations
into fisheries management, strengthened control over vessels,
companies, and nationals that engage in IUU fishing activities,
better and more timely collection and sharing of fisheries data,
the modernization of RFMOs to include new principles and
practices of international fisheries conservation and manage-
ment, and further provision of assistance to developing coun-
tries.
Many of the Conference recommendations built upon other
recent calls to action, such as by the UN General Assembly and
FAO. However, there are several distinct recommendations from
the Conference that define this meeting as taking a step forward
to address ongoing problems with international fisheries man-
agement. These recommendations include commitments to:
• establish new RFMOs where none exist and to agree on
interim management measures until such organizations are
established;
• urgently reduce the capacity of the world’s fishing fleets to
sustainable levels by establishing targets and plans for
ongoing assessments;
• strengthen data collection and reporting, including
through regular audits of compliance with such obliga-
tions; 
• initiate negotiations through the FAO to develop a legally
binding instrument on port State measures; 
• undertake performance reviews of RFMOs based on trans-
parent criteria, which would include some element of
independent evaluation, and make these reviews publicly
available;
• adopt stringent measures to regulate transshipment, partic-
ularly at sea; and
• develop processes to assess the performance of States in
implementing their obligations regarding their fishing ves-
sels (i.e., flag State duties).
PROSPECTS FOR THE UNFSA
Perhaps most significantly, the Review Confer-
ence revealed widespread support for the UNFSA
as the preeminent instrument in the field of interna-
tional fisheries management. This reflects a consid-
erable improvement in overall attitudes toward the
treaty. At the time of its adoption in 1995, and even
as it entered into force in 2001, a number of influen-
tial governments continued to express doubts about
the UNFSA. Their concerns focused particularly on
several of its innovative provisions, such as the pre-
cautionary approach to fisheries management, the
requirement that management measures be compat-
ible throughout the range of a fish stock, and certain
enforcement rules. By contrast, virtually all govern-
ments represented at the Review Conference —
even those not yet party to the UNFSA — indicated
their acceptance of the treaty as an expression of
basic standards for the management of ocean fish-
eries.
One telling example of these changing attitudes toward the
UNFSA was the general willingness of the Parties to expand its
scope for use in the management of fisheries for other categories
of stocks. The UNFSA, by its terms, applies only to the conser-
vation and management of two select categories of fisheries,
namely, fisheries for “straddling fish stocks” and for “highly
migratory fish stocks.” The participants in the Review Confer-
ence nevertheless “encouraged States, as appropriate, to recog-
nize that the general principles of the Agreement should also
apply to fisheries for discrete fish stocks on the high seas,” —
i.e., those stocks of fish that occur solely on the high seas.
The growing number of States Parties to the UNFSA pro-
vides further evidence of increasing support for this treaty. At
the time of the Review Conference in May 2006, the UNFSA
had 57 States Parties, including most States with significant
interests in international fisheries.21 Some 14 non-Parties also
announced or reaffirmed their intention to adhere to the treaty in
the near future. Four of those (Trinidad and Tobago, Slovenia,
Estonia, and Japan) have become States Parties in the few
months since the end of the Review Conference.22
Additionally, many States — both parties and non-parties to
the UNFSA — have begun to incorporate its provisions into
their domestic laws and regulations. Many States are now requir-
ing fishing vessels to observe all relevant fishing rules before
authorizing them to fish on the high seas. Some nations have also
begun to contribute funds and other resources to assist develop-
ing countries in the implementation of the UNFSA, with the
goals of improving fisheries management within the vast areas
under the jurisdiction of developing States and of monitoring the
high seas fishing operations of vessels that fly the flags of devel-
oping States.
Similarly, most of the RFMOs created to regulate fisheries
for straddling or highly migratory fish stocks have incorporated
key provisions of the UNFSA into their charters or regulatory
schemes. Some other long-standing RFMOs, including the Inter-












American Tropical Tuna Commission and the General Fisheries
Commission for the Mediterranean, have revised their charters
to incorporate provisions of the UNFSA. Other RFMOs may
soon follow this trend. For example, the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization embarked on an ambitious reassessment
of its founding treaty and may incorporate elements of UNFSA.
Finally, the UNFSA has become the point of departure for nego-
tiations to establish new RFMOs, including the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Southeast Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, and the South West Indian Ocean Fish-
eries Commission.
However, daunting challenges to full implementation of the
UNFSA certainly remain. The treaty still does not enjoy universal
— or even near-universal — adherence. Several nations with
major fishing fleets, including the People’s Republic of China, the
Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and many Latin American and
African countries, remain outside the circle of States Parties. The
recent ratification by Japan may prompt some of those nations to
adhere, but this is not certain by any means. Both parties and
non-parties struggle to collect
and analyze the scientific and
fisheries data necessary to sup-
port sound management deci-
sions, and to secure the resources
necessary to monitor fishing
activities.
As noted above, some non-
parties took the occasion of the
Review Conference to reiterate
long-held concerns about partic-
ular aspects of the UNFSA that,
in their view, remain obstacles to
their adherence. For some non-
parties, the principal issue arises
from Articles 21 and 22 of the
treaty. These provisions author-
ize fisheries enforcement per-
sonnel from States Parties under limited circumstances to board
and inspect high seas fishing vessels of other States Parties to
monitor for compliance with regionally agreed fishing rules.
Some non-parties voiced concern that these provisions unduly
undermine the basic rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction over
fishing vessels on the high seas. Other non-parties feared that the
authority to board and inspect high seas fishing vessels could be
abused; e.g., to interfere with the legitimate fishing activities of a
competing fishing fleet. 
Some non-parties are also concerned about preserving the
privileges of coastal States. These non-parties called for assur-
ances that Article 7 of the UNFSA, which requires that measures
for a fish stock be compatible throughout the range of that stock,
be implemented in ways that preserve the exclusive jurisdiction
of coastal States to manage fisheries within waters under their
jurisdiction. Despite the lack of evidence that implementation of
Article 7 has undermined coastal State prerogatives, the issue
remains a sensitive point for some nations.
The problems confronting the UNFSA and its supporters
unfortunately go much deeper than the concerns voiced by some
non-parties. Four major challenges confront effective manage-
ment of ocean fisheries; each obstacle is discussed below.
OVERFISHING AND OVERCAPACITY
Too many ocean fisheries suffer from overfishing and excess
fishing capacity, despite requirements in the UNFSA and other
international instruments to deal with these phenomena. The
FAO statistics on the poor status of marine fish stocks, including
many straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks, cannot be
ignored. Efforts to cap and reduce excess fishing capacity and to
eliminate subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfish-
ing have met with limited success. Though many governments
(and industry representatives) recognize the general need to end
overcapacity, few have been willing to make the sacrifices neces-
sary to achieve it.
IUU FISHING
Despite sustained efforts on many levels to combat IUU
fishing, such activities persist,
and may even be growing in
some regions and fisheries. As
key stocks dwindle, the poten-
tial profits available to cheaters
can increase. The difficulty of
monitoring fishing operations
far from shore, particularly in
high seas areas and areas under
the jurisdiction of developing
countries, exacerbates the situa-
tion. Governments, individually
and collectively, are trying to
deal with this classic “free
rider” problem by improving
monitoring, control and surveil-
lance of fishing operations at
sea and in port (during landing
and transshipment), by reducing market access to illegally
caught fish, and by stiffening penalties imposed on violators.
However, as the Review Conference acknowledged, much more
needs to be done.
ECOSYSTEM CONCERNS
Overfishing can deplete both the stocks that are the target of
the fisheries as well as populations of species that are associated
with, or dependent on, the target stocks. Some tuna fisheries, for
example, result in significant accidental catch of seabirds and
sea turtles, although States and RFMOs are introducing meas-
ures to mitigate such “bycatch.” The catch of many sharks, either
as targets of fisheries or as bycatch, is poorly regulated. Some
fishing methods can also harm sensitive areas of the ocean floor,
for example where sponge fields or corals live, or in the vicinity
of some seamounts. The UNFSA sparked a concerted effort to
implement an “ecosystem approach to fisheries management.”
Because implementing this approach requires considerable sci-
entific research necessary to understand the marine environment,
The Conference
emphasized the





9 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
which is difficult and costly for nations with even the most
sophisticated fisheries management systems, this approach
remains far from being fully realized.23
LACK OF CAPACITY AMONG DEVELOPING STATES
The majority of nations that lack sophisticated fisheries
management systems — including most developing States —
cannot yet implement the UNFSA completely. They lack not
only financial resources, but also the technical know-how,
human resources, and infrastructure necessary to conduct proper
stock assessments, develop and
implement management meas-
ures, monitor fisheries for com-
pliance, and impose penalties on
violators. In the pursuit of eco-
nomic development, a number of
developing States (and some
developed States) allow high
seas fishing vessels to fly their
flags without any meaningful
ability or intention to control the
operations of those vessels.
POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FROM THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE
Although these challenges are daunting, the Review Confer-
ence reaffirmed the commitment of nations to tackle them,
including through some of the specific undertakings described
below.
One recommendation to emerge from the Review Confer-
ence starts from the recognition that the best vehicles for regulat-
ing fisheries for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks are the RFMOs. Unfortunately, the performance of the
various RFMOs in fulfilling the responsibilities set forth in both
their own charters and in other instruments, such as the UNFSA,
has been uneven. The Review Conference recommended that
RFMOs be subject to a systematic performance review. If such
reviews were thorough and candid, they could, for example, cre-
ate a “report card” revealing those areas in which each RFMO
needed to improve its effectiveness.
The Review Conference also developed some stronger com-
mitments to redress the overcapacity problem and to crack down
on IUU fishing. In particular, the Review Conference called for
greater coordination of measures across ocean regions and
among two or more RFMOs. One opportunity to make progress
on this front will occur in January 2007, when Japan will host
the first-ever meeting of the five RFMOs that regulate fisheries
for highly migratory stocks.24
Finally, the Review Confer-
ence gave rise to new commit-
ments to assist developing
States Parties in the implemen-
tation of the UNFSA. A number
of vehicles for transmitting such
assistance exist, including a
trust fund established by the
States Parties pursuant to Part
VII of the treaty, which is jointly
administered by the United
Nations and the FAO. The FAO
also maintains other assistance
programs in this field, as does
the World Bank and other inter-
national financial institutions,
and some of the RFMOs. A number of developed States provide
additional assistance for fisheries management directly to devel-
oping States.
CONCLUSION
The Review Conference brought the UNFSA to the atten-
tion of governments, international organizations, and a large
number of non-governmental stakeholders that participated in
the process. The very attention the treaty received during the
preparatory meetings and at the Review Conference has cat-
alyzed action to improve its implementation. In that regard, a
notable outcome of the Review Conference was to keep the
treaty under review, through both annual informal consultations
at the United Nations and a resumption of the formal Review
Conference no later than 2011.
1 Though not clearly defined in international law, a “straddling fish stock” is
commonly understood to mean a stock of fish referred to in Article 63(2) of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNLOS”), namely, a
“stock or stocks of associated species [that] occur both within the exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone.”
Examples include cod and other demersal fish stocks in the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean. “Highly migratory fish stocks” also occur both within and beyond the
EEZ, but are distinguished from straddling stocks by the vast distances they
typically migrate. Annex I to the 1982 Convention lists highly migratory
species, both fish (such as tunas and swordfish) and certain non-fish (such as
whales and other cetaceans). See United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
2 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, July 24–Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. DOCA/Conf. 164/37 [here-
inafter UNFSA].
3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
v9878e/v9878e00.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agreement to Pro-
mote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/
MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130E00.HTM (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
5 UNFSA, supra note 2.
6 These informal consultations have met annually since 2002 to discuss issues
related to the implementation of the Agreement. See Overview, Conventions
Endnotes: Fish Stocks Treaty Law
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INTRODUCTION
Many have long assumed that the expanse and mysterious
depths of the world’s oceans contain vast living resources, ready
to be exploited in the ways that its more familiar coastal fringes
have. This assumption is very wrong. Of the 362 million square
kilometers of ocean on this planet, only 7.5 percent — the conti-
nental shelves — are shallower than 200 meters (“m”), and some
of this shelf area is covered by ice. Shelves and the adjacent
slopes, reaching down to 500 m, generate the bulk of the biolog-
ical production supporting global fish catches, the rest consisting
of tuna and other oceanic organisms, which gather their food
from the vast, desert-like expanse of the open oceans.1
As a result of legislation in the 1980s, continental shelves
are contained mostly within the exclusive economic zones
(“EEZ”) of maritime countries.
According to the United Nations
Law of the Sea, any country that
cannot fully use the f ish
resources within its economic
zone must make this surplus
available to the fleets of other
countries.2 This, along with
eagerness for foreign exchange,
political pressure, and illegal
fishing, has led to the trawling of
all the world’s continental
shelves for bottom fish, the use
of purse-seines for open-water
fishes, and the illumination of
the shelves to attract and catch
squids.3
Perhaps the strongest factor
behind these overgrown and
often destructive fisheries, and
their tacit support by the public
at large, is the notion that, somehow, the oceans will yield what
we need, simply because we need it. Indeed, demand projections
for fish generated by national and international agencies largely
reflect present consumption patterns, which the oceans ought to
help us maintain, even as the global human population — and
our taste for seafood — keeps growing. While much of the deep
ocean is unexplored and mysterious, we know enough about
ocean processes to realize that its productive capacity cannot
keep up with an ever-increasing demand for fish.4
Global fish catches began to decline in the late 1980s,5 and
extrapolation of present trends suggests that large-scale fisheries
throughout the world will collapse in a few decades, inducing
losses that aquaculture cannot be expected to compensate.6
HISTORIC ANTECEDENT
While fisheries7 and localized overexploitation have
occurred for millennia,8 the massive impact of fishing on ocean
ecosystems began only in the early nineteenth century, when
English steam trawlers began to land their catches.9 These
trawlers were soon rendered more effective by power winches
and, following World War I, diesel engines. The aftermath of
World War II added other peacetime dividends to the industrial-
ization of fishing: freezer trawlers, radar, and acoustic fish find-
ers. The fleets of the Northern hemisphere were ready to take on
the world, and they did, with help from American, Russian, and
Japanese distant-water fleets.
Fisheries science had progressed as well: the two world wars
showed that exploited fish populations (e.g., those of the heavily
mined North Sea) would bounce
back when released from fishing
pressure.10 This prompted mod-
els of single-species fish popula-
tions whose size is affected only
by fishing pressure.11 The main
point of these models, still very
much in use (though in strongly
modified forms), is that adjust-
ing fishing efforts to some opti-
mum level leads to a “maximum
sustainable” yield, a notion that
the fishing industry and the 
regulatory agencies eagerly
adopted —  if only in theory.12
In practice, the fishing
industry rarely implemented
optimum effort levels. Rather,
fisheries simply moved once a
stock was over-fished, gradually
fishing in deeper waters and
remote seamounts.13 Fisheries were even moved to the then-
untapped resources of West Africa, Southeast Asia, as well as






destructive fisheries is the
notion that, somehow, 
the oceans will yield what
we need, simply because
we need it.
* Dr. Daniel Pauly is a Professor of Fisheries and Director of the Fisheries Centre
at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. Since 1999, he has
been the Principal Investigator of the Sea Around Us Project, funded by the Pew
Charitable Trusts, located in Philadelphia and devoted to studying the impact of
fisheries on the world’s marine ecosystems (www. seaaroundus.org). The concepts,
methods and software he co-developed have been documented in over 500 publica-
tions, and are used throughout the world. Especially widely-applied is the Ecopath
modeling approach and software (www.ecopath.org) and FishBase, the online
encyclopedia of fishes (www.fishbase.org). This article is adapted from Daniel
Pauly et al., Towards Sustainability in World Fisheries, 418 NATURE 689 (2002).
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, this massive increase of
global fishing efforts led to increases in catches, which masked
local stock collapses, and which was so rapid that the catches
exceeded the world population growth, causing an entire genera-
tion of managers and politicians to believe that launching more
boats would automatically lead to higher catches.15
The Peruvian anchovy collapse, from 1971 through 1972,
was the first fishery collapse with global repercussions. Though
the El Niño event is often perceived as causing the collapse,
much of the available evidence, such as the actual catches (about
18 million metric tons,16 exceeding the officially reported catch
by six million tons), suggests that overfishing should be impli-
cated as well. Attributing the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy
entirely to environmental effects allowed business as usual to
continue, and in the mid-1970s, this led to the beginning of a
decline in total catches from the North Atlantic.17 This declining
trend accelerated in the late 1980s and early 1990s when most of
the cod stocks off New England and Eastern Canada collapsed,18
ending fishing traditions reaching back for centuries. In 1996,
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization published
a chronicle of global fisheries19 that showed that a rapidly
increasing fraction of world catches originate from stocks that
are over-fished, i.e., that the collapse of the New England and
eastern Canadian cod stock was only one of a multitude of other,
smaller, and little-noticed collapses.
EFFECTS ON MARINE SPECIES DIVERSITY
The major, direct environmental impact of fishing is that it
reduces the abundance of the species it targets. It is a frequent
assumption that fishing does not impose any direct threat of
species extinction since marine fish generally are very fecund
and the ocean expanse is wide. However, recent decades have
witnessed a growing awareness that fish cannot only be severely
over-fished, but could also be threatened with extinction through
overexploitation.20 Fisheries may also change the evolutionary
characteristics of populations by selectively removing the larger,
fast-growing individuals. It is not yet known whether these
changes in the genetic constitution of species are reversible.21
Also worrisome is a phenomenon known as “fishing down
marine food webs.”22 Most food fishes are high on the food
chain — whether sardines feeding on zooplankton, cod feeding
on bottom invertebrates, including shrimps, or tuna feeding on
small oceanic fishes. When the top predators are fished out, we
turn to their prey. For example, herring and shrimps in place of
cod. Studies have indicated that there is a steady, global decline
in the trophic level, or position on the food chain, of global fish-
ery catches.23 This implies the gradual extirpation of large, long-
lived fishes from the ecosystems of the world’s oceans, and, as
well, the destruction of many animal communities of the sea
floor (see Figure 1).
Many argue that fishing down marine food webs is both
good and unavoidable, given a growing demand for fish.24 Also,
the initial ecosystem response to “fishing down” may be a
release of predation and lead to increased catches of low trophic
level fishes. Indeed, the Japanese whaling industry insists that
removing whales from marine ecosystems would make large
amount of prey species available to fisheries.25 In the author’s
opinion, this would not be the case. Such effects are rarely
observed in marine ecosystems, mainly because they do not
function as would a number of unconnected food chains. Rather,
these ecosystems consist of reticulated food webs, where a pred-
ator may have a direct negative impact on a prey and a positive
effect by also consuming other predators and competitors of the
prey.26 Removing predators does not necessarily lead to an
increased availability of prey for humans. Rather it leads to
increases or outbursts of previously suppressed species, often
invertebrates (e.g., jellyfish).27 Some of these species are
exploitable, some are not, and some are outright noxious.28
Even more devastating impacts result from fishing tech-
nologies that fail to account for ecosystem processes.29 Though
odd in retrospect, bottom trawling, a process of dragging heavy,
chain-studded gear through the animal communities on the sea
floor, was once believed to have little, or even beneficial, impacts
on the sea bottom that it “ploughed.” Recent research shows that
the plowing analogy is inappropriate, and that if an analogy is
required, it should be that of clear-cutting forests.30 The produc-
tivity of the sea floor organisms, many of which are at the base of
marine food webs, is seriously impacted by bottom trawling, as
is the survival of juvenile fish who feed on them.31 Due to the
extensive coverage of the shelf ecosystems of the world by this
form of fishing, bottom fish throughout the world have tended to
decline faster than open-water fishes.32
AQUACULTURE IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE
TO MANAGING FISHERIES
The biological constraints to fisheries expansion and declin-
ing catches have led to suggestions that aquaculture should be
able to pick up the slack. The impressive reported expansion of
aquaculture is often cited as evidence of the potential of that sec-
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the process now widely known as ‘Fish-
ing marine food webs,’ wherein a fishery, at the onset, targets the larger fish at
the top of marine food webs, then, as these get scarce, targets the smaller
species that often are the food of larger fishes. In the process, ground trawling
eliminates the animal communities at the bottom of the sea, which feed on sus-
pended organisms. Hence, in the last stage of ‘fishing down,’ the waters are
dominated by microbial processes, toxic algal blooms and jellyfish.
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tor to meet the growing demand for fish, or even to “feed the
world.”33
However, modern aquaculture practices are largely unsus-
tainable: they consume natural resources at a very high rate
(fresh water, coastal mangrove forests, fish meal) and, due to
their intensity, these practices are extremely vulnerable to the
pollution and disease outbreaks they induce.34 Thus, shrimp
farms are in many cases fly-by-night operations, leaving devas-
tated coastal habitats and human communities in their wake.35
Additionally, much of what is meant by aquaculture, at least
in Europe, North America, and other parts of the developed
world, consists of feedlot operations in which carnivorous fish
(mainly salmon, but also various sea bass and other species) are
fattened on a diet rich in fish meal and oil. The idea makes com-
mercial sense, as the farmed fish fetch a much higher market
price than the fish ground up for fish meal (even though they
may consist of species that are consumed by humans, such as
herring, sardine or mackerels). The point is that operations of
this type consume much more fish flesh than they produce, and
hence cannot replace fisheries. Indeed, this form of aquaculture
represents another source of




It is clear that a real and
drastic reduction in fishing rates
must occur if fisheries are to
acquire some semblance of sus-
tainability. The required reduc-
tions will have to be strong
enough to reduce fishing efforts
(e.g., number of fishing vessels)
by a factor of three or more in
most areas. This can be best
achieved by phasing out subsidies to the fishing sector, recently
re-estimated at about U.S. $32 billion globally,37 twice the value
of the U.S. $14 to $20 billion estimated by the World Bank38 and
used in World Trade Organization negotiations. The idea of
phasing out subsidies applies particularly to fuel subsidies,
which make up 25 percent of global subsidies, and have, to date,
enabled energy inefficient industrial fleets to remain afloat.39
Also, the global community must take account of the inces-
sant technological innovations in fisheries, which now relies on
Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and detailed bottom maps to
zoom in on residual fish concentrations previously protected by
rough terrain. This technological race, which allows some fishers
to maintain their catches even when the underlying resource base
is depleted, is also, jointly with shifting baselines,40 the reason
why fishers often remain unaware of their impact on the
resources they exploit and object so strongly to scientists’ claims
of scarcity.41
Vessel decommissioning subsidies, which governments pay
fishers to retire their boats, will not be sufficient to reduce the
overcapacity of global fishing fleets.42 Indeed, these subsidies
can have negative effects. Decommissioning subsidies usually
end up providing the collateral that banks require to underwrite
fleet modernizations rather than achieving the intended fleet size
reductions. And, in most cases, it is not the actual vessel that is
retired, but its license. Hence “retired” vessels can still be used
to catch species without quota, i.e., “underutilized resources”
(often the prey of species for which there is a quota), or deployed
along the coast of some developing country.
CONCLUSION
Whatever resemblance of sustainability fisheries might have
had in the past can be contributed to the fisheries not being able
to cover the entire range inhabited by the wildlife species that
were exploited, which thus had natural reserves.43 Re-establish-
ing sustainability in the face of our vast technical capabilities
requires, conversely, that we withdraw from part of the ocean.
There is now strong evidence that such withdrawal, combined
with a strongly limited effort in the remaining fishable areas,
would enable f isheries to rebuild.44 The appropriate size and
location of marine reserves and their combination into networks
may indeed represent the most
profitable venue for fisheries
research in the future — research
that would contribute to the
rebuilding of the ecosystem in
which the fisheries are embed-
ded, rather than slowing down
the decline of an ultimately
failed enterprise.
Practical restoration ecol-
ogy for the oceans should take
place alongside the extraction of
marine resources for human con-
sumption.45 Reconciling these
apparently dissonant goals pro-
vides a major challenge for fish-
eries ecologists, for the public, for management agencies, and
for the fishing industry. There is no reason to expect marine
resources to keep pace with the demand that will result from
growing populations and, hopefully, growing incomes in now
impoverished parts of the world. However, fisheries designed to
be sustainable in a world of scarcity may be quite profitable. If
we act soon, there is still time for restoration to get underway,
while remaining fisheries continue to provide seafood and
wealth for humans.
Endnotes: Unsustainable Marine Fisheries
1 See generally, Daniel Pauly et al., Towards Sustainability in World Fisheries,
418 NATURE 689 (2002) [hereinafter Towards Sustainability].
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. 
3 See generally, Towards Sustainability, supra note 1.
4 See generally, Towards Sustainability, supra note 1.
5 Reg Watson & Daniel Pauly, Systematic Distortions in World Fisheries Catch
It is clear that a real and
drastic reduction in
fishing rates must occur if
fisheries are to acquire
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sustainability.
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I
n June, the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”)
held its 58th Annual Meeting in St. Kitts and Nevis and, for
the first time since its inception in 1946, declared that it
intends to reintroduce “controlled and sustainable” whaling of
certain whale species.1
The 33-32 vote is purely declaratory and does not effect a
change in the IWC’s ban on whaling, which would take a 75 per-
cent vote to overturn.2 However, organizations across the globe
call the vote an indication of a dramatic policy shift demonstrat-
ing an “abdication of responsibility by the global community”
and a sign of IWC evolution from a conservational force to a
“whaling club.”3 The members of the IWC voting to lift the ban
describe the declaration as a normalization in keeping with the
Commission’s original declared purpose.4
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
created the IWC for the underlying purpose of allowing for the
“orderly development of the whaling industry.”5 Recognizing an
international interest in preserving whale stocks, the IWC
decided to take an active role in preventing the over-fishing of
the dwindling populations of the majority of whale species.6
Starting in 1986, this mission took the form of a worldwide
moratorium on commercial whaling, although loopholes allowed
certain numbers of whales to be hunted for cultural purposes by
certain indigenous groups, and unlimited whaling for scientific
research.7
Now, for the first time, a majority vote, with one abstention
(China), has put the IWC in favor of declaring an end to the
moratorium.8 This vote is significant because it marks the first
time in twenty years that more than half of the members of the
IWC have indicated they are in favor of lifting the ban on com-
mercial whaling.9 The reasons cited by the IWC include the
expected rationales that the IWC’s mission statement has always
been to maintain whale levels suitable for sustainable whaling
practices, and the claim that certain species of whale have
reached populations at which whaling may safely resume. How-
ever, the majority also cited new concerns that the recovered
whale populations’ overconsumption of certain types of com-
mercial fish stocks have resulted in a threat to the economies of
ocean states.10
The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) is one of many organi-
zations criticizing the IWC’s new stance. WWF alleges that the
IWC makes unwarranted claims against non-governmental
organizations, exaggerates the recovery of whale species, and
that the scientific basis for claiming that whales significantly
affect commercial fisheries is invalid.11 Other anti-whaling
groups believe that the shift in voting patterns is related to pro-
whaling “vote-buying” (i.e., offering poorer countries financial
aid in return for both joining the IWC and voting to lift the whal-
ing ban).12 Recent polling showing that citizens from small
island nations overwhelmingly disapprove of their country’s
decision to vote to lift the ban on whaling further supports this
allegation.13
Only time will reveal the significance of the IWC’s new
majority position. The vote may act as a wake-up call for the
IWC, encouraging a reevaluation of its values and a shift back
towards favoring whaling bans. Alternatively, this kind of out-
come could be the first in a series strengthening the coalition to
end the commercial whaling moratorium. 
Endnotes:
1 International Whaling Commission, Chair’s Summary Report for the 58th
Annual Meeting, St. Kitts and Nevis, June 2006, available at http://www.iwc
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enerally regarded as a model for regional cooperation in
the area of fisheries, the Commission for the Con-
servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(“CCAMLR”) celebrates its twenty-fifth anniversary this year.
Negotiated by Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty to reg-
ulate harvesting of most marine species in the Southern Ocean,
CCAMLR implements laws based on conservation principles.
One of the central and continuing tasks of CCAMLR is the
ecosystem management of Antarctic krill. 
This article introduces the reader to the importance of
Antarctic krill and the structure of the ecosystem approach as
formulated by CCAMLR. It also explains reasons behind the
need of CCAMLR’s management of Antarctic krill resulting
from a steady increase in krill harvesting, and its potential for
becoming one of the world’s largest fisheries. It also further
delineates the conservation challenges that must be tackled to
ensure the long-lasting health of the Antarctic marine environ-
ment. 
ANTARCTIC KRILL AND THE KRILL FISHERY
ABOUT ANTARCTIC KRILL
“Krill” is a term applied to describe over 80 species of open-
ocean crustaceans known as Euphausiids. Euphausia superba is
the species commonly referred to as “Antarctic krill,” which are
shrimp-like crustaceans subject to significant commercial fish-
ing. Adult krill aggregate into huge schools or swarms, that may
extend for kilometers with thousands of krill packed into each
cubic meter. This swarming behavior is what makes krill attrac-
tive to commercial harvesting.1
Antarctic krill are central to the Antarctic marine food web,
as most organisms are either direct predators of krill or are just
one trophic level removed from it. For many marine mammals
and sea birds, krill are the most abundant food source. Areas of
highest krill concentration are often close to the land-based
breeding colonies of krill-eating birds and seals. These predators
depend on krill being within reach of their colonies in order to
feed and rear their offspring during the Antarctic summer.2
Acoustic surveys have estimated the circumpolar biomass
of Antarctic krill to be from 60 to 155 million tonnes.3 The dis-
tribution of Antarctic krill coincides almost entirely with the
ecological boundaries of the so-called “Southern Ocean,”
extending from the High Antarctic Continental Shelf north as far
as the Antarctic Polar Front Zone. The extended distribution of
the species— approximately 36 million square kilometers— was
behind the designation of the management area for CCAMLR.4
THE ANTARCTIC KRILL FISHERY
Krill is fished mainly as feed for aquaculture. Interest in
krill fisheries was sparked in the 1960s.5 The highest catches
occurred in the early 1980s, reaching over half a million tonnes.
In the early nineties, catches dropped dramatically due to the
break-up of the Soviet Union, which forced this heavily subsi-
dized fleet to cease operations.6 The Antarctic krill fishery has
been relatively stable for the last decade with catches around
100,000 tonnes, but observers note a trend towards expanded
fishing operations.7
The Antarctic krill fishery may become the largest global
fishery. Its size gives it the potential to significantly affect the
trophic structure of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.8 Operating
in the South West Atlantic, this fishery is located almost entirely
within the CCAMLR Area. 
THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH AND CCAMLR
The “ecosystem approach” to fisheries management, and
analogous formulations such as “ecosystem-based manage-
ment,” are subject to increased attention in the literature,9 pro-
grams, and conferences dealing with the use of marine living
resources.10 In spite of the generalized international acceptance
of the need to adopt an ecosystem approach to fisheries manage-
ment, there remains a lack of widely agreed-upon guidelines for
implementation.11
CCAMLR12 is the first international agreement to incorpo-
rate ecosystem and precautionary approaches as basic principles
for the management of marine living resources. Subsequent
treaties have followed the example set by CCAMLR; for exam-
ple, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (“UNFSA”) requires the
assessment of the impact of fishing on non-target and associated
or dependent species and their environment. These are essential
elements of the ecosystem approach. UNFSA also mandates
application of the precautionary approach, which has been iden-
tified as an integral element of the ecosystem approach.13
The key role of krill in the Antarctic ecosystem influenced
the conservation principles embraced by CCAMLR in Article II.
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Specifically, the ecosystem approach stated in Article II, (3)(b)
of the Convention delineates the need to maintain the ecological
relationships between harvested, dependent and related popula-
tions of Antarctic marine living resources, and to restore
depleted populations.
The formulation of the precautionary principle is not explic-
itly reflected in the text of CCAMLR. However, Article II, (3)(c)
embodies a clear requirement for the application of precaution-
ary approaches to management. This provision requires that har-
vesting is conducted in a way that minimizes the “risk of
changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially
reversible over two or three decades, taking into account the state
of available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of har-
vesting, the effect of the introduction of alien species, the effects
of associated activities on the marine ecosystem and of the
effects of environmental changes, with the aim of making possi-
ble the sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living
resources.” 
CCAMLR is recognized as the only regional fisheries body
that routinely carries out a comprehensive application of the
ecosystem approach to fisheries management.14 Overall, the 
specif ic achievements of
CCAMLR’s ecosystem approach
are: (1) the development of a
precautionary approach to the
management of target species;
(2) the collection of data on by-
catch and ecosystem impacts
through the CCAMLR Scheme
of International Observation; (3)
the adoption of effective seabird
by-catch mitigation rules and
other gear restrictions to mini-
mize the ecosystem impacts of
fishing;15 (4) the development of
specific policies to manage new and exploratory fisheries;16 (5)
the establishment of an ecosystem monitoring program; and (6)
the development of a management regime for Antarctic krill that
takes into account the impact of fishing on dependent species. 
REGULATORY GAPS: CCAMLR’S MANAGEMENT
OF ANTARCTIC KRILL
Soon after its entry into force in 1982, CCAMLR faced the
task of translating its conservation principles into specific rules
that could be effectively implemented. The ecosystem approach
has imperative implications for krill management; thus, there is
a need to consider not only krill as target species but also a sub-
set of dependent species, including seabirds and seals, which are
monitored by the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program
(“CEMP”).17 The Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and
Management (“WG-EMM”), a subsidiary body of the Scientific
Committee, takes on all relevant technical work in relation to
krill, and is in charge of developing ecosystem-based manage-
ment procedures.18
While developing models to estimate appropriate levels of
krill harvesting, CCAMLR soon recognized that the Maximum
Sustainable Yield model (“MSY”), commonly used in traditional
fisheries management, was clearly not an appropriate basis for
determining catch levels of krill. The MSY failed to incorporate
interactions between exploited stocks and other species, a cru-
cial element to address the objectives of Article II. Thus, to take
into account the needs of krill-dependent species, CCAMLR
adopted more conservative reference points than the ones com-
monly applied in a single-species fisheries management. These
were integrated into a new Krill Yield Model.19
CATCH LIMITS TO KRILL FISHING
Since 1991, krill catch limits have been adopted in the
Atlantic and Indian Ocean sectors of the Southern Ocean, cover-
ing just over 51 percent of the CCAMLR Area. The current catch
limit for krill in the Atlantic sector of the Southern Ocean, where
the fishery currently operates, is established at four million
tonnes, divided across several subsections.20 These catch limits
are complemented by the provision that, if the total catch in the
Atlantic sector in any fishing season exceeds a “trigger level” of
620,000 tonnes, the limits would be subdivided into smaller
management units following the advice of the Scientific Com-
mittee. The trigger-level is
designed to allow proper man-
agement of krill stocks in antici-
pation of a rapid expansion of
the fishery.21
In 2002, endorsing advice
from the Scientific Committee,
the Commission subdivided the
South West Atlantic into fifteen
small units for the management
of the krill fishery known as
Small-Scale Management Units
(“SSMUs”). The Commission
also directed the Scientific Com-
mittee to consider how the krill
catch limit could be allocated among these SSMUs.22
The majority of krill is harvested in shelf or shelf break
areas. These areas coincide with the foraging grounds used by
land-based predators, like penguins, to obtain food to rear their
offspring. Therefore, until catch limits at the SSMU level are in
place, concern remains about the localized impact within these
subareas on krill populations and, particularly, on land-breeding
predators.  
OTHER CCAMLR MEASURES APPLICABLE
TO KRILL FISHING
Krill fishing is exempt from most monitoring, control, and
surveillance measures that are applicable to other CCAMLR
fisheries despite the central role that krill plays in the ecosystem.
For example, scientific observers are required on board all fish-
ing vessels in the Convention Area, except for krill vessels,
despite calls by CCAMLR’s Scientific Committee to collect data
necessary to develop proper management advice.23
An important regulatory gap with respect to the Antarctic
krill fishery is the absence of required vessel monitoring devices.
Recent developments in
the krill fishery and
markets indicate that
expansion of this industry
might be about to occur.
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CCAMLR requires flag States to monitor the position of their
fishing vessels licensed to fish in the Convention Area through
an automated satellite-linked Vessel Monitoring System
(“VMS”).24 This requirement is applicable to all CCAMLR fish-
ing vessels except for krill.25 The fact that krill vessels are not
subject to VMS makes this fishery poorly regulated and difficult
to monitor.
CONSERVATION CHALLENGES
A FISHERY IN EXPANSION
Recent developments in the krill fishery and markets indi-
cate that expansion of this industry might be about to occur.26
The main driving factor of this expansion is the increasing
demand for krill products, particularly for aquaculture feeds.27
As “conventional” supplies of fishmeal and fish oil become
scarce, alternatives need to be found. Krill demand as aquacul-
ture feed, especially for farmed salmon, is likely to enlarge due
to its excellent value as a nutrient source. Krill have outstanding
properties as feed such as a desirable protein and energy content,
essential amino acids, natural pigment, and palatability. In addi-
tion, an interest in developing pharmaceutical products from
krill has been observed, which may contribute to the profitability
of the fishery.28
New technology also cre-
ates an expectation of increased
krill fishing. The Norwegian
aquafeed and fishing industry is
leading developments in relation
to krill. The business strategy of
Norwegian operators is based on
the use of modern harvesting
technologies, including the
catching and simultaneous on-
board processing of krill. This
avoids rapid deterioration of krill, one of the main factors that
has limited the economic feasibility of fishing operations in the
past. With the use of this technology, catch projections are
increased up to 120,000 tonnes per year per vessel.29
ECOLOGICAL CONCERNS
CCAMLR Conservation Measures for Antarctic krill cur-
rently cannot ensure that krill fishing does not negatively affect
the Antarctic marine food web. Although current krill fishing
levels are still below established catch limits, these limits are set
for large areas of the ocean and do not take into account the eco-
logical relationships between krill, dependent species, and fish-
ing operations, which occur at much smaller scales.30
The current fishery for krill coincides almost entirely within
foraging ranges of land-based predators, causing potential direct
competition for krill between fishing vessels and krill predators.
CCAMLR scientists have acknowledged that the potential for
localized effects of the krill fishery on predators is great unless
harvest controls are established for smaller areas and not just for
large harvesting units, as is currently the case.31
Additional concerns for management include long-term
environmental factors like global warming, which could have
significant effects on krill stocks.32 The Scientific Committee
has acknowledged difficulties in determining whether changes in
the ecosystem are caused by fishing operations or by environ-
mental factors.33
Since the establishment of SSMUs in 2002, the WG-EMM
has been considering how the current catch limit for the South
West Atlantic should be further subdivided. Options currently
being assessed take into account different factors such as histor-
ical catches, estimated biomass, estimated predator demand, and
the relationship between the spatial distribution of krill and
predator demand in the different areas.34 The WG-EMM is in the
process of developing performance measures for the various ele-
ments involved (krill, predators, and fishery), as well as simula-
tion models, to determine how well these options would meet
CCAMLR’s objectives.35
An important consideration is that all proposed procedures
to establish localized catch limits under discussion are affected
by uncertainties, which need to be adequately addressed on a
precautionary basis. In addition, all decisions would have little
impact on fishing operations as long as current catch levels
remain constant. However, as the fishing effort increases, a
trade-off will need to be found between options that are precau-
tionary, but more likely to displace the fishery, and those that do
not displace the fishery, but are
more likely to cause disruptions
in the ecosystem.36 For this rea-
son, it is important that the ade-
quate management procedures
are in place before the fishery
expands. The CCAMLR experi-
ence has shown that reaching
consensus to make difficult
adjustments only after the need
becomes apparent presents a
major problem.37 Overall, CCAMLR needs to ensure that the
fishery does not grow faster than its capacity to manage it.38
CONCLUSION
CCAMLR has been a pioneer in establishing an ecosystem-
based approach to the use of marine resources. The development
of the krill fishery will present CCAMLR’s ecosystem approach
its real test, offering the Convention an opportunity to become a
21st century model for fisheries management. To meet this chal-
lenge, CCAMLR needs to translate its basic conservation princi-
ples into flexible, effective management procedures that ensure
the long-lasting health of the Antarctic marine environment and
the species that reside therein. It must establish a management
procedure that: (1) follows criteria for catch limit allocations that
account for the needs of krill-dependent predators in each
SSMU; (2) incorporates uncertainties on the basis of precaution;
and (3) allows for further revisions in the light of new informa-
tion. In the meantime, the fishery needs to be properly monitored
and controlled, especially through the collection of scientific
observation data.
Endnotes: CCAMLR and Antarctic Krill on page 80
The Antarctic krill fishery
may become the largest
global fishery.
17 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
INTRODUCTION
M
arine and coastal biodiversity was an early priority for
the work of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(“CBD”). The 1995 Jakarta Mandate reflected this
priority as a Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the
Convention on Biological Diversity referred to as a new global
consensus on the importance of marine and coastal biodiversity.
Further, in 1998, a program of work on marine and coastal bio-
logical diversity was adopted to assist the implementation of the
Jakarta Mandate on national, regional, and global levels. 
The adoption of the Jakarta Mandate and the CBD program
of work on marine and coastal biological diversity represented a
major development in international policy relating to oceans and
coasts. The Mandate and the program of work both explicitly
recognize the importance of biodiversity in marine and coastal
areas. In addition, the program of work puts in place a number of
agreed-upon priority actions towards conservation and sustain-
able use. In the years following the adoption of the program of
work, the CBD Conference of the Parties (“COP”), the decision-
making body of the Convention, made additional policy deci-
sions relating to issues such as coral bleaching, mariculture,
integrated marine and coastal area management, and biodiver-
sity in marine areas both within and beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. The latter topic has been a focus of much work and
controversy in the intersessional period between the seventh and
eighth meetings of the COP.
Of particular note was the adoption at the seventh meeting
of the COP of a marine and coastal biodiversity management
framework that took into account both the ecosystem approach
and the precautionary approach.1 This framework incorporated,
in the context of integrated marine and coastal area manage-
ment, two types of marine and coastal protected areas. The first
type is an area allowing sustainable uses, and the second is an
area excluding extractive uses. The framework and associated
policy language about the role of marine and coastal protected
areas (“MCPAs”) as one of the essential tools and approaches in
the conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal bio-
diversity, cemented the role of MCPAs as a central instrument in
the national implementation of the CBD.
While all of these developments add up to a substantial and
forward-looking policy on the conservation and sustainable use
of marine and coastal biodiversity resources, the CBD has been
less successful in bridging the gap between policy and imple-
mentation. Programs and projects initiated either directly or
indirectly as a result of the CBD and with the support of various
funding agencies include numerous initiatives such as coastal
management programs, MCPA development, and proposals
relating to invasive species. However, such initiatives, though
they may have resulted in local success stories, have not done
enough to decrease biodiversity losses either globally or region-
ally. 
This article looks at the incorporation of outcome-oriented
targets into the CBD and its work programs as an attempt to
move from policy to implementation. The article focuses on tar-
gets relevant to oceans and coasts, and in particular those targets
pertaining to marine protected areas and associated measures.
The history of target development, some of the controversies
involved in the process, and how targets have been incorporated
into national-level implementation of the CBD will be exam-
ined. Finally, whether the targets will be reached, and how much
it matters if they are not reached, will be speculated.
INCORPORATING TARGETS INTO THE CBD
BACKGROUND
In a move to focus on real-world outcomes rather than ongo-
ing policy development, in 2002, the CBD COP adopted a
Strategic Plan for the Convention, containing an ambitious target
“to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of
biodiversity loss at the global, regional, and national level as a
contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on
earth.”2 This target, which became known as the “2010 target,”
has become a central driving force behind many of the actions
— national, regional and international — taken in recent years to
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implement the CBD. The World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment endorsed the target, further bolstering its international
significance.3
In adopting the 2010 target, the CBD became part of a
growing international trend of target-setting. Whether an indica-
tion of frustration over increasing worldwide environmental
degradation, or a recognition that the policy-measures of old
were simply not working, targets have increasingly found their
way into international policy. Among the most important global
environmental targets are those found in the Johannesburg Plan
of Implementation4 and the United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals.5 In the context of these global targets, many
regional conventions and programs have either adopted, or are in
the process of developing their own targets.
In the years since 2002, the admittedly rather vague 2010
target produced a number of more specific sub-targets relating to
given biomes and CBD work programs, including that on marine
and coastal biodiversity. The proliferation of targets raised fears
amongst many countries that no one would be able to keep up
with all of them. To make the various biome-specific targets
more manageable, the seventh meeting of the COP adopted a
common framework with an aim
“to enhance the evaluation of
achievements and progress in
the implementation of the
Strategic Plan and its 2010 Bio-
diversity Target.”6 The frame-
work consists of seven focal
areas under which goals and
sub-targets would be developed,
and which would collectively
contribute to reaching the 2010
target.7 For each of the seven
focal areas, the COP identified
goals, sub-targets, and indicators. Thus, the targets for all pro-
grams of work, including the one on marine and coastal biodi-
versity, now contain goals and sub-targets corresponding to this
framework. The focal areas were as follows:
1. Reducing the rate of loss of the components of biodiver-
sity, including: (i) biomes, habitats and ecosystems; (ii)
species and populations; and (iii) genetic diversity;
2. Promoting sustainable use of biodiversity;
3. Addressing the major threats to biodiversity, including
those arising from invasive alien species, climate change,
pollution, and habitat change;
4. Maintaining ecosystem integrity and the provision of
goods and services provided by biodiversity in ecosys-
tems, in support of human well-being;
5. Protecting traditional knowledge, innovations and prac-
tices;
6. Ensuring the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
out of the use of genetic resources; and
7. Mobilizing financial and technical resources, especially
for developing countries, in particular the least developed
countries and small island developing states among them,
and countries with economies in transition, for implement-
ing the Convention and the Strategic Plan.8
SOME ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES
The COP 7 target-setting has resulted in controversies that
highlight scientific and political problems relating to the adop-
tion of common global targets. In the realm of marine and
coastal biodiversity, the issues at the center of controversy
include the appropriateness of defining specific percentage tar-
gets for area-based protection, the explicit mention of marine
protected areas as tools for managing biodiversity and fisheries,
and the need to protect biodiversity in marine areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
The lengthy deliberations on targets for the program of
work on marine and coastal biodiversity took place at the tenth
meeting of the CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical,
and Technological Advice (“SBSTTA”) in Bangkok, Thailand,
February 7–11, 2005. Prior to being put in front of SBSTTA, the
proposed marine and coastal targets had gone through a process
of development by an expert group and a scientif ic peer
review process. At this point the proposed targets also contained
short technical rationales that expanded on the aims and signifi-
cance of the particular target,
and priority actions that could be
undertaken to reach it.9
Under the goal to promote
the conservation of the biologi-
cal diversity of ecosystems,
habitats, and biomes, the most
controversial target related to
marine and coastal biodiversity
was target 1.1. This target reads
as follows: “at least ten percent
of each of the world’s marine
and costal ecological regions
effectively conserved.” Two main issues arose: first, whether ten
percent was the appropriate percentage for which to aim by the
year 2010; and second, whether by including a percentage figure
the target was advocating an inappropriate, one-size-fits all solu-
tion to marine conservation.
On the first point, involved countries saw the ten percent fig-
ure as a policy target rather than one grounded upon scientific
information. Many countries also recognized that protecting ten
percent of marine and coastal ecological regions worldwide
might not, in all cases, be enough for achieving a significant
reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss. Much would
depend on how the countries managed the other ninety percent
of the marine and coastal environment and the life history char-
acteristics of the species to be protected within the different eco-
logical regions. 
Involved parties also disagreed over the meaning of the
words “effective conservation,” and to what areas of the ocean
the target referred. Some countries wanted explicit reference in
the target to marine areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. Others opposed any such reference and preferred to strictly
limit the target’s scope to national waters. Some countries also
The CBD has been less
successful in bridging the
gap between policy and
implementation.
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favored explicit reference in the target to marine protected areas,
including marine protected areas prohibiting extractive activi-
ties. Others favored the broader interpretation developed by the
expert group, which defined effective conservation as “area-
based measures, for example marine protected areas and other
means of protection, for which management plans exist.” That
definition recognized the role of measures such as integrated
oceans and coastal management and fisheries management that
do not necessarily include marine protected areas. The debate
over definitions reflects the unease in some countries about the
role of the CBD in the conservation and sustainable use of biodi-
versity in marine areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
as well as the role of marine protected areas as fisheries manage-
ment tools.
On the second point, concerning the appropriateness of
assigning a universally applied percentage figure for the target, a
number of countries opposed including any percentage figure.
These countries argued that adopting a universal flat percentage
would be too simplistic. The figure would not be appropriate for
all circumstances, and might conflict with the strong, scientifi-
cally-based approach of decisions VII/5 (on marine and coastal
biological diversity) and VII/28 (on protected areas).10 Some sci-
entific literature brings up similar concerns, recommending the
adaptive application of a mix of marine resource management
tools depending on the conditions that warrant them.11
In the end, SBSTTA adopted target 1.1 with the ten percent
figure included, but without explicit reference to marine pro-
tected areas, or to marine areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.12 The eighth meeting of the COP subsequently
adopted the target, unchanged, in March 2006.13 Most countries
originally opposed to the flat percentage target noted that it still
allows sufficient flexibility to apply the targets according to
national priorities and frameworks. After all, all COP decisions
relating to the global 2010 target framework contained the fol-
lowing language:
Emphasizes that the goals and targets… should be viewed
as a flexible framework within which national and/or
regional targets may be developed, according to national
priorities and capacities, and taking into account differ-
ences in diversity between countries.14
Additionally polarizing the debate were references to
destructive practices such as bottom trawling as the main threat
to seamounts and fragile, slow-growing, cold-water coral reefs
in the technical rationales of targets 1.1 and 1.2.15 Some dele-
gates opposed any reference to bottom trawling, while others
insisted that such references be included. Because the disagree-
ment could not be solved in the time available, SBSTTA was
unable to agree on specific technical rationales for the targets. In
the end, the targets were adopted without the annexed rationales
and the COP subsequently endorsed the integration of the targets
into the work program on marine and coastal biodiversity.16 This
move avoided debate on the bottom trawling issue in the context
of the 2010 targets, but the debate is sure to continue elsewhere,
both within the CBD and other international fora, until a solu-
tion can be found that will prevent damage from this activity to
sensitive seabed habitats, such as cold-water coral reefs.
THE NATIONAL RESPONSE TO TARGETS
Results of the CBD Third National Reports indicate that
countries are taking the 2010 targets seriously. Of the 77 coun-
tries that submitted their Third National Reports by September
2006, 77 percent set specific national targets in response to tar-
get 1.1, while eighteen percent of the responding countries
adopted the global target as is. Apparently, only a small minority
of countries have not adopted any national targets relating to
conservation of biomes and ecosystems. Important to note, how-
ever, is that these targets relate to all biomes, and are not exclu-
sive to the marine environment.
The figures are somewhat lower in relation to marine and
coastal environments, with 59 percent of coastal countries hav-
ing adopted a national target in response to target 1.1. This figure
is still quite high, considering that the COP only adopted the tar-
gets relating to the marine and coastal program of work in March
2006 (although, implicitly marine areas are included in the
framework of targets adopted in 2004 as part of decision VII/30).
Only a handful of the national targets adopted by participat-
ing countries were quantitative in nature. Some targets refer to a
specific percentage (ranging from over thirty percent to ten per-
cent) of area to be protected, others use hectares or square kilo-
meters as target figures, while yet others relate to the number of
new marine protected areas to be established by 2010. Of special
note is the Micronesia Challenge, announced at the eighth meet-
ing of the COP, which aims to effectively conserve thirty percent
of near shore marine resources and twenty percent of forest
resources by 2020 in Micronesian countries (Palau, Federated
States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands, and the U.S. territo-
ries of Guam and Northern Mariana Islands).17 A majority of
countries have set more qualitative targets in response to target
1.1, which include, for example, increasing protection for cer-
tain ecosystem types, putting in place a network of marine pro-
tected areas, or restoring good ecological quality in a given area.
Marine protective areas emerged as one of the major tools
for implementing the CBD and for reaching the 2010 targets
despite the controversy that surrounded discussions related to
marine protected areas at various international fora. According
to the CBD third National Reports, 93 percent of responding
coastal countries have declared and gazetted marine and coastal
protected areas. Thirty-eight percent of the responding coastal
countries have implemented a system or network, and most of
the others have a system or network under development.18 Addi-
tionally, 95 percent of costal countries’ biodiversity strategies
and action plans include developing new marine and coastal pro-
tected areas.19
Despite the efforts of coastal countries, there is still signifi-
cant room for improvement. Only sixty percent of the respond-
ing coastal countries’ MCPAs have established effective
management, enforcement, and monitoring. Sustainable man-
agement practices over the wider marine and coastal environ-
ment surround the national system of MCPAs in only 43 percent
of cases. 
Nevertheless, all these activities have resulted in a global
increase in marine protected areas. At the present time approxi-
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mately 4600 MPAs operate to cover an estimated 2.2 million
km2, or 0.6 percent of the world’s oceans and six percent of terri-
torial seas. Since the 1970s, MPA area has rapidly grown at an
annual rate of growth in the order of 4.5 percent. However, the
current rate of growth is not yet enough to reach the ten percent
target for all areas under national jurisdiction globally.20 The pic-
ture may look more optimistic if it included broader, area-based
protection measures other than MPAs, in the calculations.
Unfortunately, no data has been collected regarding the extent of
other area-based measures.
Whether the target-adoption actions taken by participating
countries will have the desired effect on biodiversity remains to
be seen. At the present time, the seventh meeting of the COP has
adopted a set of indicators to globally monitor the state of biodi-
versity,21 in conjunction with periodic assessments such as the
Global Environment Outlook. Currently, no comprehensive
assessment focuses solely on the state of marine environment,
although the planned regular process for the global reporting and
assessment of the state of the marine environment, including
socio-economic aspects originally called for by the General
Assembly,22 may one day fill this gap.
CONCLUSION
With only four years to go, it seems likely that the 2010 tar-
gets may not be reached globally, though they may be achieved
in part in some locations. According to the Millennium Ecosys-
tem Assessment, reaching the 2010 targets would require
unprecedented efforts, as current trends show no slowdown of
biodiversity loss, and experts expect direct drivers of biodiver-
sity loss to either increase or stay constant. With appropriate
response measures, however, it is possible to reduce the rate of
biodiversity loss for certain components of biodiversity and in
certain areas by the year 2010.23
Perhaps reaching the 2010 target may not matter so much if
the target inspires efforts to put in place a program for change
that includes specific actions that will carry on in the future. The
2010 target has already raised the level of scientific input to the
CBD, particularly in the context of developing indicators to
assess progress towards the target. The target has also served to
focus attention on the importance of biodiversity to human well-
being, and the increased use of tools such as marine protected
areas that demonstrably reduce biodiversity loss.
Failing to reach the targets may have negative side effects as
well and a large-scale failure to reach the targets may result in
disillusionment and target fatigue. Regardless, it is almost cer-
tain that the CBD will adopt new targets following the 2010 tar-
get, and that the present targets have served at least some
purpose in focusing attention on biodiversity, and in moving the
focus of the CBD increasingly from policy to implementation.
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I
n September 2004, Chevron Corporation announced the dis-
covery of a large oil field located off of the coast of
Louisiana.1 What is unique about this discovery is that the
well was drilled at a depth of 28,175 feet, breaking a new depth
record2 and signaling that advances in technology likely will
allow for future drilling at even greater depths.3
The environmental risks associated with conventional off-
shore drilling projects are well-
documented. The exploratory
phase of the process runs the
risk of underwater explosions,4
and utilizes sound waves that
may adversely affect whale pop-
ulations.5 The drilling projects
themselves contaminate the sur-
rounding areas with toxic chem-
icals and byproduct waste.6 The
vital question is will drilling
even deeper, and more often,
amplify these impacts?
Concerns regarding expand-
ed offshore oil production also
involve geopolitics. In July 2006, a major oil discovery in Cuban
waters sparked Congressional debate over ending the embargo
of the small island nation (or at least creating an exception for
energy companies).7 The oil discovery in Cuban waters compli-
cates the legal battles over drilling off of the coast of Florida
because of the possible scenario where U.S. companies who are
barred from drilling are replaced by international groups drilling
under Cuban leases, with potentially lower environmental stan-
1 Press Release, Chevron, Chevron Announces Record Setting Test Well (Sept. 5,
2006), http://www.chevron.com/news/press/2006/2006-09-05.asp (last visited
Sept. 24, 2006). 
2 Chevron, id.
3 See Offshore Oil Exploration: Energy From the Depths, STAR TRIBUNE, Sept.
11, 2006, available at http://www.startribune.com/535/story/670323.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2006).
4 Editorial, Where We Stand: Observe Moratorium on Offshore Drilling, VIR-
GINIAN PILOT, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/
story.cfm?story=102478&ran=104305 (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
5 See generally US Department of the Interior, Possible Effects of OC Oil and
Gas Activities on the California Grey Whale, available at
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http://www.mms.gov/omm/pacific/enviro/graywhale.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2006); see also VIRGINIAN-PILOT, supra note 4.
6 Sierra Club, Offshore Drilling is Messy Business, http://www.sierraclub.org/
wildlands/coasts/factsheets/2006-07_hurricanepollution.pdf#search=%22off-
shore%20drilling%20is%20messy%20business%22 (last visited Sept. 24,
2006).
7 See MSNBC, Cuban Oil Renews Embargo Debate (July 29, 2006), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14095881/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
8 See BBC News, Cuban Oil Prospects Cloud US Horizon (Sept. 11, 2006),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321594.stm (last visited Sept.
24, 2006).
Endnotes:
dards.8 The proximity of the Cuban wells to U.S. waters guaran-
tees that any environmental impact will be shared between the
two countries, and the political reality ensures that the two
nations likely will fail to work together to ensure environmental
protection in the region.
Regardless of the political or environmental impacts, the
Gulf of Mexico and its vicinity has captured the attention of U.S.
domestic oil producers. While
technology can enhance our
ability to recover oil at greater
depths, legal mechanisms need
to ensure that our ability to pre-
vent harm to the marine environ-
ment is enhanced proportional
to those advancements. The
envi ronmenta l  impact  of
increasing oil production in a
region plagued by frequent hur-
ricanes and political animosity
through methods with uncertain
environmental effects leaves
many unanswered questions.
Nevertheless, the political and economic needs of modern soci-
ety ensure that increased drilling is certain to occur.
Legal mechanisms need 
to ensure that our ability






here is now virtually universal recognition that the earth
is getting warmer and climate change is happening. In the
last 150 years we have seen a rise in atmospheric concen-
trations of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) by nearly a half.1 Although
the international community has made some attempts to reduce
emissions of CO2, it is increasingly clear that binding targets set
for 2010 under the Kyoto Protocol will not be achieved by a sig-
nificant number of parties. 
The situation is escalating in seriousness. Scientists have
also calculated that the parts per million (“ppm”) targets limiting
CO2 levels, originally considered sufficient for stabilization by
2050, could now be dangerously high and we would have to sig-
nificantly reduce our emissions beyond existing target levels in
order to limit average global temperature increases. It seems we
currently have little alternative
to continuing to burn fossil fuels
for a number of decades. This,
coupled with the enormous
growth of the economies of
China and India, has led many
Governments to believe that




method of reducing CO2 emis-
sions to the atmosphere is to
capture and store the emissions
in another domain — this
process is known as carbon cap-
ture and storage (“CCS”). CCS is also sometimes known as car-
bon sequestration, although this should not be confused with
biological carbon sequestration, where CO2 that has been
already emitted into the atmosphere is taken up in forests or
soils. CCS involves the capture of CO2 from large industrial
point sources, such as power plants, which account for a high
percentage of CO2 emissions. In basic terms, a giant vacuum
cleaner sucks up the emissions before they are released into the
atmosphere. It is estimated that fitting a power plant with CCS
technology could reduce CO2 emissions by around 85 percent. 
Once captured, the CO2 is transported and stored in either
offshore or onshore sources. Onshore CCS, in sites such as aban-
doned mines, has not been championed to the same extent as off-
shore CCS. For many countries, the infrastructure for onshore
CCS is not in place, and for countries with smaller land masses,
CCS storage sites could be in close proximity to residential
areas. Although CO2 is considered by many to be a safe gas, and
one that we come across most days in products such as carbon-
ated drinks, this could prove controversial.
Offshore disposal, where CO2 is stored directly in the seas, is
also no longer seen as a politically acceptable or favored method
of disposal by the majority. Under CCS projects, CO2 will be
transported to the oceans and artificially piped or injected into
large geological formations under the seabed, such as depleted oil
and gas traps. These projects have already demonstrated their abil-
ity to store fluids over a period of time. Other storage options
include reservoirs or deep saline aquifers under the seas. 
After the CO2 is piped or injected into sub-seabed geologi-
cal formations, the exits are sealed so that the CO2 cannot
escape, allowing it to be stored for long periods of time. For CO2
storage to be an effective way of avoiding climate change, the
CO2 must be stored for hundreds of years so it can bridge the gap
from the use of fossil fuels to the
transition to a hydrogen econ-




CCS in marine waters is
being strongly considered by
national governments and inter-
national bodies. Bodies such as
the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change and the Interna-
tional Energy Agency recently
examined both the feasibility
and potential barriers to using
CCS. These bodies concluded that there remains much ambigu-
ity as to how the legal principles, currently in place under exist-
ing international legislation, will apply to the storage of CO2.2
CCS is a relatively new concept and it does not fall easily
within the remit of international legislation, as such laws were
obviously not designed with this is mind. This paper will firstly
consider the driving factors behind CCS. It will then set out the
potential impacts of existing marine laws and set these in the
context of fast moving international discussions over taking
CCS forward, and possible amendments to marine conventions.
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE UNDER THE SEA
by Ray Purdy*
Whether CCS can be part
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DRIVING FACTORS BEHIND CCS 
There are a number of factors driving CCS. CO2 can be eco-
nomically useful if it is pumped at high pressure into oil/gas
fields to enable recovery of significant amounts of oil/gas that
are not recoverable through primary methods. The CO2 used in
such enhanced oil/gas recovery operations, such as the Sleipner
field in Norway, remains stored in the field. CCS also offers
some potentially attractive commercial benefits to industry
through potential linkages with emissions trading schemes.
However, what appears to be the main driver for CCS is interna-
tional climate change legislation and its potential to enable gov-
ernments to meet their climate targets.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), adopted in 1997, pro-
vides binding quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments. Under the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into
force in 2005, developed countries agreed to reduce their emis-
sions to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels over the period
2008–2012. Kyoto compliance is monitored by registries and
annual inventory reports, and these tracked amounts reveal that
many of the largest countries are failing to meet their targets. 
Canada and Japan’s projections show that they are both over
500 million tons (“MT”) of CO2 away from reaching their 2010
targets. If the United States was still a party to Kyoto, then it
would be approximately 2,500 MT away from reaching its target.
The European Union is also projected to narrowly miss its tar-
gets. Only Russia and Poland are expected to comfortably
achieve theirs, and this is only because of a period of economic
instability.3
Missing Kyoto targets undoubtedly increases the threat of
global warming. This problem is compounded because it was
thought for many years in international negotiations that what
was required for stabilization was limiting CO2 levels to 550 ppm
by 2050. Global emissions of CO2 currently stand at around
around 27 gigatonnes (“Gt”) a year, and will reach 44 Gt a year
by 2050 if CO2 levels are limited to 550 ppm. Many scientists
now argue that even this level of CO2 could be dangerously high.
The latest evidence suggests that atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions would need to stay at least below 450 ppm (an increase of
18.3 Gt a year by 2050), in order to limit average global tempera-
ture increases to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.4
CCS was first considered as a mitigation tool for developed5
countries who were worried that a rapid move away from fossil
fuels would cause serious disruption to their economies, but still
had binding targets to meet under Kyoto. It is now clear (see
Table 1), that although emissions in developed countries, such as
the United States, will have to be drastically kept in check, con-
sumption in developing countries will have the greatest impact
on global atmospheric CO2 levels, and these could eclipse any
further reductions made by the European Union and other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) countries.
Increases to developing countries’ emissions are primarily
because China and India have around a quarter of the world’s
coal reserves,7 and intend to support their rapid economic devel-
opment by building vast new fleets of new coal-fired plants.
China is currently installing one gigawatt of coal-powered gen-
eration a week and forecasts predict that by 2030, coal-fired
power in India and China will add 3000 million extra tons of
CO2 to the atmosphere every year.8 There is also evidence of
growing economic expansion in other countries such as Brazil. 
The emissions of developing countries need to be kept in
check, with the support of developed countries. Developed
countries have the double-edged sword of not wanting to be seen
to blame the developing countries for trying to catch up in the
industrial and competitive stakes, but at the same time providing
assistance and incentives to react to the potentially catastrophic
problems caused by such massive increases in their emissions. 
Whether CCS can be part of the Clean Development Mech-
anism (“CDM”) under the Kyoto Protocol will become increas-
ingly important. The CDM allows industrialized countries to
purchase project-based emission reduction units from develop-
ing countries. The G-77 (made up of 77 developing countries)
has long been opposed to the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, with
Brazil being the most vocal in its opposition. Developed coun-
tries are currently pressing ahead for its inclusion and this will
again be on the agenda at the next meeting of the parties to the
UNFCCC in Nairobi in November 2006. 
Gt CO2 1990 2003 2010 2020 2030
World 20.076 24.128 27.698 32.518 36.868
OECD 11.026 12.776 13.794 14.824 15.341
Developing 5.319 8.815 11.063 14.525 18.113
Countries
Table 1: Projected Global Emissions.6
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At the current time it is still unclear whether the UNFCCC/
Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries to implement CCS
projects. Whilst any projects that reduce greenhouse gases at
source can be counted as an emission reduction, and this could
include CCS, there is nothing in the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol
that expressly prohibits or allows for CCS storage in geological
formations under the sea. There are also genuine concerns about
the potential for seepage from storage sites, and this complicates
issuing credits for CCS projects. Either a separate mechanism
for CCS may have to be introduced under the Convention, or at
the very least, inventories and accounting of greenhouse gas
reductions will need to be developed and approved by contract-
ing parties to the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. 
MARINE LAWS AND CCS
A number of international marine laws are relevant to CO2
storage under the seas. This includes the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which regulates all
aspects of the use and protection of the sea. UNCLOS does not
specifically control dumping or prohibit CO2 storage offshore,
but requires states to take indi-
vidually, or jointly, all measures
necessary to prevent, reduce, or
control pollution of the marine
environment.9
UNCLOS is a framework
law, leaving the elaboration of
precise rules to be made in other
more specific laws. The London
Convention and its 1996 Proto-
col are the global laws that con-
trol and regulate the deliberate
disposal of wastes at sea. The
1996 Protocol, which came into
force in 2006, goes beyond the
provisions of its predecessor and
aims to provide greater protec-
tion for the marine environment. Whereas the London Conven-
tion aims to regulate dumping, the Protocol seeks to prevent,
reduce, and where practicable eliminate pollution, and adopts a
precautionary approach as a general obligation. 
Parties to both the London Convention and the 1996 Proto-
col are encouraged to create regional agreements that further
their objectives. There are many regional agreements around the
globe, which provide for protection of the marine environment
in particular jurisdictions.10
Whilst these marine conventions envisage compliance with
other more specific or regional conventions, and indeed operate
together in strengthening environmental protection, states are
only bound to follow the conventions that they ratify or accede.
All of the above international marine conventions have entered
into force: UNCLOS with 149 parties; the London Convention
with 82 parties; and the 1996 Protocol with 27 parties.11 In prac-
tice, if a party is signed up to more than one marine convention,
(e.g., the UK is a party to all of the marine conventions) and
there is overlap, a state would need to apply the standard of the
most specific and stringent treaty. This article will examine the
London Convention and its 1996 Protocol.
THE LONDON CONVENTION AND
ITS 1996 PROTOCOL
There are four important considerations in determining the
legality of CO2 dumping/storage under the London Convention
and 1996 Protocol. The first consideration is whether geological
formations under the sea fall under the Convention’s jurisdic-
tion. The London Convention seeks only to control dumping at
“sea” and would probably not cover CO2 storage. The Protocol
goes beyond the scope of the Convention and applies to dumping
in the “sea, seabed and subsoil.” 
LEGALITY OF CO2 STORAGE
It is arguable whether CO2 storage may be prohibited under
the Protocol, and this turns upon the definitions of “seabed” and
“subsoil” and how far down they go. One interpretation is that
the subsoil is just a layer of rock immediately under the seabed,
whereas another interpretation, and one this author would favor,
is that the Protocol was drafted to cover all areas below the sea
column.12
The next consideration is
whether CO2 can be considered
to be a waste. The London Con-
vention prohibits the disposal of
all wastes specified in Annex I.
CO2 is not specifically referred
to in any of the lists that are pro-
hibited for disposal in Annex I,
but will probably fall under the
“industrial waste” category in
the Annex if it can be shown that
it derived from a manufacturing
or processing operation. The
Protocol is simpler as it places a
general prohibition upon the
dumping of wastes, with the exception of those wastes or matter
to be found listed in Annex I. It is most unlikely that CO2 will
fall within the categories approved for dumping in Annex I. It is
therefore suggested that as CO2 would fall within the definition
of waste under the Convention and Protocol and, as a result,
dumping it would be prohibited. The definition of “dumping” in
both conventions also refers to “wastes or other matter,” so tech-
nically this could also be sufficiently broad enough to include
CO2.
The third consideration is the method of actual disposal.
The Convention and the Protocol both define “dumping” to be
“any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”
Therefore, the Convention and Protocol only apply to activities
using ships or platforms to dispose CO2 into the marine environ-
ment and there are no controls governing pipeline discharges
direct from land based sources. This can be supported further by
a provision in the Protocol stating that its remit does not extend
to sub-seabed repositories accessed only from land. It is there-
The problem remains that
the majority of the world’s
commercial energy needs
are met by fossil fuels and
we are no closer to the end
of the fossil fuel era.
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fore suggested that the transportation of CO2, by pipeline, from
land-based courses direct to sub-sea repositories, will not fall
foul of these Conventions.
The fourth consideration is whether there are any excep-
tions within the Conventions, which may also provide a basis for
the storage of CO2. Both of the Conventions exclude from the
definition of “dumping” the disposal or storage of wastes or
other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration,
exploitation, and associated off-shore processing of seabed min-
eral resources. This would suggest that where CO2 ends up in
storage, following enhanced oil/gas recovery operations, this is
permissible under the Convention and Protocol.
The second possible exception is that both Conventions
exclude from the definition of “dumping” the “placement of
matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal.” It could be
argued that the CO2 is not in fact disposed of, but temporarily
placed until the climate situation
is bought under control. It is
unclear what “placement” is
intended to constitute or what is
its scope, but one could guess it
is intended to cover things such
as the placement of artificial
reefs.13 On balance, it seems
unlikely that one can succeed in
arguing that the CO2 will be
temporarily stored rather than
disposed of, particularly as it
could gradually leak from the
storage site and there are no
plans to recover it later.
CHANGING THE LAW
Contracting Parties to the
London Convention and Proto-
col have recently been dis-
cussing the legal implications of
CO2 storage. A questionnaire
asking Parties for their legal
opinions to a number of ques-
tions was circulated by the Secretariat in 2004. The results of this
questionnaire were discussed at the 27th Meeting of the Parties
in October 2005. There was no agreement amongst parties as to
whether the Convention or the Protocol were compatible with
CCS activities, apart from in some instances that CCS may be
allowed (in enhanced oil and gas recovery for example). It was
agreed that it may be expedient to either reach agreements on the
interpretation of the Protocol and Convention or consider mak-
ing amendments to the legislation.
An Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working Group
on CO2 Sequestration was established to develop and clarify the
legal issues. This was with a view to facilitating and/or regulat-
ing CCS, and, if appropriate, drafting potential amendment
options to the Protocol or Convention.14 The Scientific Technical
Group to the Conventions was also instructed to make an assess-
ment of the potential risks to the marine environment.15
After the legal and technical working groups met in April
2006, it became clear that the Protocol would be amended in the
first instance. Australia put forward a proposal, co-sponsored by
France, Norway, and the UK, recommending an amendment to
Annex I of the Protocol, thus bringing the regulation of CO2 into
line with the regulation of other substances eligible for dumping
or storage. The proposal would allow for carbon dioxide streams
from CCS consisting “overwhelmingly of CO2” to be stored in
geological formations.16
An amendment to the Annex was pursued because it is eas-
ier to change an Annex rather than a main text of the Conven-
tion. It would have also been considered easier to amend the
Protocol in the first instance as it has less contracting parties.
The next meeting of the Contracting Parties (the 28th Meeting)
will be held in November 2006 and to amend the Protocol will
require a two-thirds agreement of those present at the meeting.
The amendment will then enter
into force immediately for any
party agreeing to it, and for all
other Parties (whether they
agreed to it or not) after a period
of 100 days following the rele-
vant meeting, unless a declara-
tion against acceptance is made
by a Party within that period. 
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, it is obvi-
ously not a flawless plan to
store/dump CO2 in geological
formations in marine waters.
Many will find transferring pol-
lution from one source to
another to be morally abhorrent,
as well as potentially illegal.
The problem remains that the
majority of the world’s commer-
cial energy needs are met by
fossil fuels and we are no closer
to the end of the fossil fuel era.
The sad truth is that government and industry has been aware of
the threat posed by climate change since the Rio Summit over
fifteen years ago, but have been slow to react and invest in new
clean technologies. 
If we carry on adopting a “business as usual” approach,
global temperatures will continue to increase, sea levels will
rise, and extreme weather events will intensify. This is exacer-
bated by the economic growth in Asian countries. A toolkit of
responses is necessary to deal with the urgency of global warm-
ing, and although CCS could prove unpopular in some quarters,
it will probably have to be deployed worldwide if we want to
continue using fossil fuels up to 2030.
Humans are faced with the difficult environmental choice of
either increasing the CO2 in the atmosphere to dangerous levels,
or possibly polluting marine waters if CO2 is not successfully
stored. Although stored CO2 has the capacity to leak into the sea,
CCS was first considered
as a mitigation tool for
developed countries who
were worried that a rapid
move away from fossil
fuels would cause serious
disruption to their
economies, but still had
binding targets to meet
under Kyoto.
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it should prevent it reaching the atmosphere, which in the
author’s opinion is probably worth the risk. CCS could also pro-
tect the seas because as things stand, there is growing evidence
of ocean acidification caused by higher levels of atmospheric
CO2 being absorbed by the oceans. This is thought to be already
exerting a detrimental effect on marine ecosystems. 
It also seems unlikely that CO2 storage projects will take
place over huge maritime areas. Under UNCLOS, nations have
the greatest amount of coastal jurisdiction and control over the
waters closest to shore, with
increasing responsibility to
accommodate uses by other
nationals as the distance from
shore increases. It is suspected
that most storage sites will
therefore be in countries’ own
exclusive economic zones or
continental shelves. There are
also only a limited number of
suitable storage sites in interna-
tional waters and economic
restrictions will mean that the
majority of projects will take
place where there is existing
infrastructure and the geology is
known. 
Therefore, even though CCS in geological marine forma-
tions could attract criticism, there are imperative reasons for
such projects to go ahead. It is debatable whether a two-thirds
majority will support amending the Protocol when Parties meet
in November 2006. If the vote goes against those pushing for
CCS, then it is very likely it will be back on the agenda for
amendment in 2007. If CO2 storage does receive the two-thirds
majority go-ahead in November 2006, then it is also feasible that
1 Lord Ronald Oxburgh, Capturing the Moment, PARLIAMENTARY MONITOR, July
21, 2006.
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Working Group III, 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005); The International Energy Agency
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3 IPCC website, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
4 IPCC, IPPC THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2001 (2001),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/online.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
5 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, annex 1, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L. M 32. 
6 Table compiled in 2006 by Martin Hession of Defra, UK. (On file with the
author).
7 Oxburgh, supra note 1.
8 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Meeting UK Energy
and Climate Needs: The Role of Carbon Capture and Storage; First Report of
Session 2005–06; Volume 1; HC 578-I; Stationary Office Ltd. (2006).
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 194, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
10 E.g., Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
the London Convention and other regional agreements might
also be amended.
Although the international acceptance of CCS is gathering
pace, there will still be a number of challenges even if marine
laws are changed to expressly allow it. Firstly, the international
community still has to determine how CO2 in geological forma-
tions under the sea will fit in with Kyoto. Greater clarification
and certainty is needed in relation to crediting and CDM inclu-
sion. Secondly, there will also need to be regulatory frameworks
at international and national lev-
els covering capture, transport,
and storage sites, as well as
agreements in place on monitor-
ing and liability. The EU has
already stolen a march on this
and has recently announced
plans for a draft legislative pro-
posal for an enabling CCS
framework.17
CCS is arguably at the fore-
front of current climate change
policy and thinking, and this is
reflected in the unusual pace of
international policy and legal
developments. Interestingly, CCS
reflects contemporary challenges in environmental law because
it not only highlights the overriding importance of interdiscipli-
nary cooperation, but it also requires competing environmental
interests (e.g., air and water) to find legal solutions and make
concessions to achieve common goals. This poses real and com-
pelling challenges for environmental lawyers, who have an
increasing responsibility in helping determine difficult environ-
mental choices.
East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069.
11 These numbers are current as of April 2006.
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UK (C. Gough & S. Shackley eds., 2006).
13 R. Purdy & R. Macrory, Geological Carbon Sequestration: Critical Legal
Issues (TYNDALL CENTRE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO.
45, 2004), available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/
wp45.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
14 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Provisional Agenda for the
meeting of the CM Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working Group on
CO2 Sequestration, IMO, LC/CM-CO2 1/1, Jan. 26 2006.
15 IMO, Provisional Agenda for the meeting of the SG Intersessional Technical
Working Group on CO2 Sequestration, IMO, LC/SG-CO2 1/1, Jan. 30, 2006.
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17 European Commission 2006/s102-108792, Contract: Technical Support for
an Enabling Policy Framework for Carbon Capture and Geological Storage
(2006).
Endnotes: The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage
Many will find
transferring pollution
from one source 
to another to be 
morally abhorrent.
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INTRODUCTION
S
ince at least the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act amend-
ments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act,1 the United States has, at least
nominally, been pursuing a policy of sustainable management of
fisheries, guided by the precautionary principle. Nevertheless,
there is continued concern about the state of American fisheries.
As the Pew Oceans Commission pointed out in May 2003, we
are depleting the oceans of fish and have been for decades.
While we only know the status of one-third of the commercially
fished stocks in U.S. waters,
thirty percent of the fish popula-
tions that have been assessed are
overexploited to some degree.2
In its 2004 Final Report to Con-
gress and the President, the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy
expressed similar concerns in a
chapter devoted to the topic of
sustainable fisheries. Specifi-
cally, the Commission noted that
“the last thirty years have wit-
nessed overexploitation of many
fish stocks, degradation of habi-
tats, and negative consequences
for too many ecosystems and
fishing communities.”3
Chances are that the United
States’ actual attainment of sus-
tainable fisheries will involve the
increasing use of marine pro-
tected areas (“MPAs”) and
marine reserves. MPAs are loca-
tion-based legal protections for marine species and ecosystems
— the ocean equivalent of terrestrial national and state parks.
While all MPAs restrict some activities within their boundaries,
often through the use of marine zoning, the most protective
MPAs are marine reserves. Within the boundaries of a marine
reserve, usually all extractive uses of the marine ecosystem are
prohibited, including all fishing. Some marine reserves go fur-
ther and prohibit all access to the ecosystem except scientific
research, but most allow non-extractive recreational uses such as
snorkeling, diving, and boating.
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that MPAs and
marine reserves that are scientifically chosen to protect impor-
tant fish habitats, such as breeding grounds or nurseries, can be
quite effective in increasing both the numbers and size of tar-
geted species of fish.4 Size can be just as important as numbers
for the many species for which larger, older fish — the usual tar-
gets of commercial and recreational fishers — produce far more
gametes far more often than smaller fish. As the Pew Oceans
Commission summarized:
“Marine reserves — areas of the ocean in which all extrac-
tive and disruptive activities are prohibited — are a rela-
tively new, but very promising
approach to marine conserva-
tion . . . . The establishment of
areas that prohibit extractive and
disruptive activities, such as
wilderness areas, has been a
well-accepted conservation
practice on land for more than a
c e n t u r y  a n d  h a s  g r e a t l y
enhanced ecosystem protection.
While 4.6 percent of the land
area of the United States is pre-
served as wilderness, the area of
ocean under U.S. jurisdiction
that is protected in marine
reserves is a small fraction of
one percent.”5
Similarly, the U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy linked
sustainable f isheries to the
increased use of MPAs and
ecosystem-based management.
It recommended that fisheries
managers increase the use of “essential fish habitat” designa-
tions on an ecosystem basis6 and that the federal government
“develop national goals and guidelines leading to a uniform
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process for the effective design, implementation, and evaluation
of marine protected areas.”7
Even accepting these general goals, the legal mechanism for
establishing a national system of MPAs and marine reserves
remains relatively unexamined. Currently, there are many legal
vehicles available to create an MPA or marine reserve, even just
within federal law. For example, MPAs can and have been cre-
ated through the Antiquities Act of 1906,8 the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (“MPRSA”),9 the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, direct congressional legislation,10 and presidential
executive order. In addition, coastal states can establish MPAs
and marine reserves in the first three nautical miles of the ocean
pursuant to a wide variety of state statutes. This variety of legal
vehicles gives credence to concerns that both the Pew Oceans
Commission and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy raised
regarding the uncoordinated patchwork of laws and regulatory
programs that govern the nation’s oceans. However, differences
in these regulatory regimes, and in the MPAs and marine
reserves that result, can also suggest improvements in the law
that might better effectuate sustainable use of the nation’s marine
fisheries.
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands provide one possible
testing ground for examining the many federal legal mecha-
nisms for creating MPAs and marine reserves. On June 15, 2006,
President Bush used the Antiquities Act to create the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument (“NWHI
Monument” or “Monument”).11 This new national monument
protects almost 140,000 square nautical miles of ocean around
the long chain of islands — almost 1400 miles long — that
stretches north and west of Kauai, the northernmost Hawaiian
island that tourists normally visit. The Monument is the largest
MPA in the world and protects the largest and arguably most
pristine and remote coral reef ecosystem in the world, which is
home to more than seven thousand marine species, twenty-five
percent of which are found nowhere else.
President Bush’s invocation of the Antiquities Act, however,
was the last in a series of federal legal actions to protect the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands coral reef ecosystem. By invok-
ing the Antiquities Act, President Bush cut short the process of
designating the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands as a national
marine sanctuary pursuant to the MPRSA. The national marine
sanctuary designation process, in turn, was a response to Presi-
dent Clinton’s use of an executive order to create the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve (“NWHI
Reserve” or “Reserve”), which was itself in tension with both
the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council’s (“West-
Pac’s”) fisheries management planning pursuant to the Magnu-
son-Stevens Act and, at least for a while, the State of Hawaii’s
management efforts pursuant to state law.
PROTECTING THE NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS AS AN MPA: CHOICE OF LEGAL VEHICLE
JURISDICTION OVER THE NORTHWESTERN
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Under the third United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS III”),12 which entered into force on Novem-
ber 16, 1994, coastal nations can assert various levels of regula-
tory authority over four zones of the ocean. The twelve nautical
miles of ocean closest to shore are the territorial sea, in which
the coastal nation may exercise sovereign control over the
waters, the airspace, the seabed, and the subsoil. The next twelve
nautical miles of ocean (twelve to twenty-four nautical miles out






























29 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
to sea) are the contiguous zone, which coastal nations can use to
enforce laws relating to activities in the territorial sea or on
shore. A nation’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) can extend
up to two hundred nautical miles from shore. In its EEZ, the
coastal nation has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve,
and manage the sea’s natural resources, “whether living or non-
living,” in the waters, seabed, and subsoil.13 Finally, coastal
nations can exercise regulatory control over the continental
shelf, particularly for energy development purposes.
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS III. However, it
views most of the jurisdictional provisions of UNCLOS III as
customary international law and has asserted conforming claims
of jurisdictional authority over all four zones. Thus, as a practi-
cal matter, the United States regulates marine fisheries out to two
hundred nautical miles from its shores. Given the United States’
relatively long and unshared coastlines and its territorial hold-
ings in the Pacific and Caribbean, this assertion of jurisdiction
means that the United States regulates more square miles of
ocean than it does of land.
Nevertheless, while, as a
nation, the United States asserts
jurisdiction over two hundred
nautical miles of ocean extend-
ing from its shores, generally
only the outermost 197 nautical
miles are purely federal waters.
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared all marine waters under
U.S. jurisdiction to be federal.14
However, six years later, Con-
gress “restored” title to the first
three nautical miles of ocean to
the states through the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953.15 In
addition, the Submerged Lands
Act allowed states to assert
claims to more than the standard
three nautical miles, based on historical control. While most of
such claims have been unsuccessful, Texas and Florida both
established that their sovereign rights extend three marine
leagues (about nine nautical miles) into the Gulf of Mexico.
Title to submerged lands gives the states authority to regu-
late the waters above those lands. However, states’ regulation of
the three nautical miles of ocean closest to shore remains sub-
ject, under both the Submerged Lands Act and the Supremacy
Clause, to the federal government’s authority to regulate for
“commerce, navigation, national defense, and international
affairs.”16 Thus, with respect to the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands, the State of Hawaii generally has primary authority to
regulate the three-nautical-mile “donut” of ocean water sur-
rounding each island (Midway Island is an exception). The rest
of the waters surrounding this island chain are purely federal.
FEDERAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR SETTING ASIDE
THE NORTHWESTERN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AS AN MPA
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands have long attracted fed-
eral attention. In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt, acting
through executive order, reserved all of the Northwestern Hawai-
ian Islands except Midway “for the use of the Department of
Agriculture as a preserve and breeding ground for native
birds.”17 This reservation eventually became the Hawaiian
Islands National Wildlife Refuge, and in 1988 the Refuge’s pro-
tections were extended to the area’s coral reefs and the marine
life found in and around them.
The Clinton Executive Orders
In 1998, President Clinton issued the Coral Reef Protection
Executive Order18 to preserve the biodiversity and other values
of the United States’ coral reef ecosystems. The Order makes
federal agencies directly responsible for protecting coral reefs
and their associated ecosystems, and it created the Coral Reef
Task Force. In March 2000, the Clinton Administration adopted
the Coral Reef Task Force’s National Plan to Conserve Coral
Reefs. A key component of this plan was to set aside twenty per-
cent of the existing coral reef MPAs as no-take fisheries reserves
(also referred to as “marine wilderness areas”).
On May 26, 2000, President
Clinton signed the Marine Pro-
tected Areas Executive Order.19
The Order seeks to establish a
national system of MPAs by
l inking  MPAs and  mar ine
reserves established under fed-
eral, state, territorial, tribal, or
local law. President George W.
Bush adopted this Executive
Order in June 2001. The
National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (“NOAA”)
is currently implementing the
Executive Order through the
National Marine Protected
Areas Center. In November
2004, the MPA Center issued its
Strategic Plan for working toward “a cohesive and integrated
system of MPAs.” 
The designation of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands
Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve came about through an unusual
blending of congressional and presidential action. In November
2000, through the National Marine Sanctuary Amendments Act
of 2000, Congress authorized President Clinton, in consultation
with the Governor of Hawaii, to “designate any Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands coral reef or coral reef ecosystem as a coral
reef reserve to be managed by the Secretary of Commerce.”20
President Clinton exercised this authority in Executive Order
No. 13178,21 establishing the NWHI Reserve. This Reserve set
aside an area 1200 nautical miles long by one hundred nautical
miles wide, protecting seventy percent of the nation’s coral reefs.
President Clinton ordered the Reserve to be managed pursuant
to a precautionary approach that favored resource protection
when information was lacking. The Order also called for the use
of marine zoning, including the establishment of marine reserves
Once an area is designated
as a National Marine






(“Reserve Preservation Areas”), and for restoration of degraded
portions of the reef. Finally, the Order capped all fishing in the
Reserve at the currently existing levels.
The problem with the NWHI Reserve Executive Order was
that Congress did not permanently eliminate other sources of
legal authority that could apply in the Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands. The flimsiness of President Clinton’s legal authority to
establish the Reserve is evidenced by the fact that, in an appro-
priations act, Congress demanded “adequate review and com-
ment” before the Reserve Preservation Areas could become
permanent. The Secretary of Commerce held seven public hear-
ings on the executive order’s proposal, allowing President Clin-
ton to issue a final NWHI Reserve Executive Order on January
18, 2001,22 three days before he left office.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act
The legal authority of the NWHI Reserve Executive Orders
remained questionable, especially in light of the authority given
to NOAA and WestPac pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
This Act establishes “[a] national program for the conservation
and management of the fisheries resources in the United States”
in order “to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished fish stocks,
to ensure conservation, and to realize the full potential of the
Nation’s fishery resources”23 Moreover, as noted, when Con-
gress amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act through the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act, it incorporated both a precautionary
approach to and a sustainable development goal for the country’s
fisheries management. 
Pursuant to the 1996 amendments, the regional Fisheries
Management Councils have begun to experiment with an
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, including the use
of zoning and MPAs. For example, on June 28, 2006, NOAA
Fisheries used its authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to
amend five fishery management plans for Alaska fisheries to
prohibit trawling in 370,000 square miles of Alaska waters. This
regulation, which became effective July 28, 2006, effectively
created two MPAs — a 320,000-square-mile area in the Aleutian
Islands and a 50,000-square-mile area in the Gulf of Alaska —
for Alaska’s cold-water coral gardens, one of the rarest marine
ecosystems in the world. More recently, the Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council has used its authority under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act to create marine reserves off the California coast,
especially in connection with the Channel Islands National
Marine Sanctuary. 
Nevertheless, nothing in the Magnuson-Stevens Act vali-
dates the establishment of the NWHI Reserve or required
NOAA and WestPac to respect the Reserve Protected Area des-
ignations. In fact, under this Act, NOAA and WestPac remained
legally free to choose to impose fishing regimes for the North-
western Hawaiian Islands that would contradict the Reserve Pro-
tected Area designations. 
Indeed, conflicts did arise. In December 2000, WestPac pub-
lished its ecosystem-based Draft Fishery Management Plan for
the Coral Reef Ecosystems of the Western Pacific Region. It
received several comments adamantly opposing the creation of
MPAs, and especially no-take marine reserves, in the Northwest-
ern Hawaiian Islands, despite the fact that federally regulated
fishing there was already fairly limited. Yet, when WestPac
issued the final version of this fishery management plan in Octo-
ber 2001, it did preserve the concept of no-take marine reserves.
However, the marine reserve boundaries in the fishery manage-
ment plan differed from those President Clinton had designated
within the NWHI Reserve, leaving the executive order more pro-
tective of the coral reefs than WestPac allowed pursuant to the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. 
Incoming President George W. Bush took about a year to
accept President Clinton’s NWHI Reserve Executive Orders,
rendering the Reserve’s status even more legally ambiguous.
Moreover, after the change in administration, WestPac more
actively opposed the NWHI Reserve’s Reserve Protection Areas
and their prohibitions on fishing, proposing instead to allow har-
vesting of lobsters and precious coral.
Similarly, into mid-2001, Hawaiians continued to express
concern about the fishing limitations in the NWHI Reserve.
Indeed, the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources
was reluctant to commit to MPA and marine reserve protections
in the Hawaiian state waters surrounding each island. Its January
2002 draft management plan for these waters was far less protec-
tive, and far more permissive of fishing, than President Clinton’s
executive order for the federal waters in the Reserve.
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972
The national marine sanctuaries provisions of the MPRSA
allow the Secretary of Commerce, acting through NOAA, to
designate “any discrete area of the marine environment” as a
National Marine Sanctuary if NOAA makes certain findings.24
Specifically, NOAA must find that: (1) the area is of special
national significance; (2) the area needs protection; and (3) the
area is manageable. Thirteen National Marine Sanctuaries cur-
rently exist, protecting more than 18,000 square miles of ocean.
In addition, in January 2006, Governor Ted Kulongoski of Ore-
gon proposed a new Oregon Coast National Marine Sanctuary.
Once an area is designated as a National Marine Sanctuary,
no one can use or remove sanctuary resources except in accor-
dance with federal law. Thus, National Marine Sanctuaries are
MPAs. However, historically, very few National Marine Sanctu-
aries have included marine reserves because the MPRSA
emphatically encourages multiple uses of these sanctuaries.
Nevertheless, some of the National Marine Sanctuaries are
experimenting with the use of marine reserves. The designation
of the Dry Tortugas Ecological Reserve in the Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary is probably the most famous exam-
ple of a marine reserve negotiation. In addition, the Channel
Islands National Marine Sanctuary, off the coast of southern
California, has been pursuing a multi-year plan to establish
marine reserves within the sanctuary.
Spurred by President Clinton’s final NWHI Reserve Execu-
tive Order, NOAA announced on January 19, 2001, that it
intended to designate the Reserve as a national marine sanctuary.
As a result of the Bush Administration’s reconsideration, how-
ever, NOAA did not begin the scoping process for the sanctuary
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until March 2002, and then, because of high levels of public
interest, it extended that process twice. Designation of the
national marine sanctuary also required the issuance of a fishery
management plan pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act and a
full environmental impact statement (“EIS”) pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act.25 Partially as a result of
these and the MPRSA’s procedural requirements, NOAA antici-
pated from the beginning that sanctuary designation would take
two to three years. 
Even so, it is fair to say that the sanctuary designation
process effectively stalled out. As late as May 2006, NOAA was
still working on the draft EIS for the proposed sanctuary,26 and
management of the NWHI Reserve was still proceeding through
the uneasy double authorities of President Clinton’s executive
order and WestPac’s implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.27 This four-year delay helps to explain why President Bush
reached for the Antiquities Act.
The Antiquities Act/Act of June 8, 1906
The Antiquities Act is very short. Under it, the President of
the United States is “authorized, in his discretion, to declare by
public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that
are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Govern-
ment of the United States to be national monuments.”28 More-
over, while the Antiquities Act has a predominantly terrestrial
focus, Presidents have repeatedly used it to create marine-related
national monuments that function as MPAs, such as the Buck
Island Reef National Monument in the Virgin Islands and the
California Coastal National Monument along most of the coast
of California.
President Bush’s proclamation29 establishing the North-
western Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument is very
protective of the area. Virtually all activities within the Monu-
ment are subject to regulation by the Secretaries of Commerce
(water) and the Interior (land), and the proclamation imposes a
vessel monitoring requirement as well. All commercial fishing is
to be phased out over five years, with the lobster fishery immedi-
ately subject to an annual catch limit of zero. Oil and gas explo-
ration and development, vessel anchoring, and introductions of
invasive species are absolutely prohibited. In addition, the Secre-
taries cannot permit any activity within the Monument unless
the activity meets ten ecosystem-preserving criteria. For exam-
ple, recreational snorkeling and diving are prohibited in the Spe-
cial Preservation Areas and Midway Atoll Special Management
Area. Thus, effectively, most of the NWHI Monument is or will
become a marine reserve, the largest such reserve on the planet.
CONCLUSION
The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands’ history as an MPA
strongly suggests that pure presidential authority is a more effi-
cient vehicle for establishing MPAs, especially marine reserves.
Even at the executive order stage, President Clinton accom-
plished far more through the NWHI Reserve Executive Order
than NOAA managed in five years of the national marine sanctu-
ary designation process. As noted, however, executive orders
lack comprehensive legislative backing and authority, leading to
potential conflicts with other marine regulatory programs, such
as those established under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
In contrast, the Antiquities Act gives the President this exec-
utive authority with full legislative backing, an improvement
over the use of executive orders. It also appears to have two
advantages over the MPRSA. First, the Antiquities Act has the
advantage of speed of designation. As soon as President Bush
declared the NWHI Monument established on June 15, 2006, the
Monument existed. In addition, NOAA — undoubtedly aided by
the prior existence of the NWHI Reserve and the national
marine sanctuary process — issued its final regulations for the
national monument just two months later.30
Second, the legal protections for a marine national monu-
ment are potentially much greater than those for a national
marine sanctuary. As noted, the MPRSA promotes a philosophy
of multiple use regulation of national marine sanctuaries. In con-
trast, the Antiquities Act inspires a preservationist philosophy, as
President Bush’s proclamation setting aside the NWHI Monu-
ment attests.
Congress is currently debating whether and how to imple-
ment the many recommendations of the Pew Oceans Commis-
sion and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. The history of
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands suggests that if Congress
decides to vigorously pursue the Commissions’ recommendation
to increase the use of MPAs and marine reserves to preserve and
restore fisheries and to protect marine ecosystems in general, it
should seriously consider modeling at least one part of any new
federal MPA legislation on the Antiquities Act and giving the
president considerable direct authority to establish MPAs and
marine reserves. 
Of course, to create a coherent national system, Congress
may want to constrain presidential authority in some way — for
example, by limiting presidential designation authority to rec-
ommendations of an expert agency or panel. Nevertheless, this
constrained authority would still be more likely to produce a
functional national system of MPAs and marine reserves —
especially if joined to a streamlined agency designation process
— than the multi-use, multi-agency, multi-analysis national
marine sanctuary regulatory regime.
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eef ecosystems are an invaluable biological resource —
the “species factories” of the world’s seas.1 Though they
occupy less than one percent of the ocean floor, reefs are
home to 25 percent of all marine species and 32 of the 33 animal
phyla.2 Among these reefs ecosystems, ten “Coral Reef
Hotspots” comprise just one hundredth of a percent of the ocean
floor in terms of area and harbor more than half of the world’s
restricted-range marine species.3 For the sheer concentration of
biodiversity they support, only tropical rainforests can compare,
and rainforests occupy 20 times the area.4
Coral reefs also rank among the most endangered marine
ecosystems on earth.5 The same unique biology that enables
reef-building corals to create and maintain vital habitat also
makes them particularly vulnerable to the cumulative and inter-
active effects of local and global environmental stressors, prima-
rily overfishing, pollution, and coral bleaching. In every place
they are found, reefs are now
reported to be “in crisis.” Of the
coral reefs that remain, nearly a
third worldwide are degraded,6
and more than half are consid-
ered to be at risk.7 By 2030, 60
percent of the world’s coral reefs
are predicted to disappear.8
Properly managed, healthy,
and intact reefs could potentially
provide a sustainable livelihood
for coastal communities. As our
knowledge of the risks to coral
reefs grows, so too does the need to adapt our international legal
regimes to ensure their sustainable use. This article argues that
there are significant economic benefits to adapting existing legal
regimes, notably the public trust doctrine, to protect the long-term
sustainability of coral reefs. The first part delineates the benefits
that healthy coral reefs provide as well as the primary threats they
face today. The second part surveys the legal regimes most rele-
vant to their sustainable use. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CORAL REEFS
THE BENEFITS OF CORAL REEFS
Coral reefs provide two kinds of benefits: “economic bene-
fits,” which are tangible and immediate, and “ecosystem serv-
ices,” which are less apparent perhaps, but no less important.
Worldwide, coral reefs have a net present value of almost $800
billion, and every year, they generate $30 billion in net economic
benefits.9 One square kilometer of healthy reef habitat can feed
up to 300 people; nearly ten percent of all the fish consumed
worldwide is caught on a reef.10 Sustainable managed reefs can
become a financially lucrative for both the marine aquarium and
the live fish trades.11 The annual dockside value of commercial
U.S. fisheries that depend on coral reefs exceeds $100 million;
“the annual value of reef-dependent recreational fisheries proba-
bly exceeds that.”12
The pharmaceutical industry has found dozens of sub-
stances with antimicrobial, anti-inflammatory, and anti-coagu-
lating properties in reef species.13 AZT, a drug doctors have used
to treat HIV, is derived in part from compounds found in a
Caribbean reef sponge.14 Moreover, with potentially eight mil-
lion more reef species still to be identified, reefs may represent
an “untapped wealth of biochemical resources.”15 The aesthetic
value of healthy and intact coral reefs generates another source
of tourism-related income for coastal communities to the tune of
$9.6 billion in net benefits annually.16 Finally, healthy reefs may
also translate into a “politically
actionable existence value...
[P]eople derive satisfaction from
just knowing that coral reefs still
exist.”17
In addition to their eco-
nomic benefits, reefs also pro-
v ide  va luable  ecosys tem
services that are difficult to
quantify because they are pro-
vided at no cost. Healthy and
intact reefs absorb as much as 90
percent of the impact of wind-
generated waves, protecting ports, shipping, coastal develop-
ment, and mangroves from storms and erosion.18 Replacing
these services can be expensive: in the Maldives, an artificial
substitute for a coral reef cost $12 million to construct.19 Reef-
dependent animals also provide valuable ecosystem services.
Green turtles, for example, maintain seagrass beds, ecosystems
in themselves worth an estimated $3.8 trillion.20 Finally, from an
aesthetic perspective, healthy reefs also keep white sand beaches
clean. In the aftermath of Hurricane Allen, the combination of
disease, pollution from coastal development, and historic over-
fishing of algae-eating reef fish, “flipped” Jamaica’s coastal
ecosystem from an array of pristine coral reefs to a massive
algae bloom.21
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Sound environmental policies do not easily translate into
conventional measures of economic health, such as gross
national product. Nonetheless, “[i]nvesting in environmentally
sustainable management and development of [coral reefs today]
will be more cost effective than restoring human livelihoods and
ecosystems after a catastrophe.”22 While any attempt to put a
price on ecosystem services should be viewed with caution, val-
uations can guide us in weighing the costs and benefits of sus-
tainable reef management. A healthy and intact coral reef may be
worth as much as $600,000 per square kilometer — well worth
the $775 per square kilometer it costs to maintain a marine pro-
tected area around them, especially considering that doing noth-
ing will also have costs.23 Harder still is to calculate the value of
unknown opportunities lost when a biologically diverse reef is
destroyed. Used sustainably, coral reefs will continue to provide
immediate benefits. Preserved for the future, coral reefs may pay
unforeseen dividends. Left undefended, their loss may deprive
many development countries of their principle livelihood and a
potential source of wealth.
THREATS FACING CORAL REEFS
The trends are not encouraging. Reefs are disappearing
faster than they can be counted. By one estimate, 40 percent of
the world’s remaining coral reefs
may be gone by 2010, 60 percent
by 2030 if nothing is done.24
One reason for the precipitous
decline is an accident of reef
ecology. Nearly 40 percent of
the world’s human population
now lives within 100 kilometers
of a coastline.25 As a result, reef
species become overexploited,
habitat is destroyed, watersheds
are altered, and runoff pours sediment, sewage, pollutants,
hydrocarbons, litter, and pathogens into coastal waters. Invasive
species, stowed away in ballast water of tankers, are discharged
along with cargo in port. Air pollution carries heavy metals, per-
sistent organic pollutants (“POPs”) and persistent toxic sub-
stances (“PTSs”) miles from shore. Even excess nutrients can
generate harmful plankton blooms that stifle corals.26
Another reason for the decline is a general failure of fish-
eries to account for the dynamic nature of reef ecosystems. His-
toric overharvesting of one species can have cascading effects on
others. The pressure is compounded by the fact that many of the
over-fished species play vital roles as “ecosystem engineers” and
maintain the health of reef ecosystems.27 When they are
removed faster than their stocks can be replenished, reef ecosys-
tems break down and lose their capacity to recover. Without a
viable habitat, overexploited populations cannot recover. This
entire process can happen quickly, but the effects endure. A reef
discovered in Guam in 1957, for example, was fished down in six
months and 40 years later the populations have yet to recover.28
In the long run, some species of reef fish and some areas of
reef habitat may be more valuable if left alone. However, even a
complete moratorium on reef fishing will not address all the
threats reefs face today. When subjected to severe stress, corals
release symbiotic microalgae that account for their vivid colors,
resulting in “coral bleaching.” Bleaching seems to be occurring
with increasing frequency, such that every coral reef region in
the world has experienced some bleaching over the past
decade.29 In 2005, scientists witnessed the worst bleaching event
on record in the Caribbean.30 The interaction of local and global
pressures has a cumulative effect on the long-term health of
corals, reducing their reproductive capacity, and making them
susceptible to diseases. Given that the recovery time of reefs can
take decades, successive environmental stressors can kill a reef.
Permanent damage comes at significant cost. Bleaching on the
Great Barrier Reef in Australia could cost nearly $300 million
over the next 15 years.31 Globally, the economic losses over 50
years could approach $83 billion.32
LEGAL REGIMES FOR CONSERVATION
AND SUSTAINABLE USE
Despite the benefits they provide, the risks they face, and
the legal regimes created to manage them, coral reefs today
remain largely unprotected. Like fisheries, reef conservation is a
classic case of “the tragedy of the commons.” When access to a
valuable resource is open, such that everyone can use it and no
one can bar or limit another’s
use, exploitation will inevitably
occur. Traditionally, oceans
were like air, with benefits so
abundant that reducing them to
possession as private property
was impracticable. This is not
quite true for reefs. Limited in
scope, fixed in location, they
could arguably be reduced to
private ownership. 
While nearly 20 percent of the world’s coral reef habitat lies
within one of 980 Marine Protected Areas (“MPAs”), less than
0.1 percent are protected by “no-take” rules that prohibit poach-
ing, and none are protected from risks arising outside the MPA.33
Even when reefs are officially “protected,” a mandate to regulate
on behalf of a species, an area, a process or a habitat may not
guarantee protection in an area subject to fractured jurisdiction
or authority.34 Divided authority engenders incoherent conserva-
tion goals for natural resources and undermines any opportunity
for their sustainable use.
But even a regional approach to conservation will not work
if it does not attend to the full range of risks facing a particular
ecosystem. For example, The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act (“Magnuson Act”) authorizes
the drafting of a Fishery Management Plan for Coral and Coral
Reefs of the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic to preserve “all
corals on the seabed in U.S. federal waters (of the Gulf) from
harvest, sale, and destruction from fishing related activities.”35
Nevertheless, the National Marine Fisheries Service itself con-
cluded that “[n]o regulatory mechanisms are currently in place,
or expected to be in place in the foreseeable future, to control or
prevent [the three principal threats to corals in the Gulf: elevated
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sea surface temperature, and hurricanes, and disease.] [T]he
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms is contributing to
the threatened status of these species.”36 Success of coral reef
conservation depends on a unified authority with jurisdiction
extending “from the inland extent of coastal watersheds to the
offshore boundary of the nation’s exclusive economic zone,” and
over “a wide range of ocean and coastal issues.”37 Writ large, the
gaps in United States ocean policy exemplify the problem of
fragmentation facing coral reef conservation internationally.
THE GLOBAL: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA38
When they entered into force in 1994, the 320 articles and
nine annexes of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS”) became the most comprehensive interna-
tional legal agreement for marine conservation to date.39 Most
importantly, UNCLOS shifted the legal assumption that the
ocean was an inexhaustible commodity, and adopted a precau-
tionary approach that treated the seas as a vulnerable resource
worthy of human stewardship. This idea is implicit throughout
UNCLOS. However, certain provisions of UNCLOS undermine
its effectiveness as a tool for protecting coral reef ecosystems.
Under UNCLOS, living resources do not belong to the 
“common heritage of mankind.”
Moreover, because most reef-
building  cora ls  depend on
photosynthesis, they are limited
to a “sunlit zone,” part of the
ocean where light penetrates
(about 660 feet). Thus, by
another accident of ecology,
most of the world’s coral reefs
are well within coastal states’
jurisdiction, entitling them to
conserve or to exploit most of the world’s reefs as they see fit.
While a state may invoke its obligation to maintain or
restore populations of marine life at levels that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield to justify a conservation policy,
nothing requires them to do so. A state need only “consider” the
effects of its policies on the marine environment. Moreover, the
state itself sets its own benchmark for what level of protection of
the marine environment is appropriate. While UNCLOS does
caution Parties against undertaking actions which jeopardize the
marine environment of their neighbors, absent proof of trans-
boundary damage, no state can challenge the policies or prac-
tices of its neighbors. Ultimately, the state decides the
sustainable limits of the living resources within its EEZ and the
degree to which it will enforce them leading to instances where
enforcement is so lax as to be nonexistent. 
All told, “the one international agreement theoretically most
suited for marine biodiversity protection is at best only a decid-
edly incomplete response to the mass extinction bubbling under
the surface of the planet’s waters.”40 Unfortunately, UNCLOS
falls prey to a false dichotomy. When food pressures are at odds
with reef conservation, people come first, as they should. But
sustainable economic development and environmental conserva-
tion need not be at odds; they may even be synonymous. What
happens, for instance, when a state allows pollution to continue
unabated in the name of economic development and its reefs are
permanently destroyed as a result, taking with them one of the
few resources that developing nations have to generate economic
growth? 
THE LOCAL: MPAS AND MARINE RESERVES
In their approach to coral reef management, coastal states
have had to find a balance between conservation and economic
development. This has meant picking a regulatory scheme that
protects reefs by limiting the ways the public can use them. A
more permissive scheme, the Marine Protected Area (“MPA”),
allows some commercial and recreational activities. A more
restrictive subset of MPA, the marine reserve, implements a “no-
take” rule which prohibits all activities that upset the natural
ecological functions of the area. “No-take” reserves tend to be
the exception rather than the rule, and less than 0.1 percent of
coral reefs worldwide are protected by these kinds of “no-take”
provisions.41 Governments are reluctant to create marine
reserves because “no-take” provisions fly in the face of the open
access people associate with marine resources. In California, for
example, a no-take reserve near Santa Barbara provoked a grass-
roots campaign to put a “Free-
dom to Fish Act” on the state
and federal legislative agenda.42
Today, federal and state
governments in the United
States have ample legislative
authority to create no-take
marine reserves. The Supreme
Court did away with the notion
of State title to fisheries as a
19th-century legal fiction, but it
kept state “sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, [...]
with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion
thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment
of the interest of the public in the waters[.]”43 Legitimacy of pro-
tecting fisheries turns upon “whether the State has exercised its
police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitu-
tion.”44 But this approach begs the question: who decides what
“the interest of the public in the waters” is, precisely?45
One view maintains that the legislature, as the ultimate rep-
resentative of the public, is the final arbiter of the public interest.
Another view elevates the public interest to an informal constitu-
tional right — not even the legislature could assign a general
benefit held in trust for the many to a privileged and well-con-
nected few. Florida and Louisiana went so far as to include the
public trust doctrine in their state constitutions.46 A third
approach views the public interest as a government defense
against takings claims by private parties contesting conservation
restrictions on private land. Under this view the public trust cre-
ated a pseudo-easement on the land. If a private party bought
tidal lands, it did so with constructive knowledge of the public’s
traditional interests in fishing, or navigation thereon. Under this
view, “the individual States have the authority to define the lim-
40 percent of the world’s
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its of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights
in such lands as they see fit.”47
But if two equally legitimate public property rights — like
recreational fishing and coral reef conservation — are at odds,
which interest wins out? Absent enactment of a “Freedom to
Fish” bill or the like, the courts are left to decide. While tradition
limited the public trust to navigation, fishing and commerce,
time has amended the list, adding recreation, conservation and
aesthetic concerns, without necessarily creating a hierarchy
among them. The Florida State constitution added to the list
marine living resources which “should be conserved and man-
aged for the benefit of the state, its people, and future genera-
tions.”48 The Supreme Court of Washington upheld a ban on the
use of jet-skis on county waters reasoning, “it would be an odd
use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actu-
ally harms and damages the waters and wildlife.”49 This seems to
suggest that the vitality of the ecosystem in general is paramount
to any particular use to which it can be put. 
As MPAs become more pervasive, and their classification
becomes more fixed, the question of no-take provisions becomes
more salient. In 1999, California passed its Marine Life Protec-
tion Act to create a network of MPAs and marine reserves along
its coast that would be “managed according to clear, conserva-
tion-based goals and guidelines that take full advantage of the
multiple benefits that can be derived from the establishment of
marine life reserves.”50 In 2000, President Clinton signed Exec-
utive Order 13158 to bring 1,500 MMAs under one national sys-
tem with individual areas classified according to a single set of
criteria.51 Regionally, the United States, Mexico, and Canada are
working on a North American MPA Network (“NAMPAN”).52
To date there are approximately 400 MPAs which include
coral reefs in more than 65 countries around the world.53 As the
number of MPAs worldwide continues to grow, coastal states
will have to choose which rules will govern reef conservation;
how many of these new protected areas will have no-take provi-
sions remains to be seen.
The advantage of “no-take” reserves is that they promote a
more holistic approach to conservation management by aiming to
restore the vitality to an entire ecosystem rather than just a single
species. Reserves protect habitat, conserve biological diversity,
provide a sanctuary for sea life, establish a benchmark to measure
changes elsewhere in the marine environment, and help rebuild
depleted fisheries by cushioning crashes in local fish stocks from
overfishing in adjacent areas. On the other hand, the benefits of
reef reserves have their limits. Sanctuary status only reduces the
risk of overharvesting; it does not address the damage that arises
from pollution, shipping, or coral bleaching. These require the
cooperation of local authorities with responsibility for regulating
the source of these threats. Marine reserves may also be inappro-
priately situated. Creating reserves where none are needed while
leaving essential habitat unprotected is not a strategy for sustain-
able coral reef conservation. Understandably, communities that
depend on reefs for food or other resources may have a strong
incentive not to establish marine reserves in those reefs’ most
productive areas, regardless of whether they are fragile ecosys-
tems susceptible to overexploitation. 
Paradoxically, a more permissive approach to use within an
area may do more to protect fragile habitat. So long as use
occurs at a sustainable level, the trade-off for less stringent pro-
tections potentially creates greater community involvement and
cooperation between managers and users. One way to accom-
plish this is through zoning. “Several zones can and generally
should exist within a single MPA, contributing to the strength of
MPAs in protecting the biodiversity of a location, rather than try-
ing to address each individual human impact separately.”54 The
most successful MPAs have this in common. The Great Barrier
Reef of Australia is exemplary “of integrated and multiple-use
management, allowing sustainable utilization of the reef by a
wide range of users with numerous and often conflicting
needs.”55 In the Philippines, the Apo Island Reserve “has
allowed [fish] stocks to recover sufficiently so that local fisher-
men operating in the surrounding areas are reporting major
increases in fish yields.”56 This question of enforcement remains
a crucial as many developing countries face real constraints in
terms of the resources available to enforce even the most lenient
provisions. Without resources MPAs risk becoming “paper
tigers.” One global study of 383 MPAs found that conservation
objectives were only enforced effectively in one third of them
(117).57
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, governments will be forced to choose between
protecting their publics’ right to use marine resources today
against its right to have them there to use tomorrow. While giv-
ing a coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over valuable marine
habitat enables that state to manage it in a coherent manner and
provides that state with an economic incentive to do so, the pub-
lic trust doctrine also could serve as a check on any exploitative
or unsustainable practices the state decides to permit. 
Even so, the public trust doctrine cannot alone save reef
ecosystems. For even though they could be reduced to private
property, fragile reef ecosystems cannot be fenced off. They
depend on fluid ocean currents for their survival. The boundaries
of even the best protected marine reserves are permeable. Envi-
ronmental stressors from around the world will continue to
afflict them if we cannot find a way to hold ourselves in check.
“It is no longer sufficient to talk of state responsibility for envi-
ronmental damage. The context must change to reflect state
responsibility for the preservation of global environmental well-
being.”58 This sentiment is especially apt for the world’s coral
reefs, given their breakneck pace towards mass extinction.
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n July 2006, an oil spill approaching the size of the Exxon
Valdez disaster of 1989 began making its way along the
Mediterranean Sea.1 Unlike the infamous Exxon Valdez
incident, this was no accident but the result of a military action
by Israel on the Jiyyeh power utility in Lebanon. While environ-
mental destruction as a war tactic is an ancient practice, legal
scholars, environmentalists, and military tacticians are increas-
ingly focusing their attention on this phenomenon. International
laws contain provisions for such destruction and tribunals such
as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) are empowered to
hear these types of claims, though almost none of these laws or
venues have been tested. 
EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF OCEANS AND SEAS
The oil spill from the Jiyyeh plant spread along 150 kilome-
ters of Lebanon’s coastline and up to Syria.2 Early estimates put
the volume of oil spilled at
between 10,000 and 15,000
tons,3 though the eventual count
could reach 35,000 tons.4 The
shores of a nature reserve off the
coast of Tripoli were covered in
oi l ,  th rea ten ing  numerous
species of birds as well as log-
gerhead turtles and rare monk
seals.5 The spill contains car-
cinogenic substances of the kind
which caused the fish population
to collapse years following the
Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska.6
The social and economic impact of the spill on the region is
equally alarming. Lebanese families living along the coast
depend on fish as a major food and income source and much of
that fish will become toxic as a result of the spill.7 The effects on
the Lebanese economy will be severe, since tourism is sixteen
percent of the economy and many tourist destinations are along
the coastline.8
More disturbing is that the total tonnage of oil spilled into
seas and oceans in the 1990s is estimated at 1,140,000 tons and
this figure does not even include wartime spills.9 While more oil
releases into the ocean through routine dumping than through
spills, the concentrated nature of oil spills makes the effects on
the environment more visible and immediate. Oil is extremely
harmful to the marine environment, coating birds and marine
mammals, poisoning fish, killing reefs, and creating long-lived
toxic effects.10
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WARTIME
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
Lebanon announced in September 2006 that it intends to
seek damages from Israel for the oil spill through the ICC.11 The
enabling statute of the ICC, the Rome Statute, contains environ-
mental crimes within the list of triable war crimes.12 War crimes
include “intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that
such attack will cause . . . long term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage antici-
pated.”13 Problems with the use of ICC as a means to seek reme-
dies include the fact that the ICC was designed to deal with
individuals, not states. Thus Lebanon cannot seek relief from
Israel, but only from individuals involved in the bombing.
The International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) is another venue
through which states could
address wartime environmental
destruction. The ICJ has not
decided an environmental crime
claim yet; however in a 1996
advisory opinion it repeatedly
mentioned destruction of the
natural environment as a con-
cern.14 Unfortunately, the power
of the ICJ is limited, and it can
only hear cases if all state parties
involved consent. 
Several international environmental laws address wartime
environmental damage. The Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (“ENMOD”)15 was created on the heels of environ-
mental destruction in Vietnam. ENMOD has been interpreted to
mean large-scale manipulation of natural forces and not oil
spills.16 In addition, the World Charter for Nature prohibits dam-
aging military activities17, and the Stockholm Declaration of
197218 and Rio Declaration of 199219 both address the need to
protect the environment during armed conflict.
Moreover, maritime laws are at odds with each other regard-
ing liability for war damage to waterways.20 The United Nations
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) contains a
chapter devoted to the protection of the marine environment, yet
it explicitly exempts warships and crafts (including airplanes)
from compliance.21 UNCLOS does however make the flag state
of warships responsible for loss or damage to another state
through non-compliance with the laws and regulations of that
state.22 In addition, the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Water-
courses, adopted in 1997 but not
yet in force by 2005, provides
that these areas shall enjoy the
protections of international law
for international and non-inter-
national armed conflict.23
CONCLUSION
The very nature of wartime
environmental damage makes it
difficult to address through
existing international law. The
destruction on Lebanon’s Mediterranean coastline occurred
amidst continuing hostilities, and cleanup was delayed several
weeks until Israel gave permission for a crew to begin and condi-
tions became safe enough for work.24 Given the nature of war-
fare, it is not unusual that environmental destruction should
occur long before the end of the military actions. Unfortunately,
given the nature of oil spills, any delay in clean up can cause
irremediable damage. The wait before surveys for cleanup could
begin in Lebanon was “pretty unprecedented” for a spill of its
size, according to a UN Environmental Programme spokes-
person.25
Environmental wartime destruction in seas poses an addi-
tional problem due to the nature of tides, currents, and owner-
ship of those bodies of water. As evidenced in the Lebanese oil
spill, the slick can spread rapidly
to protected areas, other coun-
tries’ coastlines, and interna-
tional waters. To effectively
remedy environmental destruc-
tion, any damages must include
clean up costs in coastal waters
and international waters.
Though the forums and
laws are somewhat deficient, an
increased focus by scholars on
prosecution of environmental
war crimes may make this a ripe
time to move forward with such a claim. If Lebanon does bring
this case, it will be a canary for this emerging jurisprudence, and
the results will forecast how well the international community is
prepared to deal with the widening problem of wartime environ-
mental destruction. 
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n recent years, international recognition of the value of port
State measures in combating illegal, unreported, and unregu-
lated (“IUU”) fishing has intensified. All fish harvested at
sea must be landed, and a coordinated system of controls at port
— including requirements for vessels, information systems,
inspections, and training — increasingly can be used to detect
and enforce against IUU-caught fish. There is also an important
cost-benefit consideration: the use of port State controls does not
necessarily entail significant resources, and they represent a
promising avenue for implementation by developing States.
Operationally, the measures can be integrated into a wider sys-
tem of port controls extending to areas such as health, safety, and
security.
The concept of coordinated port State control for merchant
vessels is not new. Comprehensive regimes and requirements
relating to vessel safety, labor conditions and pollution preven-
tion have been progressively developed by legally binding
instruments for over two decades.1
Additionally, port State measures for fishing vessels have
been addressed by international fisheries instruments since
1982, but particularly since 1995. Relevant instruments have
tended to focus on the role of the port States individually or
through regional fishery bodies (“RFBs”), rather than through
the mechanism of specific regional MOUs such as those devel-
oped for merchant ships. 
In March 2005, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (“COFI”)
endorsed the Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat
IUU Fishing (“FAO Model Scheme”). The FAO Model Scheme
built upon provisions of the preceding international fisheries
instruments2 and paved the way for the development of interna-
tional consensus on whether a binding instrument on port State
measures should be developed.3 The FAO Model Scheme
includes elements of the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action
to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregu-
lated fishing (“IPOA-IUU”) which contains guidelines for port
State access, information to be collected from fishing vessels,
and a process for actions to be taken where IUU fishing is sus-
pected. 
The FAO Model Scheme provides voluntary minimum stan-
dards for port State measures, including the responsibilities of a
port State, inspections, follow-up actions, and information
requirements for vessels. The annexes contain details on report-
ing requirements for and port State inspection procedures of for-
eign fishing vessels, training of port State inspectors, and more.
Implementing such port State measures are cost-effective and
result in a compelling array of enforcement tools by the port
State, flag State, and/or third State. For example, the imposition
of port State measures can result in denial of port access, pro-
hibiting the landing, transhipment, and/or processing of catch;
the seizure and forfeiture of catch; the initiation of criminal,
civil, or administrative proceedings under national law, and
cooperating with the flag State and/or members of an RFMO on
enforcement and/or deterrence.
However, not all States are currently prepared to implement
port State measures. Industrial IUU fishing is often highly
organized and driven by high stakes and high profits. It is an
activity that falls in the realm of environmental crime. In some
cases, IUU interests may offer economic or other incentives to a
port State to avoid the implementation of controls; in other
cases, port States lack the necessary capacity, policy and legal
frameworks, and institutional arrangements. This has resulted in
“ports of convenience” for IUU vessels seeking to offload their
catch and resupply in ports that do not have or do not implement
controls. As noted, there are different reasons why a State may
not exercise controls, and the need to agree on a definition of
“ports of convenience,” was underscored at the UN Fish Stocks
Review Conference in May 2006.4
Despite such challenges, countries continue to progressively
strengthen the role of the port State through international instru-
ments. The pivotal role of the port State is realized in relation to
relevant regional activity, information systems, and linkages
with other IPOA-IUU tools. International fora firmly support
stronger and deeper action based on the FAO Model Scheme as
described below. 
LINKAGES WITH REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
OTHER IPOA-IUU TOOLS
It is said that port State measures are the “last untapped
area” in efforts to combat IUU fishing. The spotlight had been
directed mostly at the flag State, having primary responsibility
for compliance, and the coastal State, having sovereign rights
over its fishery resources. Port State measures did not reach the
forefront until 2005, when the emergence of the FAO Model
Scheme provided a launching pad for strengthened and coordi-
nated approaches. 
PORT STATE MEASURES TO COMBAT
IUU FISHING: 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
by Judith Swan*
* Judith Swan is Senior Programme and Policy Officer, FishCode Programme,
Fisheries Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(“FAO”) Rome, Italy. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author;
they do not necessarily reflect the views of FAO or any of its Members. 
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Broader forces also drive the crescendo of international
activity encompassing port State measures. Foremost is a shift
toward intensified governance at regional level, involving the
unprecedented and rapid increase in the establishment of RFBs
and efforts to strengthen governance in existing bodies. At the
international level, the development and strengthening of inter-
national information systems will add to effective implementa-
tion of port State measures. Finally, because the IPOA-IUU is to
be applied in a holistic and integrated manner, linkages with
other key compliance tools demonstrate the synergies contribut-
ing to the essential role of port State measures.
THE RAPIDLY INCREASING NUMBER OF NEW RFBS
The international community recognizes the continuing
need to strengthen international cooperation and institutions that
work on a regional basis and to increase coverage of the oceans.5
Consequently, the family of RFBs — already numbering thirty-
eight including seventeen bodies with a management mandate
— is rapidly expanding: in the past three years, no less than five
RFBs have been or are being established. This will result in a
growing body of international conservation and management
measures for which strengthened and coordinated compliance
tools will be essential. In this regard, it is foreseeable that port
State measures will play an increasingly significant role. 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (“RFMOs”)
established in recent years include the South East Atlantic Fish-
eries Organization (“SEAFO”) (2003) and the Western and Cen-
tral Pacific Fisheries Commission (“WCPFC”) (2004). The
respective conventions of these RFMOs refer to port State meas-
ures, building upon provisions in the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment.6
The South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (“SIOFA”),
signed in July 2006, has a mandate over fishery resources other
than tuna in areas that fall outside national jurisdictions. Among
other things, parties will conduct inspections of ships visiting
ports of the parties to verify they are in compliance with SIOFA
regulations and deny landing and discharging privileges to those
that do not comply.
Negotiations to establish the South Pacific Regional Fish-
eries Management Organisation were initiated at the first meet-
ing, held in February 2006. Participants agreed to work to
establish, as a matter of priority, a legally binding instrument for
the conservation and management of living marine resources,
other than species listed in Annex I of the 1982 UN Convention,
in the high seas of the South Pacific Ocean.7 It was also agreed
that the second meeting, scheduled for November 2006, will
consider the adoption of interim arrangements to apply prior to
the entry into force of the instrument, in light of the information
and advice provided by the working groups and participants. 
Another initiative is underway to establish an RFMO in the
North Western Pacific Ocean to regulate bottom trawl fishing,
including through the development of interim measures for the
management of bottom trawling and for the conservation of vul-
nerable marine ecosystems.8
WCPFC, SEAFO, and SIOFA give early indication of the
importance with which they regard the role of port State meas-
ures in their regions. In particular, the WCPFC is developing its
regional scheme based on the FAO Model Scheme and SIOFA
has agreed to carry out port inspections. Other RFBs under
negotiation have agreed to apply interim measures, but, at the
time of writing, had not yet addressed the content of such meas-
ures. 
STRENGTHENED GOVERNANCE IN RFMOS
Members of RFMOs recognize the benefits of strengthened
governance and agree upon a number of actions and measures
that will improve control and compliance with management
measures. Consequently, port State measures, already adopted
by many RFMOs,9 will be strengthened and integrated with a
broad range of other compliance tools. 
Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement have agreed that
there is a duty of non-members to cooperate in the conservation
and management of fish stocks.10 To this end, RFMOs have been
working towards enhancing participation by cooperating non-
members and identifying the roles of non-members in the con-
text of regional port State schemes. 
A number of RFMOs have developed regional plans of
action to combat IUU fishing11 and port State measures and/or
regional schemes would be an important component of these
plans. Many RFMOs have adopted resolutions to support Moni-
toring, Control and Surveillance (“MCS”) measures that have
similar requirements and are linked with port State measures.
Examples include: regional schemes for boarding and inspec-
tion, observer coverage and monitoring transhipment; presump-
tions of IUU fishing by non-member vessels; and vessel lists for
IUU and authorized vessels
Many have also recently adopted Vessel Monitoring Sys-
tems (“VMS”) requirements or schemes, enabling the detection
of IUU fishing and fishers before a vessel enters into port. Flag
States of these RFMOs increasingly implement the use of VMS
to monitor fishing vessels under their control. VMS and other
monitoring systems are moving toward electronic data transmis-
sion to promote the transmission of “real time” information. 
Catches are generally registered routinely in a logbook, in
landing declarations, and in sales notes and cross-checked with
VMS-data to allow an effective management of the quota
uptake. Port State controls can contribute to the verification of
information obtained through VMS requirements and the catch
information described above.
The international community underlined the importance
attached to the use of VMS on the high seas in the March 2006
UN General Assembly Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries. It
urged flag States to require that all their large-scale fishing ves-
sels operating on the high seas be fitted with VMS no later than





FAO maintains information systems with databases useful
for combating IUU fishing. Information on IUU fishing vessels
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is kept in the FAO High Seas Vessel Authorization Record
(“HSVAR”) database. It contains descriptive elements of high
seas fishing vessels as well as information on registration and
authorization status, infringements, and other relevant informa-
tion. Access to the database is granted by FAO to countries that
provide data.13
The international community identified a need for addi-
tional data relevant to IUU fishing activities, vessels, and port
State measures. In March 2006 the UN General Assembly, in its
Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries,14 encouraged and sup-
ported the development of a “comprehensive global record”
within FAO of fishing vessels that incorporates available infor-
mation on beneficial ownership, subject to confidentiality
requirements in accordance with national law. Potential syner-
gies between the proposed global record and port State inspec-
tions are being considered. A data base that identifies IUU
vessels and catch at port could assist in the activation of port
controls with respect to relevant vessels. A report will be pre-
pared for consideration by the 2007 Session of COFI. 
International MCS Network
There have been recent efforts to strengthen the Interna-
tional MCS Network for Fisheries Related Activities, which has
a protocol for information
exchange that could be used to
support port State controls.15 It
consists of a network of national
organizations and institutions
formed to coordinate efforts to
prevent, deter, and eliminate
IUU fishing. The objective of the
International MCS Network is to
improve the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of fisheries-related
M C S a c t i v i t i e s t h r o u g h
enhanced cooperation, coordination, information collection, and
exchange among national organizations/institutions responsible
for fisheries-related MCS. It is intended to give agencies support
in meeting national fisheries responsibilities as well as interna-
tional and regional commitments in relation to the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, the Code of Conduct, the Fish Stocks
Agreement, and the IPOA-IUU.
The strengthening of the MCS Network was recommended
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (“OECD”) High Seas Task Force and is supported by the
current UK IUU Action Plan.16
TRADE AND INTERNATIONALLY AGREED MARKET-
RELATED MEASURES TO COMBAT IUU FISHING
Ports play a pivotal role as points of entry into a country for
fish and fish products. This role contributes to the need for effec-
tive use of the IPOA-IUU tools aiming at diminishing the eco-
nomic incentive for IUU fishing through preventing IUU caught
fish from entering trade. In turn, these efforts are also buttressed
by eco-labelling initiatives, trade monitoring under the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”),
and requirements for traceability— including the agreement on
rules of origin taken through the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”). In this regard, the IPOA-IUU provides encouragement
for internationally agreed market-related measures to be taken at
the national, bilateral, and regional levels.17 An increasing num-
ber of RFMOs have adopted such measures.18
The IPOA-IUU encourages States to take all steps necessary,
consistent with international law, to prevent fish caught by vessels
identified by the relevant RFMO as having been engaged in IUU
fishing from being traded or imported into their territories.19 To
address this situation, many RFMOs have implemented catch
certification and trade documentation schemes20 that enable
identification of the vessel that harvested a particular fish. 
These schemes require that fish and fish products be accom-
panied by forms indicating, for example, when and where the
fish were harvested and by whom. Catch certification schemes
typically require such forms to accompany all fish and fish prod-
ucts to which they apply, whether or not they become part of
international trade. Trade documentation schemes cover only
fish and fish products that enter international trade. Inspection at
port would serve to assist in verification of information required
under the schemes, and therefore play a major role in their suc-
cess.
At national level, many
countries have adopted legisla-
tion based on the US Lacey
Act,21 prohibiting activities such
as the import, export, sale, pur-
chase, or acquisition of IUU
caught fish, and port State meas-
ures figure prominently in the
enforcement of such legislation.22
The IPOA-IUU also calls
upon states to deter importers,
transhippers, buyers, con-
sumers, equipment suppliers, bankers, insurers, and other serv-
ice suppliers within their jurisdiction from doing business with
vessels engaged in IUU fishing, including adopting laws to make
such business illegal.23 Efforts are being made in a number of
quarters to increase awareness of the detrimental effects of doing
business with vessels engaged in IUU fishing by identifying
marketing and sales routes of fish derived from IUU activities.24
Information obtained through port inspections would assist with
the identification of such routes, and conversely, identification of
the routes would alert enforcement officers to the ports used for
landing.
Port State measures could also contribute to efforts to target
businesses involved in IUU fishing, prevent laundering of
catches by IUU vessels and to take actions against businesses
involved in IUU fishing and other cooperative actions with coun-
tries where the businesses are based.25
FLAG STATE AND PORT STATE INTERACTIONS
The flag State has primary responsibility for its fishing ves-
sels to ensure that they do not engage in IUU fishing. However,
this has often proved ineffective due to the practice of IUU fish-
ing vessels using flags of non-compliance or the inability or
Port State measures are
the “last untapped area”
in efforts to combat 
IUU fishing.
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unwillingness of some flag States to effectively exercise control
over their fishing vessels. In such cases, the port State is seen as
the next line of defence to combat IUU fishing, and interactions
between port States and flag States are significant in this regard. 
Key interactions involving port States and flag States,
described in the IPOA-IUU, encourage the port State to report to
the flag State where there is clear evidence of IUU activity and
where IUU fishing took place beyond the coastal State’s jurisdic-
tion. The port State may then take other action with the consent
of, or upon the request of, the flag State.
In any event, where a port State has clear evidence that a
vessel having been granted access to its ports has engaged in
IUU fishing activity, the port State should not allow the vessel to
land or transship fish in its ports, and should report the matter to
the flag State of the vessel. 
In addition, the port State should not allow a vessel engaged
in IUU to land or tranship fish in its ports.26 However, there is no
requirement to report to the flag State if the vessel is presumed
to have engaged in IUU fishing as defined by a relevant RFMO.
Additionally, the IPOA-IUU encourages States to consider
developing within relevant RFMOs port State measures building
on the presumption that fishing
vessels entitled to fly the flag of
States not parties to a regional
fisheries management organiza-
tion and which have not agreed
to cooperate with that RFMO,
which are identified as being
engaged in fishing activities in
the area of that particular organi-
zation, may be engaging in IUU
fishing. Such port State meas-
ures may prohibit landings and
transhipment of catch unless the
identified vessel can establish
that the catch was taken in a manner consistent with those con-
servation and management measures. 
The policies and procedures adopted by countries and
RFMOs involving the refusal of port calls against certain flag
vessels have varied.27 For the most part, the vessels themselves
are targeted and not the flag States. Vessels that have under-
mined conservation and management measures of an RFMO to
which a country is party, are refused entry into port as are for-
eign fishing vessels that have taken part in an unregulated fishery
on the high seas.
RFMOs take different approaches in their application of
port State measures, with some only requiring measures for non-
members and others including all members and national vessels.
This could be an area for further coordination and strengthening.
ERA OF THE FAO MODEL SCHEME: SOME
RESPONSES AND NEXT STEPS
There has been a swift and significant response by the inter-
national community to the endorsement by COFI of the FAO
Model Scheme in March 2005. Prior to that time, the need for
strengthened port State controls had been recognized by a num-
ber of international organizations and fora. The rapid global and
high level response to the adoption of the Model Scheme is
indicative that the scheme was long overdue, and that much work
remains to be done at all levels. 
THE UN SYSTEM
In its July 2005 report to the General Assembly, the UN
Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the
Law of the Sea (“ICP”) promoted the FAO Port State Model
Scheme and suggested the possibility of a legally binding instru-
ment.28 The recommendation was made in the context of consid-
ering fisheries and their contribution to sustainable development.
It is significant that, only four months after COFI endorsed the
FAO Model Scheme, there was already a call for the possibility
of adopting a legally binding instrument. 
Four months after the ICP report, the UN General Assembly
(“UNGA”), at its 60th session in November 2005, carried for-
ward the momentum supporting a binding instrument in its Res-
olution on Sustainable Fisheries. Earlier that year, prior to the
endorsement of the Model Scheme by COFI, the UNGA Resolu-
tion on Sustainable Fisheries had recognized the need for
enhanced port State controls and encouraged the elaboration of a
draft model scheme.29
Importantly, in the Novem-
ber 2005 Sustainable Fisheries
Resolution, the UNGA encour-
aged States to apply the FAO
Model Scheme, promote its
application through RFBs, and
to “consider, when appropriate,
the possibility of developing a
legally binding instrument”30
(emphasis added). The Novem-
ber Resolution continued the
two-track approach encouraged
by ICP, recognizing that the value of the voluntary scheme but
the need for a binding instrument. 
Six months later, in May 2006, the momentum for the two-
track approach was reinforced, and a new and more immediate
call for a binding instrument was put forward by the Review
Conference for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The Report
noted the following in connection with the review and assess-
ment of the Conference on matters relating to Monitoring, Con-
trol and Surveillance, and Compliance and Enforcement:
“A number of port States and RFMOs have developed
measures or schemes to prevent the landing and trans-
shipment of illegally caught fish in order to promote com-
pliance with RFMO conservation and management
measures. However, there is still much to be done in devel-
oping such measures or schemes. In particular, a more
coordinated approach among States and RFMOs is
required.”31
To address this, the Conference recommended that States
individually and collectively through RFMOs: 
“Adopt all necessary port State measures, consistent with
Article 23 of the Agreement, particularly those envisioned
Ports play a pivotal role
as points of entry into 
a country for fish and 
fish products.
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in the 2005 FAO Model Scheme on Port State Measures to
Combat IUU Fishing, and promote minimum standards at
the regional level; and in parallel, initiate, as soon as pos-
sible, a process within the FAO to develop, as appropriate,
a legally binding instrument on minimum standards for
port State measures, building on the FAO Model Scheme
and the IPOA-IUU”32 (emphasis added).
It is clear that the international community is moving for-
ward in an increasingly strong manner, not only to enhance port
State measures at all levels and apply the FAO Model Scheme,
but to develop a legally binding instrument sooner rather than
later. 
MINISTERIAL INITIATIVES AND FORA
There were three Ministerial meetings or conferences and
one Ministerially-led initiative between September 2005 and
August 2006. Significantly, two Ministerial meetings that have
taken place since the UN Fish Stocks Review Conference
endorsed its recommendation for a process to be initiated within
FAO as soon as possible to develop, as appropriate, a legally
binding instrument on minimum standards for port State meas-
ures.
The Second Asian Pacific
Economic Commission (“APEC”)
Ocean-Related Ministerial
Meeting, held in September
2005, involved twenty member
economies and adopted the Bali
Plan of Action Towards Healthy
Oceans and Coasts for the Sus-
tainable Growth and Prosperity
of the Asia-Pacific Community.
The Ministers committed, where
appropriate, to undertake certain
actions, including strengthening
efforts to combat IUU fishing
including by pursuing the use of at-sea, port-state and trade-
related measures, in accordance with international law, as key
compliance tools, through APEC capacity building and sharing
of best practices, and strengthening efforts to collaborate
through MCS regimes and the MCS network.33 They did not
refer specifically to the FAO Model Scheme, but it is significant
that port State measures figured as one of the three priority com-
pliance tools.
At the 11th Conference of North Atlantic Fisheries Minis-
ters (“NAFMC”), in June 2006, Ministers focused their discus-
sions on fighting IUU fishing in the North Atlantic and on the
progress made to strengthen RFMOs. They also agreed to focus
future activities on strengthening port State control through the
development of a legally binding instrument as advised by the
2006 UNFSA Review Conference, and to consider the potential
for a comprehensive regional scheme for port State control,
based on the outcome of the NEAFC process.34
A Round Table Conference on Measures against IUU Fish-
ing was held at Trondheim, Norway, on August 7, 2006, and was
attended by Ministers or their representatives from eight coun-
tries and the European Commission. There, the Norwegian, Dan-
ish, and Swedish governments stressed the importance of intro-
ducing official management of ports, stating that IUU fishing is
nothing short of theft from legitimate fishermen, undermining
the conservation and management of fish stocks. They also
stressed the value of continuing cooperative efforts to combat
IUU fishing particularly through closer cooperation between rel-
evant RFMOs. Specifically, participants agreed to look at future
activities on strengthening port State control, through the devel-
opment of a legally binding instrument as advised by the 2006
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, and
to consider the potential for a comprehensive regional scheme
for port State control, based on the FAO Model.
The Ministerially-led High Seas Task Force (“HSTF”) of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
had an overall goal of setting priorities among a series of practi-
cal proposals for confronting the challenge of IUU fishing on the
high seas. The end result announced in February, 2006 was an
Action Plan on IUU Fishing currently being implemented under
the leadership of the UK Minister responsible for fisheries. The
HSTF, in its final report, reviewed the measures adopted by Task
Force members and RFMOs and
compared them to the FAO
Model Scheme. The report also
made recommendations to
strengthen both national port
State measures and develop
regional arrangements on port
State controls. An outcome of
the HSTF report was a proposal
to support greater use of port
and trade measures by promot-
ing the FAO Model Scheme as
the international minimum stan-
dard for regional port State con-
trols and to support the proposal by COFI that FAO develop an
electronic database of port State measures.35
CONCLUSION
The overdue FAO Model Scheme is being repeatedly and
increasingly adopted at all levels as a framework for further
development of port State measures. At the same time, the two-
track approach recommended by ICP, the UN General Assembly,
and the UN Fish Stocks Review Conference, which also had
been endorsed at Ministerial meetings and conferences, has
attracted considerable energy and support in a short space of
time. Why is this so? 
The need for a legally binding agreement at this stage could
be questioned. The FAO Model Scheme, although still in its
infancy, is already being used as the basis for national and
regional measures; therefore, all efforts should be put into build-
ing on its recommended standards. Supporting this is the percep-
tion of implementation fatigue: the 1990s was the decade of
developing international fisheries instruments, and this is the
decade of implementation, not of creating more binding instru-
ments. Laws, institutions, policies, and human capacity need to
The flag State has
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ensure that they do not
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be developed to implement the instruments that have already
been agreed. One should question whether a binding instrument
would make any difference to environmental crime — would
ports of convenience not continue to exist?
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons to respond,
sooner rather than later, to the call for a binding instrument.
Generally, the Model Scheme, although a sound document that
reflects international consensus on a range of minimum stan-
dards, was developed and concluded in just one FAO Technical
Consultation, an achievement, to be sure. However, the process
was not as comprehensive or inclusive as those agreed for other
international fisheries instruments.
The FAO Model Scheme could be regarded as a stepping-
stone; a broader process, involving a full complement of players,
could build on, and as appropriate, expand the current standards.
Unlike more general voluntary fisheries instruments, the FAO
Model Scheme is highly technical and specific, building on the
IPOA-IUU. The next step could result in more comprehensive
and universal technical standards that could be applied nation-
ally and adapted regionally. 
Experience to date in implementing the FAO Model Scheme
could benefit the process to develop a binding instrument;
strengths, constraints, and gaps uncovered in the process to
implement the Model Scheme could be addressed. Such a
process could accommodate the increasing commitment of the
international community in combating IUU fishing. 
Implementation of the Model Scheme would not preclude
development of a binding instrument but could enhance the final
outcome. Although an agreed binding instrument could mean
that port controls based on the FAO Model Scheme will need to
be updated, the fact that the measures are binding would
strengthen the prospects for strong and coordinated efforts to
combat IUU fishing. 
It is anticipated that the issue will be considered in the next
session of COFI in March 2007. By that time the international
community will have had further opportunities to express its
views on the subject, including in the November, 2006 General
Assembly Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries. In the meantime,
in many quarters, exemplary progress is being made in imple-
menting the FAO Model Scheme at national and regional levels.
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equipment, available at http://www.parismou.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); (2)
MOUs establishing regional port State regimes around the world, which incor-
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http://www.imo.org/home.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2006); and (4) IMO’s global
strategy for port State control.
2 The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement refers to situations where the port
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“right and duty” of a port State to take non-discriminatory measures in accor-
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that States may, among other things, inspect documents, fishing gear and catch
on board fishing vessels, when they are voluntarily in its ports or at its offshore
terminals, and empower their authorities to prohibit landings and transhipments
where the catch was taken in a manner which undermines high seas conserva-
tion and management measures; the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsi-
ble Fisheries, in the context of fishing operations, recommends that port States
should take non-discriminatory measures to achieve and assist others in achiev-
ing the objectives of the Code of Conduct, and inform other States; the 2001
FAO International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing (“IPOA-IUU”) contains guidelines for port State
access, information to be collected from fishing vessels and the process for
actions to be taken where IUU fishing is suspected. 
3 David J. Doulman, The FAO/FFA Regional Workshop to Promote the Full and
Effective Implementation of Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing, Aug.
28–Sept. 1, 2006, Role of the Port State in Combating IUU Fishing and Pro-
moting Long-term Sustainability in Fisheries, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/FI/
DOCUMENT/tc-psm/Reg_Workshop_2006/Default.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2006).
4 Report of the Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. New York, 22 to 26 May 2006
A/CONF.210/2006/15 (July 3, 2006), para. 82, available at http://www.un.
org/depts/los/convention_agreements/reviewconf/reviewconferencedraftreport.
pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Fish Stocks Report].
5 See Fish Stocks Report, id. 
6 See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982 Relating to the Con-
servation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, art. 23, available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/unfsa.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter UN Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
7 Report of the First International Meeting on the Establishment of the Pro-
posed South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, held in
Wellington, New Zealand, 14–17 February 2006. Participants understood that
conservation and management includes the sustainable utilisation of resources
and the protection of the marine environment, and that the new instrument
should, as far as possible, avoid duplication and overlap with existing interna-
tional instruments and should be consistent with international law relating to
law of the sea. The meeting was attended by representatives from 26 states and
regional economic integrated organisations, including coastal states and states
with a historical fishing interest in accordance with FAO statistics. Eleven inter-
national and regional fisheries organisations, and eight non-governmental
organisations and industry groups also participated as observers at the meeting. 
8 Participants are the Republic of Korea, Japan and the Russian Federation. The
three States have agreed to cooperate in the compilation, analysis and exchange
of data on bottom trawling in this region.
9 See High Seas Task Force, Port States Measures Final Report — Promoting
Responsible Ports, available at http://www.high-seas.org/ (last visited Sept. 30,
2006); see also T. Lobach, the FAO/FFA Regional Workshop to Promote the
Full and Effective Implementation of Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fish-
ing, Aug. 28–Sept. 1, 2006, Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing: The
FAO Model Scheme on Port State Measures, available at http://www.fao.org/
fi/NEMS/events/detail_event.asp?event_id=34648 (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
10 See UN Fish Stocks Agreement, supra, note 6, at art. 17.1.
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U
nder normal conditions, many species of algae form the
base of the ocean’s food chain and support the growth of
aquatic and terrestrial animals.1 However, algae can
grow out of control creating a large mass called a harmful algae
bloom (“HAB”) that produces dangerous toxins and threatens
both humans and aquatic animals.2 In 2003, Congress passed
legislation promoting more research on HABs in an attempt to
prevent the damaging effects of these blooms on our oceans and
lakes.3 Nevertheless, even after Congress recognized that a sin-
gle HAB can cost millions of dollars in damage, it has not
passed any legislation aimed at preventing or controlling this
problem.4
Red tide, a form of HAB, is
prevalent in oceans worldwide,
including in all major bodies of
water that touch the United
States.5 States and people
affected by red tide, or other
HABs, often suffer economi-
cally and socially because of
beach closings and bans on
shellfish harvests. For example,
red tide forced the governors of
Maine and Massachusetts to
declare states of emergency dur-
ing the summer of 2005; federal aid was also requested to soften
the financial impact of an HAB on the shellfish industry.6
Additionally, there are often fatal consequences for animals
that consume shellfish containing toxins from HABs.7 In a one-
year period, researchers found HABs responsible for the deaths
of 72 manatees in Florida, along with 57 dolphins, and 319 sea
lions in California.8 What makes addressing the HAB issue even
more difficult is the fact that many estuaries located in the U.S.
are affected by different species of algae that produce a diverse
range of toxins. Consequently, the varied effects of algae species
lead to the erroneous belief that a decentralized approach will
best solve the problems created by HABs. Unfortunately, many
of the factors believed to support the growth of algae blooms are
the same throughout all coastal waters: (1) increased water tem-
peratures; (2) coastal water pollution; and (3) algae cyst
deposits.9
The combination of warmer waters and the increase of pol-
lution run-off into rivers will only intensify the problem and cre-
ate larger areas of blooms.10 While Congress should be
applauded for conducting and promoting research on HABs, it
needs to move beyond research and start protecting these vulner-
able ecosystems before these blooms permanently damage our
coastal waters and the surrounding environments. 
Endnotes:
1 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-326, at 5
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1998 §§ 601-05, 16 U.S.C. § 1451
(2006). 
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-326, at 6
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10 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-326 (2003). 
CHANGING TIDES: THE NEED FOR NEW
LEGISLATION TO PREVENT ALGAE BLOOMS
by Marcel De Armas* 
* Marcel De Armas is a JD candidate, May 2008, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law. 
Algae can grow out of
control creating a large
mass called a harmful
algae bloom.
45 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
INTRODUCTION
S
hips take on water by gravity or through pumping and
store that water in onboard tanks to control trim and draft,
provide stability, and enhance voyage safety — an action
known as ballasting. Although any heavy solid or liquid can
serve as ballasting material, ships almost exclusively employ
ballast water for operational convenience. Ships often store bal-
last water as compensation for those times in which they are less
than fully loaded. The term ballast water is a bit of a misnomer,
however, as the “water” contains organisms and pathogens that
were present in the aquatic environment from which the ballast
originated; while other organisms and pathogens that have been
entrained in ballast water tanks are found in a sediment layer,
which separates out from the liquid phase in the tanks.1 When
ships reach destination ports, they discharge ballast (both water
and the surviving organisms and pathogens) into those new port
environments. Ballast is discharged for many reasons, including
to lighten loads to aid naviga-
tion or to take on additional
cargo. In new aquatic environ-
ments, some introduced organ-
isms reproduce, live more than
one life cycle, and become
established. These organisms —
referred to as exotic, non-native,
non-indigenous, alien, nuisance,
marine pests, or invasive —
may, for example, out-compete
native aquatic species, transmit
diseases to native species, or
contaminate the genome of native species through inter-breed-
ing. Pathogens such as E. Coli also may be present in ballast
water (for example, where local discharge of untreated sewage to
coastal waters occurs), thus providing a vector for disease trans-
mission to human populations from one port to the next.
The use of ballast to stabilize ships has been employed since
the Phoenicians began to trade by sea, however two changes dur-
ing the industrial era have greatly increased the rate of species
transfer from one aquatic environment to another: first, a techno-
logical shift from solid to liquid ballast; and second, globaliza-
tion of trade and the concomitant increase in the number, size,
and speed of ships engaged in waterborne commerce. Because
the marine transportation system presently moves the vast
majority of international trade,2 vessels have become the pri-
mary vector for the introduction of non-indigenous species.3
Indeed, each day some three thousand species are transported in
ship ballast or on ships’ hulls.4
Although the impact of species introduction is in one sense
ecological, those ecological impacts have potentially grave
socio-economic consequences,5 as witnessed by the infestation
of zebra mussels in the North American Great Lakes.6 In
response, there have been efforts at local, national, and global
levels to control species introductions from ships’ ballast. A
number of countries have adopted rules and regulations related
to the handling of ballast water, including Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Chile, Israel, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the
United States.7 Significant achievements have been realized at
the global scale — the arena that is the focus of this paper. Of
particular relevance is a recently adopted convention by the
International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) regarding ballast
water, the International Convention for the Control and Manage-
ment of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (“Ballast
Water Convention” or “BWC”).8
THE BALLAST WATER
CONVENTION
Each Party to the Ballast
Water Convention is required,
“with due regard to its particular
conditions and capabilities,” to
develop national ballast water
management policies and “pro-
mote the attainment” of the Con-
vention objectives.9 Each Party
also “shall require” ships flying
its flag to comply with the Con-
vention, including taking “effective measures” to ensure such
compliance.10 The Convention applies to all ships with a few
practical exceptions,11 although States may exempt certain ves-
sels from the ballast water discharge standards that follow speci-
fied routes based on a risk assessment undertaken in accordance
with guidelines to be developed by the IMO.12 The Ballast Water
Convention is to be applied by Parties as a condition for port
entry for non-parties; thus ships of non-parties receive “no more
favorable treatment.”13
The Parties to the Convention have a number of obligations,
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APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
The Ballast Water Convention applies to discharges of
“harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens” and to “sediments”
that settle out of ballast water from ships that fly the flag of, or
are otherwise under the administration of, a Party to the Conven-
tion. The Convention defines the term “harmful aquatic organ-
isms and pathogens” as organisms and pathogens, “which, if
introduced into the sea including estuaries, or into fresh water
courses, may create hazards to the environment, human health,
property or resources, impair biological diversity, or interfere
with other legitimate uses of such areas.”30 By reference to “bio-
logical diversity” and the use of the permissive “may,” this defi-
nition is less anthropocentric than other definitions of
“pollution” under international law, such as found in UNCLOS
or as crafted by the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific
Assessment  of  Mar ine  Envi ronmenta l  Pro tec t ion
(“GESAMP”).31 Moreover, in the preamble of the Ballast Water
Convention there is explicit acknowledgement of the threat that
ballast water poses to the conser-
vation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and of the
actions taken by the Convention
on Biological Diversity Confer-
ence of Parties to protect marine
biodiversity from invasive
species.32 These developments
suggest an expanded regulatory
horizon for the IMO; in addition,
the definition moves beyond pol-
lution prevention to biodiversity
protection.
While no mention of the
precautionary approach is found
in the substantive text of the
Convention, the Parties were at
least “mindful” of it.33 Rather
than explicitly relying on the
precautionary approach, the Convention establishes specific
requirements in a number of areas, including: ballast water man-
agement planning and reporting,34 ship surveying and certifica-
tion,35 ballast water exchange,36 sediment management,37 ballast
water treatment,38 and additional measures for certain areas in
order to prevent, minimize, and ultimately eliminate the threat
posed by aquatic organisms and pathogens contained in ballast
water.39
When in force, the Ballast Water Convention will require
each ship from a signatory Party to have an approved ship-spe-
cific Ballast Water Management Plan (“BWMP”).40 A ship also
must have on board a ballast water record book in which to enter
and maintain a record of its ballast activities and explain the cir-
cumstances behind, and the reasons for, any non-standard bal-
lasting activities (e.g., due to an exemption, for safety, or as a
result of an accident).41
Each ship of 400 gross tonnage or more will be required to
undertake a series of surveys to ensure that its BWMP “and any
including: to provide technical assistance “as appropriate;” “to
cooperate actively” in technology transfer “subject to their
national laws;” and to enhance regional cooperation, particularly
in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.14 The Parties also have obli-
gations regarding monitoring, data gathering and sharing,15
inspection16 and enforcement,17 and are required to inform the
IMO and other Parties of domestic ballast water management
requirements, procedures, and reception facilities for ballast
water and related sediments.18
Article 9 provides that when a ship is flying the flag of one
Party to the Convention in a “port or offshore terminal of
another Party,” the ship is subject to inspection for the “purpose
of determining whether the ship is in compliance with this Con-
vention.”19 A port State also may inspect a ship if a request is
received from another Party, “together with sufficient evidence
that a ship is operating or has operated in violation of a provi-
sion” of the Convention.20 In general, inspections are limited to
verifying that the ship has a valid International Ballast Water
Management Certificate, inspecting the Ballast Water record
book, and sampling the ballast
water in accordance with guide-
lines to be developed by IMO.21
By authorizing port States to
sample ballast water to deter-
mine compliance with ballast
water discharge standards in the
absence of “clear grounds” for
believing that the ship does not
conform substantially to the
Certificate, the Ballast Water
Convention, like the 2001 Inter-
national Convention on the
Control of Harmful Anti-Foul-
ing Systems on Ships,22 repre-
sents a significant departure
from prior international prac-
tice.23 Authorizing compliance
sampling rather than merely a paper examination is a major step
that should enhance compliance with the Ballast Water Conven-
tion. The Convention requires flag, coastal, and port States to
establish sanctions for violations.24 Importantly, port and coastal
States have authority under the Convention to not only furnish
the flag State with information regarding a violation, but, in the
alternative, can themselves institute enforcement proceedings.25
This grant of authority to port and coastal States, while not
unusual on its face,26 takes on added significance given the abil-
ity of port States to engage in compliance sampling. In contrast,
the two most prominent examples of international instruments
providing for enhanced port and coastal State control and/or
jurisdiction, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS”)27 and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agree-
ment,28 are structured in such a manner that enforcement under
those regimes ultimately can devolve to the flag State if that
State so wishes.29 The Ballast Water Convention thus encom-
passes an expanded vision of port State control. 
Perhaps the most
important aspect of the
Ballast Water Convention
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associated structure, equipment, systems, fitting, arrangements,
and material or processes comply fully” and “have been main-
tained in accordance with” the Convention and “remain satisfac-
tory for the service for which the ship was intended.”42 These
surveys must be conducted after each significant ship repair and
at other specified intervals. After passing the surveys the ship
receives certification. This certificate is valid for a period of not
greater than five years, but it ceases to be valid if the ship
changes its flag registry to a different State.43
The Convention requires ships to engage in ballast water
exchange with “at least 95 percent volumetric exchange” or to
pump through three times the volume of each ballast water
tank.44 Each Party to the Convention must ensure that “ade-
quate” sediment reception facilities are provided “where clean-
ing or repair of ballast water tanks occurs.”45
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Ballast Water Con-
vention is its establishment of
concentration-based ballast
water performance standards,
which ships that fly the flag of a
State Party must meet. Assum-
ing timely entry into force of the
Convention, these standards will
come into effect between 2009
and 2016 depending on vessel
class, size, and construction
date.46 Vessels can gain an addi-
tional five years by participating
in a technology demonstration
project.47 Two performance stan-
dards (limits) are set for “viable
organisms” and three perform-
ance standards are set for “indi-
cator microbes” in order to
protect human health from
pathogens.48 These standards
must be achieved unless the ves-
sel undertakes alternative meth-
ods that ensure an equivalent
level of protection.49
The Ballast Water Convention also explicitly acknowledges
the right of individual States to establish “more stringent meas-
ures . . . consistent with international law.”50 While States enjoy
broad authority to condition entry into their ports on compliance
with environmental and other mandates — for example, the U.S.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires oil tankers to be double
hulled51 — it is unusual, although not unprecedented, for an
international treaty to explicitly acknowledge the right of States
to establish more stringent standards.52
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Given the aquatic organism and pathogen performance stan-
dards and the lack of off-the-shelf technology to necessarily
meet them, it is expected that substantial thought and effort will
be directed in the near-term toward developing treatment tech-
nologies that will reduce or eliminate the introduction of species
from ballast water as cheaply as possible. However, as noted
above, individual States may regulate ballast water discharges
more stringently, and the global standards established by the
Ballast Water Convention are not inviolate. Indeed, the Conven-
tion performance standards are subject to review by the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (“MEPC”) “no later than
three years before” their “earliest effective date.”53 To assist the
MEPC in its review of ballast water standards, Resolution Two
of the Conference Final Act,54 calls for the application of “suit-
able” decision-making tools. Fundamental, interdisciplinary
research is thus needed not only to facilitate implementation of
the specified standards, but to design and develop these decision
and risk assessment tools as well. 
In light of the existing performance standards, the man-
dated-review of the standards, and the ability of States to imple-
ment more stringent measures on a State-by-State basis, what is
needed is: (a) an enhanced
understanding of which trade
routes and vessel types present
the greatest risk of introducing
non-indigenous species; (b)
information on which treatment
technology or suite of technolo-
gies will need to be employed on
a particular vessel that follows a
specific route to reduce the con-
centration of viable organisms
and pathogens prior to discharge
to levels that are below the stan-
dards specified in the Conven-
tion; (c) exploration of the
least-cost solution for that ves-
sel to come into compliance
with the standards; and (d) an
evaluation of the cost-effective-
ness of meeting the present stan-
dards  and/or  a l te r na t ive
standards. Attention also may be
directed toward whether an
administratively feasible and
enforceable alternative market-based standard that would allow
for trading among vessels can provide equal protection at lower
cost. 
Decisions such as how to implement the BWC can be diffi-
cult for several reasons.55 To begin with, a decision may simply
be complicated, with a number of factors to consider. In addi-
tion, some considerations that bear on a decision may be uncer-
tain. In the present context, ecosystem risk factors, vector
characteristics, and treatment technology efficacy and costs are
all uncertain to at least a limited degree. Frequently, a decision
also poses tradeoffs among desirable attributes or objectives.
Moreover, because differently-situated actors often approach a
question from their own unique perspectives, they in turn weigh
decision criteria differently. While port States may place a prior-
ity on protecting sensitive ecosystems from species introduc-
Policy-makers could
construct a ballast water
management regime that
applies selectively to those
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tions, the major maritime nations may be more interested in
meeting the economic goals of shippers that fly their flags. 
PROPOSED MODEL TO FACILITATE
BWC IMPLEMENTATION
With the above discussion as a backdrop, what is proposed is
a Ballast Water Discharge Compliance and Policy Support Model
(“BWDCPSM”)56 that is premised on five primary objectives: 
• Minimizing the number of viable organisms discharged
(or, alternatively achieving a specified standard);
• Reducing the time needed to achieve reductions;
• Minimizing total cost (public and private);
• Protecting particularly sensitive ecosystems; and
• Maximizing technology adoption by vessels according to
their relative risk of introducing organisms.
By evaluating how alternative policy scenarios fare under
these five objectives, such a model could shed light on points of
agreement, identify other considerations in need of more scien-
tific research or policy development, and generally assist policy-
makers in the implementation of the Ballast Water Convention
and other applicable policies. 
The BWDCPSM extends a recent model that Winebrake,
Corbett, and others developed to generate optimal passenger
ferry air pollution reductions.57 In laymen’s terms, it is an opti-
mization model that allows determination of the minimum cost
required for a given ship (or ships) that takes a particular voyage
to meet a specified ballast water discharge performance standard
given the cost and efficacy of the suite of available treatment
technologies. The BWDCPSM can generate results in a disag-
gregated fashion that will: 1) permit analysis of the relative risk
posed by a given vessel (e.g., by type, tonnage, ballast tank
capacity) undertaking a particular voyage;58 2) support imple-
mentation of the Ballast Water Convention; and 3) assist policy-
makers in their consideration of the relative merits of alternative
policy goals. 
The model can be run under various policy scenarios,
including the Ballast Water Convention’s concentration-based
standards. Alternatively, the BWDCPSM permits a user to
model either more stringent or more lenient concentration-based
standards to facilitate the Convention-mandated review of stan-
dards established therein. It also assists States that may wish to
set more stringent standards. Indeed, a legislative proposal
before the U.S. Senate would, if adopted, set ballast water organ-
ism discharge standards for U.S. waters at 1/100 of those estab-
lished by the Ballast Water Convention.59 Moreover, recent
testimony before the U.S. Congress recommended establishing a
standard of zero live organisms above 50 microns to simplify
enforcement.60
The BWDCPSM can facilitate the analysis of other policy
scenarios as well. For example, concentration-based standards
could vary by port (e.g., some ports may have sensitive ecosys-
tems while others may have ecosystems that have only a slight
chance of being invaded) or be even more finely-tuned standards
that vary by source-destination port pair. Furthermore, the
model is flexible enough that, at a given port, a concentration-
based standard could be set at the average concentration of
viable organisms in the ballast water across all discharges.
Finally, in addition to, or in place of a concentration-based stan-
dard, other constraints could be specified such as one on the total
number of organisms that could be discharged into a port
ecosystem over a given period of time. In sum, inclusion of pol-
icy variables in the BWDCPSM permits decision-makers to
model the technical feasibility of achieving various policy objec-
tives, alternative means of achieving those objectives, and the
comparative compliance costs associated with those means. And
for any given policy scenario, the model will generate the least-
cost solution. More specifically, the objective function for the
model, assuming a policy that places limits on both the concen-
tration and the total number of viable organisms that may be dis-
charged, is:
The binary variable BINKv,k takes on a value of “1” if a
given treatment technology (k) (e.g., filtration) is incorporated
on a specific vessel (v) and a value of “0” otherwise. The vari-
able KTEv,k is the total annual expense (the capital cost annual-
ized over its lifetime at a given discount rate plus operation and
maintenance costs) of incorporating technology k on vessel v.
Those two variables are multiplied together in equation (1) and
the resulting product is summed over all vessels and treatment
technologies, with the objective of minimizing total costs. Cv is
the concentration of viable organisms (e.g., the number per cubic
meter) in the ballast water discharge of vessel v. It is a function
of the initial organism/pathogen concentration by size and a
number of factors that affect survivability, including: donor and
recipient attributes such as water temperature and salinity; voy-
age duration; ballast water tank size; volume exchanged at sea;
and treatment efficacy. Pv is the maximum concentration of
viable organisms permitted by regulatory authorities to be dis-
charged by vessel v. Under equation (1a), the concentration dis-
charged must be less than that permitted. Finally, Vv is the
volume of ballast water discharged by vessel v and Qv is the
maximum quantity of organisms permitted by regulatory author-
ities to be discharged by vessel v.
The use of limits on the concentration and quantity of
organisms discharged (the risk of introduction) in the model
rather than the risk of harm/invasion61 has parallels in the sur-
face water quality discharge regulatory context where regulators
can choose to focus on end of pipe discharge limits rather than
water quality parameters. The choice of risk of introduction also
is sensible given a similar focus in the Ballast Water Convention.
Moreover, at this point in time, we believe it prudent to avoid
modeling individual species or quantifying species invasive
potential given the fact that the majority of species that move in
international waterborne commerce have yet to be identified, let
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alone analyzed for their invasive potential.62 In any event, pre-
dicting invasiveness continues to confound experts.63
CONCLUSION
The Ballast Water Convention has ushered in a new era: it
suggests that the international community has come to recognize
that near-exclusive flag State control is outmoded and that flag
State prerogatives must be complemented by, and in some cir-
cumstances give way to, coastal and port State jurisdiction. In
this modern era, crew safety remains paramount and a reason-
able flag-State interest, but it has been joined by biodiversity
protection, which is primarily a port or coastal State interest. The
BWC also provides evidence that the international community
has begun to take seriously the threat posed by organisms and
pathogens contained in ballast water. 
In regard to the last point, the Ballast Water Discharge Com-
pliance and Policy Support Model can help decision-makers
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cience and policy concerning oceans must be considered
as strategies are developed to attempt to buffer the impacts
of climate change from the global to the local levels. As
discussed in this article, climate change science and policy need
to be inserted into the oceans agenda, and oceans science and
policy need to be inserted in the climate agenda. Also discussed
are the outcomes from the Third Global Conference of Oceans,
Coasts, and Islands and the effectiveness of the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment Scientific Report of 2004. Finally, possible
impacts and responses to climate change for the Canadian Beau-
fort Sea, a “hot spot” within the Arctic, is examined. 
GLOBAL CLIMATE AND OCEANS INITIATIVES
The Third Global Conference on Oceans, Coasts, and
Islands took place in Paris from
January 23 to 28, 2006 and
included a panel on oceans and
climate issues. A summary of
the panel was drafted, which
included recommendations aris-
ing from the panel and the fol-
lowing discussion.1 Recognition
of and recommendations for
oceans and climate issues are
crucial, as the need for global
mitigative measures (as well as
global, regional, and local adap-
tive measures) are of vital
importance. These measures are
required to minimize climate
impacts on coasts and oceans,
coastal and marine ecosystems, and the environmental and eco-
nomic goods and services these ecosystems provide. 
SEA LEVEL RISE IMPACTS
The panel summary began with a discussion of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), which will pres-
ent the Fourth Assessment Report to the Thirteenth Conference
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in December 2007. The panel summary indi-
cated that sea level rise is a significant threat for small islands,
coasts, and low-lying lands. Ocean acidification is a new and
potentially overwhelming threat that could undermine the
marine ecosystems and food web, preclude coral development,
and even affect atmospheric and ocean interactions. Irrespective
of what mitigative measures are adopted, changed sea levels and
acidification will remain for the next few millennia.2
Parallel changes are occurring, and parallel approaches will
be required for small islands, as well as equatorial and tropical
regions. For example, coral reefs, marine fisheries, and marine
resources also will be affected by climate change and climate
variability. However, small islands with large Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones already have limited capacity to manage these
zones, and climate change will compound these management
issues.3 Sea level rise due to flooding, salt water intrusion into
fresh water, salination of the soils, and declines in water quality
and quantity will impact subsistence and commercial agriculture
on small islands. Sea level rise and extreme events will affect
infrastructure and development in all regions, including tourism,
agriculture, transportation, and the delivery of health, fresh
water, food, and other essential services.
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Scientific Report
documents climatic changes for
the circumpolar Arctic and is
subsequently discussed in this
article. The Arctic has been
warming rapidly, and larger and
more significant changes are
projected for the future.4 Small
islands are also vulnerable to the
impacts of climate change, sea
level rise, and extreme events
because of size and exposure to
natural hazards and more lim-
ited adaptive capacity. Accord-
ing to the Third Assessment
Report of the IPCC, islands, like
the Arctic, are early indicators of
global climate change. Islands
often depend on rainwater and are vulnerable to changes in the
distribution in rainfall. 
ALTERATIONS IN THE WEATHER
Another emerging and more immediate threat is the impact
of high sea surface temperatures on the intensity of tropical
cyclones and hurricanes. Understanding of the role of oceans as
a regulator of the earth’s climate system is also increasing: the
oceans control the timing and magnitude of changes in the
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global climate system, primarily through the absorption of car-
bon dioxide and heat. Other climate impacts include arctic sea
ice reduction, cyclonic storms, changes in ocean circulation,
intensification of eutrophication in shallow waters and enclosed
seas, and inter-related changes in biodiversity and fisheries.5
WARMING SEA IMPACTS EXTEND TO LAND
Human health is also impacted by climate change. Out-
breaks of vector-borne diseases like dengue fever and malaria
will increase, with the Caribbean islands and equatorial zones
being at greater risk. Shortages of water and drought, as well as
contamination of water quality during floods and storms, will
increase disease risk, including cholera, diarrhea, and dengue
fever. 
Africa is very vulnerable to climate change, with negative
impacts expected for the watersheds, coasts, and seas of Africa.
Worsening desertification in northern and southern Africa is also
forecasted to occur. The continent is most vulnerable to the
impacts of projected change because of widespread poverty and
limited adaptation capabilities. A parallel recognition of the dis-
proportionate impacts of climate change on Latin America and
the Caribbean, including coastal and oceans areas exists. A
recent report catalogues the impact of climate change and envi-
ronmental degradation ranging from drought in the Amazon to
floods in Haiti and elsewhere; vanishing glaciers in Colombia to
extreme cold in the Andes; and hurricanes, not only in Central
America and the Caribbean, but also in southern Brazil.6
STRATEGIZING CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY SOLUTIONS
Climate change mitigation is a major challenge, and must
be considered while formulating energy, economic, technologi-
cal, and development policy. The Eleventh Conference of the
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) in Montreal in December 2005 initiated a
two-track process to develop future climate strategy with the
Kyoto Protocol as the first track. The second track is an informal
Convention Dialogue aimed at exchanging experiences and ana-
lyzing strategic approaches for long-term cooperative action.
This dialogue is not confined to the present Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol and will address technology, adaptation, market-based
opportunities, the development context, and voluntary action by
developing countries.7
In short, the UNFCCC process addresses adaptation
through understanding of climate impacts, vulnerability, and
other possible measures on the one hand and financial and tech-
nical assistance to the most vulnerable Parties on the other. For
example, proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism
project activities will fund a new Adaptation Fund under the
Kyoto Protocol. Additionally, the bulk of two other dedicated
funds under the Convention are targeted for adaptation to the
impacts of climate change by developing countries.8
On a global and regional level, climate change science and
policy need to be inserted into the oceans agenda, and oceans
science and policy need to be inserted in the climate agenda.
Adaptation is not enough; mitigation is also required through
reducing greenhouse gases and shifting to renewable energy and
increasing energy efficiency. Thinking globally, planning region-
ally, and acting locally is necessary. 
Climate issues are complex and require input from many
disciplines and the integration of ecosystem-based and other
integrated approaches. In addition, constant dialogue between
scientists and decision-makers is required. Scientific data and
analysis, from accurate and timely predictions of hurricanes to
improved global and regional forecasts of future sea level rise
and the impacts of ocean acidification, lay the foundation for
adaptation policy discussions and the development of climate
strategies. In order to be effective, this data and analysis needs to
be communicated to decision-makers on a timely basis and in
the appropriate language. 
As policies adapt to climate change and variability, opportu-
nities must be considered as well as risks. With accelerating cli-
mate change and variability, reliable scientific information
becomes crucial for formulating policy on a wide variety of
issues, including fisheries, marine infrastructure, and transporta-
tion. Therefore, more resources need to be devoted to ocean cli-
mate research, paying attention to the short and medium term,
regional, and global impacts.
ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE AND OCEANS
One of the key findings of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment Scientific Report is that the Arctic has been warm-
ing rapidly and much larger changes are projected for the future.
Increasing temperatures, melting glaciers, reductions in the





























extent and thickness of sea ice, thawing permafrost, and rising
sea level illustrate this warming trend. Chapter 10 of that report,
Principles of Conserving the Arctic’s Biodiversity, begins the
dialogue on management and policy approaches for conserving
biodiversity and related ecosystem services in the circum-arctic. 
In the Arctic, changes in sea ice are a key indicator and
agent of climate change, affecting surface reflectivity, cloudi-
ness, humidity, exchanges of heat and moisture at the ocean sur-
face, and ocean currents. Changes in sea ice have enormous
economic, environmental, and social implications. There are
negative impacts on ice-dependent wildlife and northern peoples
like the Inuit with a traditional subsistence lifestyle based on
hunting mammals on, or adjacent to, sea ice. Changes may also
have positive economic effects, as it may facilitate increased
marine transportation, economic development, and immigration
into the region.9
THE CANADIAN BEAUFORT SEA10
The Beaufort Sea Large Ocean Management Area
(“LOMA”) is composed of the Mackenzie Delta and the Cana-
dian Beaufort Sea, extending to the northernmost extent of
Canada’s jurisdiction. Despite its relatively pristine state, the
region is on the brink of significant economic and environmental
change. Hydrocarbon activity and is other forms of economic
development are underway against a backdrop of the implemen-
tation of comprehensive northern land claims and complicated
by global and regional climate change and contamination issues.
Integrated management under the Beaufort Sea LOMA reflects
the commitment under the Canadian Ocean Policy Framework to
manage oceans so as not to compromise coastal and marine
ecosystems while encouraging multiple uses of ocean spaces
and resources.11
The Arctic Ocean receives significant freshwater input from
rivers, and the Beaufort Sea receives
freshwater inputs from the Mackenzie
River year-round, resulting in the
“Mackenzie Lake” beneath the ice in the
winter and the Mackenzie freshwater
plume in the summer. Given the extent of
the freshwater input year-round, it is diffi-
cult to separate the impacts of the
Mackenzie River from coastal and ocean
processes. With the deltaic nature of the
terrain, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems
are difficult to differentiate. There are vast
arrays of freshwater lakes and rivers in the
summer, land-fast ice and ice on river,
coasts and land in the winter, continuous
permafrost underlying the land, the coasts,
and the Beaufort Sea, and a highly unsta-
ble, shifting and eroding coastline formed
of consolidated ice, gravel, and sand. 
COMPLEXITIES OF THE BEAUFORT SEA
CLIMATE SYSTEM
Sea ice is an important component of the global, Arctic, and
Beaufort Sea climate system. Sea ice variability not only indi-
cates climate change but also is directly driven by and feeds into
the atmospheric, oceanic, and hydrologic cycle. Sea ice, particu-
larly the diminishing summer sea ice conditions, has the poten-
tial to drastically alter the cycles of atmosphere, ocean,
hydrology, and other components in the Beaufort Sea LOMA.
Examining sea ice, including flaw leads and polynyas12 can be a
good way to understand climate change and how ocean warm-
ing, or a longer open season, affects biologic productivity. The
mechanisms and impacts of long-term variability and trends for
Arctic sea ice are not fully understood and developing an inte-
grative understanding of the past, current, and possible future
influences of polar sea ice on climate systems is necessary. 
Interactions of freshwater, marine water, and brackish
water, including mixing and stratification and the implications of
these interactions with climatic changes are useful considera-
tions. Unlike tropical oceans, which are temperature stratified,
the Arctic Ocean is salinity stratified, with a halocline where
salinity increases with depth. This is important for the formation
of sea ice, as saltwater is most dense just before freezing, and sea
ice is largely salt free. 
Salinity influences the presence of marine species directly
through salinity preferences of particular species and indirectly
through its effects on stratification, water movements, and phy-
toplankton productivity. Differences in the density of seawater
throughout the water column, or stratification, affect the aggre-
gation of biological matter in the upper layers of the ocean. Den-
sity is a function of salinity, temperature, and pressure and varies
with depth. Temperature is another important environmental fac-
tor because many species have narrow temperature tolerance,
which will affect their spatial distribution. Temperature also
















Beluga whales at an ice edge. The Beaufort Sea LOMA contains three marine
protected areas for migratory beluga whales in the Mackenzie Delta.
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LAND CLAIMS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
INFLUENCE BEAUFORT SEA MANAGEMENT
When one imagines the Beaufort Sea LOMA, the complex-
ity and overlapping land claims agreements are an important
consideration. All the land claims agreements in northern
Canada are constitutionally protected and override inconsistent
federal and territorial legislation and policy. The Canadian fed-
eral government has a strong commitment to Inuit and First
Nation involvement and participation under the Oceans Act and
the Oceans Action Plan, and thus in the Beaufort Sea Partnership
and other initiatives for the LOMA. There are also international
cooperative management arrangements between Canada and the
United States for migratory and ice dependent marine species
such as bowhead and beluga whales, seals, and polar bears. The
Gwich’in and Inupiat of Alaska could also participate to reflect
and support these international wildlife management arrange-
ments.14
The Oceans Policy Frame-
work commits Canada to man-
age impacting activities in
oceans in a way that does not
compromise marine and coastal
ecosystems, while encouraging
multiple uses of oceans spaces
and resources. The Beaufort Sea
LOMA is subject to multiple use
designations, with extensive
economic development on the
horizon, at a time when climate
and contaminant impacts are
increasing. Significant hydrocar-
bon development is on the hori-
zon, with the proposed
Mackenzie Gas Project. Though
this project is currently limited
to three fields in the Mackenzie
River delta and the construction
of an extensive natural gas and
natural liquids pipeline from that delta to northern Alberta, there
are significant impacts from the construction of the pipeline and
the likelihood of extensive future developments and habitat and
landscape fragmentation over time.15
Multiple use designations will remain the norm in the
LOMA, except where certain uses are excluded or restricted by
marine protected areas or other designations. As indicated by the
implementation of the proposed marine protected areas in the
LOMA, it is important to provide early information to federal
and territorial government departments of potential ecological
and biologically significant areas and species in order to condi-
tion or to limit the issuance of economic rights and develop-
ments in these areas.16
NATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF AN ARCTIC “HOT SPOT” 
Identifying areas that have particularly high ecological or
biological significance is necessary to facilitate provision of
greater than usual degree of risk aversion in the management of
activities in these areas. Providing early information to federal
and territorial governments of potential ecological and biologi-
cally significant areas and species, and conditioning or limiting
the issuance of rights and subsequent developments in these or
adjacent areas is important.17
The Beaufort Sea is a climatic hot spot for the Arctic.
Observation and scientific experiments have shown that climate
change is affecting permanent, seasonal, and land-fast ice; per-
mafrost and coastal erosion; fresh water inputs, flows, and sedi-
ment deposits; and temperatures, stratification, and salinity.
Climate change may be one of the biggest challenges facing the
Beaufort Sea LOMA, and its institutions and processes. This
challenge may drive much of the management, monitoring, and
research efforts for the Beaufort Sea Partnership and Regulatory
Coordination Committee that are being established to manage
the LOMA. Much of the biology, biodiversity, and ecosystems in
the Beaufort Sea LOMA is not extensively known or studied. All
are likely to be affected in some
way by climate change, whether
adversely or positively.
Coastal change in the Beau-
fort Sea is a product of the inter-
action between local geological
and geo-morphological condi-
tions and waves and storm
surges driven by winds. Sea ice
formation and movement may
also play a subordinate role.
Also, it is possible that the
severity, not number, of storms
has increased in this area.
Decreasing ice concentration
and increasing wind speeds
together suggest a more severe
wave climate in Beaufort.
Observations of land loss along
the coast, inc luding  subs i -
dence  and  slumping, have been made. There will be a
decreased sea ice that previously protected infrastructure and
inhibited wave formation. If sea ice is mobile, it could cause ice
scour, more coastal erosion, and damage to infrastructure. 
There may be increasing hazards to coastal infrastructure in
the Beaufort Sea, but not in a catastrophic way and without risk
of loss of life. Instead, it will be a slow and very predictable
process. There are some positive aspects in that very limited
infrastructure is currently in place, and thus, one can plan and
defend for climate change. For example, roads and pipelines can
be constructed away from coasts, with a similar planning
approach for communities. Coastal change is occurring in Tuk-
toyaktuk, which is the only northern community with coastal
defenses. Erosion has been reduced but with other implications,
and there is concern for the inner harbor.18
Considering the scope of federal activities in the Beaufort
Sea LOMA, several Canadian government departments are
On a global and regional
level, climate change
science and policy need to
be inserted into the oceans
agenda, and oceans
science and policy need 
to be inserted in the
climate agenda.
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likely to have complimentary activities on climate and marine
issues. Fisheries and Oceans Canada is the coordinating agency
for oceans matters, as well responsible for fisheries and marine
resources. The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development is involved in northern communities in all the ter-
ritories as the major landowner on land and in the offshore, as
well as specifically focusing on contaminants and climate inter-
action.19 Environment Canada and the Canadian Ice Service
focus on sea ice and climate issues, including ice thickness and
extent, ice modeling and climate science. Transport Canada is
interested in the regulation of marine shipping, which is affected
by all sea ice issues. 
Natural Resources Canada is involved in programs such as
Reducing Canada’s Vulnerability to Climate Change Program,
which has been re-named, Enhancing Canada’s Resilience to
Climate Change Program. This program covers everything from
sea ice and permafrost response to municipal case studies and
integrated socio-economic assessments. Much of the Macken-
zie Delta work focuses on permafrost’s impacts and costs to
communities. Natural Resources Canada’s Climate Change
Impacts & Adaptation Program has funded several projects in
the Beaufort Sea. Currently, there are three projects underway,
two of which are transportation projects and the other is a coastal
management project.20
CONCLUSION
Climate change is a global concern. The Beaufort Sea can
be used as a microcosm to demonstrate the impact of climate
change on our oceans, and forecast the problems we might have
to face in the future. Currently, steps are underway to understand
the impacts of the changing climate and to provide adaptive
management approaches. Likewise, mitigative measures are also
underway in global, regional, and national forums.
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O
ver the past decade, Californians have witnessed ever-
increasing damage to the water quality and fish popula-
tions of the wine growing regions.1 Despite the best
efforts of many winegrowers, agencies, and environmental
groups, farming practices continue to exhaust certain species
and violate provisions of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
and Clean Water Act (“CWA”).2 The lack of substantive law in
this area makes conservation very difficult. Rather than settling
for so-called incentive based voluntary programs, the time has
come for California’s legislature to provide explicit and mean-
ingful regulations to help safeguard California’s fish popula-
tions.
Hundreds of vineyards rest alongside the waterways and
tributaries of the Russian, Napa, and Navarro Rivers, which are
home to various threatened and endangered species.3 Among
these, the anadromous Coho and Chinook salmon and Steelhead
trout face particular problems because they live in freshwater,
travel to the ocean, and return to freshwater for spawning.4
These species are severely affected by pesticides, heavy sedi-
mentation, and fertilizer run-offs, which pollute the water and
prevent them from laying eggs in the gravel bottom.5
Organizations such as the Fish Friendly Farming Certifica-
tion Program (“FFFCP”) and the Napa Sustainable Winegrow-
ing Group (“NSWC”) have attempted to address this problem by
seeking to promote winegrowing practices that are “economi-
cally viable, socially responsible, and environmentally sound.”6
These programs set up voluntary watershed management guide-
lines marketed as “incentive based” because they authorize par-
ticipating wineries and grape growers to label and advertise their
wine as eco-friendly.7 Next, the vineyards work with organiza-
tions like FFFCP and NSWC to create an inventory of natural
resources and management practices and to devise a plan to
upgrade their property and improve environmental quality.8
While many vineyards, including Clos du Bois and Fetzer, have
been willing to make a start at such programs, their impact is
limited because of a lack of public recognition.9 Moreover, the
absence of near-term benefits and long-term enforcement 
methods make these voluntary programs susceptible to immi-
nent failure. 
Cooperative conservation and feeble marketing techniques
will not suffice to get wine the same recognition as other sustain-
able products such as coffee and seafood. It is time for realistic
government action that would hold vineyards accountable for
nonconformity with the ESA and CWA. The legislature ought to
implement, for instance, a statewide labeling system that classi-
fies wines based on the extent to which their production was
environmentally viable. In consideration of the impact and vital
role wine producers play in California’s economy, the govern-
ment could provide growers with money to start implementing
the sustainable practices. Whatever the means, the occasion has
come for state measures. As vineyards in California continue to
grow, it will become increasingly necessary that mechanisms by
which they produce their grapes safeguard the threatened fish
populations.
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“EBM looks at all the links among living and nonliving
resources, rather than considering single issues in isolation . . .
Instead of developing a management plan for one issue . . . EBM
focuses on the multiple activities occurring within specific areas
that are defined by ecosystem, rather than political, boundaries.”
— US Ocean Commission Report, 2004
INTRODUCTION
R
apid decline in ocean health has led scientists and policy
makers alike to conclude that single-sector and single-
species approaches to managing ocean resources and
wildlife will not be successful in the long term. Coral bleaching,
dead zones, red tides, and fishery collapses are becoming all too
common in coastal areas. Meanwhile, we have become increas-
ingly aware that the open ocean and the deep sea, which includes
the 64 percent of the ocean beyond national jurisdiction, have
not gone unscathed. Recent articles in scientific journals such as
Nature and Science have described global declines of up to 90
percent in populations of large ocean predators (i.e., tunas, bill-
fish, sharks, and sea turtles) during the past 50 years.1 In this
same period, predator diversity has declined by tenfold in all
regions of the ocean.2 At least five species of deep sea fishes
(three of which are non-target species exploited only as by-
catch) can now be classified as critically endangered under the
World Conservation Union (“IUCN”) Red List Criteria,3 while
two other species of deep sea fish, orange roughy and oreo
dories, are now considered by the United Nations (“UN”) Food
and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) as overexploited or
depleted in all areas where fishing has developed,4 and deep sea
bottom trawling is destroying seamount and coral ecosystems
before they can even be studied.5 In order to protect our marine
resources, there must be a move towards an Ecosystem-Based
Management (“EBM”) approach to oceans and fisheries man-
agement. 
FRAGMENTED AND INCONSISTENT APPROACHES
TO OCEAN MANAGEMENT
CURRENT INEFFICIENCIES IN OCEAN MANAGEMENT
WITH A BIAS TOWARDS FISHERIES
Beyond national jurisdictions, fragmented and inconsistent
management — relying largely on sector-based and single-
species approaches — have proven ineffective in ensuring the
health and integrity of marine ecosystems. One approach has
been the creation of regional fisheries management organiza-
tions (“RFMOs”). The majority of RFMOs are limited to single-
species or species group fisheries, namely tuna and “tuna-like”
species. For example, the Commission for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Convention cover huge swathes of ocean, but their mandates are
narrow and their track records are poor. Several tuna stocks
under their management are now listed as endangered or criti-
cally endangered under the IUCN Red List.6
Another approach has been protection under the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement (“FSA”). The FSA requires the conservation
of, not only target species, but also of associated species and the
ecosystem as a whole. However, the agreement applies only to
fish populations that “straddle” political boundaries or to a lim-
ited number of highly migratory species, leaving other highly
migratory species and all discrete high seas (e.g., deep sea) fish
stocks unprotected. 
Obstacles are also created by fragmented legal frameworks.
For example, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), the water column beyond national jurisdiction,
the high seas, is treated differently than the seabed. Hence, while
deep seabed mineral resources are the “common heritage of
mankind” to be exploited only pursuant to specific rules for the
protection of ecological integrity, the living seabed and associ-
ated resources are regarded by some as open access frontiers to
be freely exploited and essentially “mined.”7
A LICENSE FOR LAWLESSNESS
As a result of this smorgasbord of legal approaches, vulner-
able ecosystems beyond national jurisdiction remain largely
unprotected. The right to free passage and trade inherent in the
17th century concept of freedom of the seas has been translated
in the 21st century as a virtual license for lawlessness, under
which exploiters can freely impact ocean wildlife and marine
resources that are, or at least should be, the common heritage of
all humankind, with little or no legal consequence. 
Deep sea bottom trawling exemplifies the problems created
by this free-for-all approach. In addition to having a dispropor-
tionably high impact on targeted species, to the point that many
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are now considered overexploited or depleted, bottom trawling
simultaneously destroys the highly diverse and highly endemic
benthic communities upon which the targeted species depend.
As noted in a recent report for the FAO, observers monitoring
the first year of the orange roughy fishery in the South Tasman
Rise, an area straddling Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone
and the high seas, recorded 10 tonnes of coral by-catch per tow.
This means that for every 4,000 tonnes of orange roughy caught,
10,000 tonnes of coral were brought up in the nets.8
The report notes further that the by-catch of corals is just one
symptom of the larger impact of trawling on deep seabed com-
munities.
THE MOVE TOWARDS AN ECOSYSTEM-BASED
MANAGEMENT APPROACH
Recent global and regional assessments9 of the marine envi-
ronment such as the Pew Oceans10 and U.S. Ocean Commis-
sion11 reports in the United States, the UK Royal Commission’s
Turning the Tide report on the Northeast Atlantic (“OSPAR”)
region,12 and the Defying Ocean’s End Agenda for Action13 have
taken note of these trends. These
reports have nearly unanimously
recommended an EBM approach
to address the full range of
ocean uses, inclusive of fish-
eries. Furthermore, the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable
D ev e l o p m e n t ( “ W S S D ” )
emphasized the crisis of ocean
resource exploitation and habitat
destruction — mostly from
large-scale commercial fishing
— and urged implementation of
EBM and conservation, includ-
ing networks of marine pro-
tected areas (“MPAs”). The
WSSD set a target for the intro-
duction of EBM by 2010. 
These assessments suggest that the tools of spatial planning
and zoning that separate and govern human activities on land
can also be used in the ocean. Within a framework of marine
EBM, these land-based tools have the potential to protect
ecosystem services, preserve ecosystem structures, functions,
and processes and allow sustainable use of the ocean resources
upon which we all depend. Thus, EBM is defined as having the
following elements:14
• Sustainability: ecosystem management does not focus pri-
marily on “deliverables” but rather, regards intergenera-
tional sustainability as a precondition.
• Goals: ecosystem management establishes measurable
goals that specify future processes and outcomes neces-
sary for sustainability.
• Sound ecological models and understanding: ecosystem
management relies on research performed at all levels of
ecological organization.
• Complexity and connectedness: ecosystem management
recognizes that biological diversity and structural com-
plexity strengthen ecosystems against disturbance and
supply the genetic resources necessary to adapt to long-
term change.
• The dynamic character of ecosystems: recognizing that
change and evolution are inherent in ecosystem sustain-
ability, ecosystem management avoids attempts to
“freeze” ecosystems in a particular state or configuration.
• Context and scale: ecosystem processes operate over a
wide range of spatial and temporal scales, and their behav-
ior at any given location is greatly affected by surrounding
systems. Thus, there is no single appropriate scale or time
frame for management.
• Humans as ecosystem components: ecosystem manage-
ment values the active role of humans in achieving sus-
tainable management goals.
• Adaptability and accountability: ecosystem management
acknowledges that current knowledge and paradigms of
ecosystem function are provisional, incomplete, and sub-
ject to change. Management approaches must be viewed
as hypotheses to be tested by





In its strategy for achieving
the Millennium Development
Goals (“MDG”) in the area of
environmental sustainability and
human well-being, the UN Mil-
lennium Project frames its high-
est level recommendations
within an EBM approach.15
Addressing fisheries and marine
resources as a major component
under this approach, it recommends the elimination of bottom
trawling on the high seas by 2006 to protect seamounts and other
ecologically sensitive habitats and as a means to restore depleted
fish populations. Such a measure would need to be implemented
prior to the introduction of EBM, as bottom trawling’s destruc-
tive nature on the ecosystem would directly conflict with the
management of it.
The Millennium Project highlights the work of the IUCN
Commission on Ecosystem Management, which has identified
five steps towards achieving implementation of the ecosystem
approach. All five of these steps are conspicuously missing from
the current ocean governance regime for areas beyond national
jurisdiction. 
STEP ONE: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS CONDUCTED
WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE ECOSYSTEM CONTEXT
The first step involves a stakeholder analysis that must be
conducted within the appropriate ecosystem context. Pursuant to
the 1970 UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) resolution,







resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of
mankind and all nations and their citizens are stakeholders in the
use of these marine resources.16 Unfortunately, individual
resource users (e.g., fisheries, bioprospecting, ocean tourism,
energy prospecting, and exploitation) have many different and
potentially conflicting interests, as some are not fixed to a spe-
cific locale, and are free to move on to the next seamount or
hydrothermal vent once the resources have been consumed or
damaged. 
This migratory pattern of deep seabed use may undermine
the notion that those with a direct relationship to the resource are
its best stewards.17 Conservation, which represents the broader
and long-term interests of humankind and the planet, is rarely
given as much weight as individual industrial users. Stakehold-
ers operating within ecosystems outside of national jurisdictions
must be encouraged to establish a better balance between long-
term, global-scale interests versus short-term, sector-based eco-





TURE AND FUNCTION TO
MANAGE AND MONITOR
The second step involves
characterizing ecosystem struc-
ture and function and establish-
ing appropriate mechanisms to
manage and monitor them. Little
is known about deep sea habitats
and  the i r  vu lnerabi l i ty  or
resilience to human impacts.
Biogeographic classif ication
workshops could be a first step
in defining these ecosystems,
but more work needs to be done
in order to adequately character-
ize the structure and function of
these ecosystems and to develop ongoing mechanisms to moni-
tor them. Their management must begin with broad protection
via a moratorium on destructive activities, or an equivalent
measure, to sustain their survival while the science is underway.
STEP THREE: IDENTIFYING KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES
AFFECTING THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS INHABITANTS
Once the baseline data on ecosystem structure and function
has been acquired, the next necessary step is to identify key eco-
nomic issues affecting the ecosystem and its inhabitants. Every
stakeholder has a unique set of economic checks and balances,
and each stakeholder carries differing degrees of fiscal risk and
reward. 
For example, the single most significant and immediate
threat to deep sea ecosystems beyond national jurisdictions as
well as to the legal continental shelves of states, when these
extend beyond 200 nautical miles (“nm”), is high seas bottom
trawling. Yet, high seas bottom trawling accounts for only 0.5
percent of the estimated value of the annual global marine catch.
This fishery, as a whole, provides work for approximately 100 to
200 vessels, significantly fewer than the 3.1 million vessels
worldwide engaged in other fishing activities.18 The economic
impact of closing this fishery is low, with potentially high eco-
nomic returns gained by protecting seamounts, cold water coral
beds, and other deep sea ecosystems. These efforts will insure
the opportunity to pursue alternative methods of exploitation for
purposes such as medicine, tourism, or less destructive fisheries.
STEP FOUR: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACTS AND INTER-
CONNECTEDNESS OF ECOSYSTEMS
Within the highly dynamic and interconnected oceanic
realm, understanding how one ecosystem can influence func-
tionality within surrounding ecosystems is imperative. For
instance, there is increasing evidence for connectivity between
the deep sea bed and coastal ecosystems, as well as the surface
layers of the pelagic water col-
umn.19 Examples include daily
migration of fish and inverte-
brates from the deep sea to sur-
face, the use of mid-ocean
seamounts as spawning grounds
for American, Asian, and Euro-
pean eels,20 and the use of ben-
thic habitats as nursery and
breeding grounds for the very
fish that bottom trawl fisheries
target and subsequently annihi-
late. However, the inadequacy of
current knowledge on ecosys-
tem connect iv i ty  beyond
national jurisdiction and the
long-lasting and potentially irre-
versible nature of the harm
caused by deep sea bottom
trawling underscore the need for
the precautionary principle,
defined as: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation.”21
STEP FIVE: DETERMINING LONG-TERM GOALS AND
REQUISITE APPROACHES
The fifth step, determining long-term goals and requisite
approaches for ecosystem-based management, is essential. The
international community has repeatedly expressed the need to
protect vulnerable deep sea biodiversity, particularly along
seamounts, cold water corals, and hydrothermal vents, and to
introduce EBM in the marine realm. However, very few ideas or
measures for reaching these goals have been expressed. 
For example, one major tool of EBM is the use of protected
areas. Thus far, an adequate governance framework does not
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into waters beyond national jurisdiction. The European Union
has recently introduced a proposal for a new UNCLOS imple-
menting agreement for biodiversity management and conserva-
tion beyond national jurisdiction that would include such a
framework. In the interim, without a comprehensive assessment
on the extent of impacts from current activities, or even where
the most vulnerable areas are located, the precautionary princi-
ple must be evoked, particularly on activities that leave no room
for doubt as to their destructive and wide-spread nature.
CONCLUSION
In consideration of current ocean governance regimes and
threats to marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, the
authors recommend a series of steps for promptly moving EBM
forward. First, for reasons outlined above, an immediate morato-
rium on all deep sea bottom trawling on the high seas is required
as a first stage measure. This should occur through a UN General
Assembly resolution and would voluntarily be enforced by Flag
States. Second, agreed upon methodologies and on-going strate-
gies should be established for defining biogeographic provinces
and ecosystem structure beyond national jurisdiction. Third, a
mechanism needs to be established, potentially a new UNCLOS
implementing agreement, for permanent protection for critical,
unique, and vulnerable habitats on the high seas and in the Area,
specifically through the establishment of a globally representa-
tive network of MPAs. Finally, a World Ocean Public Trust that
unites governance of the high seas and the Area into one regime
under an EBM framework should be established throughout the
world’s oceans in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Such a
Trust would treat the world ocean as the common heritage of
humankind, with governments of the world responsible for safe-
guarding biodiversity as well as ecosystem structure, function,
and processes for the benefit of present and future generations.
The Trust would operate on the principle of a precautionary
approach to all uses of high seas marine life, biogenetic and
other living resources, habitats, and ecosystems, in order to con-
serve and protect the world ocean,22 while ensuring long-term
sustainable and equitable use for all. Existing regulations,
regimes, programs, and objectives would be harmonized as nec-
essary to ensure consistency with these goals.
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS AQUACULTURE
A
quaculture — or the farming of fish — is both a new
technology and one that has long been part of human
history. Aquaculture is employed for a variety of rea-
sons: fish may be raised to stock public waters for sport fishing
and for commercial fishing; it may be used to save an endan-
gered species; or it may be used to harvest a commercially valu-
able crop in ponds or coastal waters. In simple terms,
aquaculture is an extension of agriculture: the farmer farms the
water instead of the land.1 Aquaculture’s importance to the
global food supply is hard to overestimate. It is has grown faster
than any other agriculture segment in the past half century, from
less than one million tons to 59.4 million tons in 2004, repre-
senting $70.3 billion in value.2
FISH AND SHELLFISH AS GROWING PART OF A
HEALTHY DIET: SEAFOOD SUPPLY ISSUES
As people in developed countries seek a healthy life style,
they are increasing their seafood intake. Globally, the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”) predicts
that the yearly per capita demand for seafood will grow by
nearly twenty percent, from 35.5 to 42.1 pounds, between 2000
and 2015,3 and forecasts that the total demand for seafood will
surge by 50 million tons in the coming decade, representing a
3.1 percent annual increase since 1985,4 and will reach 133 mil-
lion tons by 2015. As an illustration of the importance of aquatic
products in human diets, FAO further reports that for more than
2.6 billion people, fish provides twenty percent or more of their
animal protein.5
While increased fish and shellfish consumption presents
benefits to public health, supplying this demand is a significant
challenge. The total world supply of wild capture6 fisheries has
been stable at about 88 million tons since 1985.7 FAO experts
project this to be the global sustainable limit of harvest, stating,
“catches in the wild are still high, but they have leveled off,
probably for good.”8
If world demand for seafood reaches 133 million tons in
2015, and wild capture fisheries can only yield 88 million tons,
how will society fill this gap? There is clear evidence that aqua-
culture is rising to the challenge. FAO notes that the global pro-
duction from aquaculture continues to grow in terms of both
quantity and its relative contribution to the world’s supply of fish
for direct human consumption.9 Aquaculture already supplies 43
percent of the fish humans eat (up from 27.5 percent in 2000),
and that percentage is expected to grow in the future.10
Countries in Asia and Latin America are the largest aquacul-
ture producers and developing countries accounted for 90.7 per-
cent of production in 2002.11 The output of China alone is
massive and was reckoned to account for 71 percent of global
aquaculture production in 2002,12 although production figures
from China are a source of controversy.13
So if developing nations are producing most of the globe’s
aquaculture products, where are these products going? Clearly,
of that which is internationally traded, much of it is coming to
the United States. The U.S. imports about eighty percent of its
fish.14 A review of the top ten fish and shellfish that Americans
eat reveals that four of the top six are, to a great extent, supplied
through imports and aquaculture (shrimp, salmon, catfish and
tilapia). Of the top six species, only pollock and tuna are solely
or primarily produced from the wild.
SUSTAINABILITY AND SEAFOOD
There is a growing call for a rational use of the globe’s
resources, often couched in terms of “sustainable development”
or “sustainability.” However, in the context of world trade policy,
the UN has noted that the sustainability principle should not be
extended for ostensibly environmental purposes so that it acts as
a trade barrier. Specifically, Principle 12 of the United Nations’
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states:
“States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open inter-
national economic system that would lead to economic growth
and sustainable development in all countries, to better address
the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy meas-
ures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade.”15
FISHERIES CERTIFICATION AND ECO-LABELING
Since the mid-1990s, sustainability and certification efforts
in the seafood industry have proliferated. Much of the impetus
for these programs has come from large institutional buyers in
North America and Europe who seek to ensure they buy prod-
ucts that are sustainably harvested. 
To ensure consistent guidelines for these eco-labeling sys-
tems, the FAO developed guidelines for eco-labeling fish prod-
ucts in 2005. The guidelines outline general principles that
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should govern eco-labeling schemes, including the need for reli-
able, independent auditing, transparency of standard-setting and
accountability, and the need for standards to be based on good
science.16
GLOBAL AQUACULTURE ALLIANCE
The Global Aquaculture Alliance (“GAA”) represents the
world aquaculture industry. As an international, non-governmen-
tal organization (“NGO”), GAA defines its mission as “promot-
ing responsible aquaculture to meet world food needs.”17 It takes
a long-term view of the industry’s needs and focuses on issues
affecting environmental, social, and economic sustainability.
The organization serves to unify a large, diverse industry. Princi-
pally it seeks to raise environmental and social standards
through its Best Aquaculture Practices (“BAP”) program by pro-
moting codes of conduct and aquaculture standards developed
through a synthesis of best management practices. 
In the late 1990s, international environmental NGOs such
as Greenpeace publicized the environmental challenges caused
by the rapid growth of aquaculture, particularly tropical shrimp
farming. Specific areas of concern included: damage to natural
habitats such as mangroves, pollution arising from pond efflu-
ents, antibiotic residues in finished products, and the use of fish-
meal and genetically modified organisms. In 1996, twenty-one
NGOs and community organizations met in Choluteca, Hon-
duras and demanded a global moratorium on the expansion of
any shrimp farming that did not meet their criteria for sustain-
ability.18 Largely in response to this pressure, executives from
the shrimp industry formed GAA in 1997. GAA initially con-
centrated on aspects of shrimp production, but soon broadened
its efforts to include the full supply chain, from hatcheries and
feed production to farms, and processors to retailer buyers. 
Even though there are numerous aquaculture codes of prac-
tice, GAA went further and developed the BAP and defines the
most important elements of responsible practices through quan-
titative standards. Each BAP standard was developed by a com-
mittee composed of technical experts and stakeholders,
including includes members of conservation NGOs, industry
leaders, representatives from regulatory agencies, and academ-
ics. Care was taken to ensure broad stakeholder participation and
a balance among the different sectors of interest. 
The resulting BAP standards specify the auditing proce-
dures to objectively assess adherence with
these practices. Points are awarded according
to the level of compliance on individual crite-
ria, and these points are then added together.
The total must exceed a minimum level if a
facility is to achieve BAP certification. Certain
essential items (for example in shrimp farms,
items that deal with mangroves, effluents,
antibiotics, and hatchery seed) are mandatory
and failure to satisfy any one of them results in
automatic failure, irrespective of the total num-
ber of points scored.
GAA also registered a BAP certification
mark (see Figure 1) for use in advertising and
on finished products at the whole-
sale and retail levels. Aquaculture
facilities that pass the auditing
process are deemed to be in compli-
ance with the BAP standards and
can make use of this BAP logo to
promote their products.19 BAP stan-
dards are currently available for
shrimp farms, shrimp hatcheries,
and shrimp processing plants. The
standards for aquaculture feed mills
and for laboratory verification of the safety of finished products
are scheduled to be finalized by the end of 2006, along with a
general aquaculture standard that will extend coverage to fish. 
AQUACULTURE CERTIFICATION COUNCIL
In addition to comprehensive standards, GAA also recog-
nizes the requirement for independent confirmation of the condi-
tions and actions under which aquaculture products are made
and processed. GAA established the Aquaculture Certification
Council (“ACC”) in 2003 to embody the following characteris-
tics: 
1. Independence from GAA, the standard setting body;
2. Independence from the parties seeking certification;
3. Possession of expertise in this relatively new industry; and
4. The ability to function with a low cost base to broaden the
appeal of the BAP program.
The ACC is a not-for-profit corporation with the mission to
“certify aquaculture facilities that apply best management prac-
tices to ensure social and environmental responsibility, food
safety, and traceability throughout the production chain.”20 ACC
is governed by a twelve-member board of directors, from a
cross-section of aquaculture professionals from the Americas,
Asia and Europe. Its members represent seafood producers,
processors and buyers, academic institutions and other entities. 
GAA assigned ACC the exclusive right to certify compli-
ance with the BAP standards. In addition to certifying aquacul-
ture facilities, the ACC trains and accredits certifiers, maintains
a website, commissions software for a traceability database, and
interacts with stakeholders. As of September 2006, ACC had
certified 39 processing plants, 25 farms and fifteen hatcheries.
Figure 2 illustrates the annual growth in certifications, which
Figure 1: Best Aquaculture
Practices Certification Mark.
Figure 2: Number of Aquaculture Facilities Certified by ACC.
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shows that the program is successfully attracting new partici-
pants. Importantly, facilities on three continents have been BAP
certified. Countries with certified facilities include: Bangladesh,
Belize, Brazil, Dutch Antilles, Ecuador, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Thailand, United
States, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
To maintain consistency across the program, operations are
subject to repeat inspections and the ACC also performs surprise
audits of accredited facilities. ACC is separately constituted and
operates independently from GAA. This separation between the
GAA standard setting process and a certification body ensures
the system is consistent with recently adopted FAO Guidelines
for EcoLabeling of Marine Products.
FUTURE PLANS TO EXPAND BAP STANDARDS
To meet demand for non-shellfish species, the GAA is
expanding the BAP program to produce new standards to cover
fish farms, feed mills, and laboratory verification of food safety
in finished products. The new standards for fish farms address
additional issues such as waste from cage sites, fishmeal usage,
and animal welfare. Participating feed mills will be required to
demonstrate that they have adopted adequate procedures for
manufacturing feeds without biological and chemical hazards.
Feed mills will also be required to provide information on the
fishmeal and fish oil content of their feeds so that farmers can
make efficient use of these valuable, yet limited, natural
resources. 
Large, often vertically-integrated aquaculture operators are
the most financially and technically able to modify their prac-
tices to meet the BAP standards. To address the needs of the
myriad small-scale farmers with less financial and technical
resources, GAA is developing special provisions so that multiple
small farms can certify in clusters. Cluster certification encour-
ages small enterprises to form associations with their neighbors
in order to meet the BAP criteria collectively, sharing responsi-
bility for raising environmental and ethical performance levels
and spreading the financial burden of certification. The success
of cluster certification is vital to the BAP program’s success. 
Both the environmental NGOs and GAA represent different
factions in global society that seek the same end result — a
socially equitable and environmentally benign aquaculture
industry. Continuing dialogue that leads to objectively consid-
ered and fairly implemented actions will be essential if these
aims are to be met.
CONCLUSION
Many international bodies such as the FAO recognize that
Best Management Practices play an important part in the sus-
tainable development of aquaculture, for both large-scale and
small-scale producers.21 Third party certification of these prac-
tices can help improve public confidence in the management of
aquaculture facilities, provided that the certification systems
function independently of the standard setting organizations.
Hopefully the rapidly expanding and evolving aquaculture
industry, with the assistance of groups such as the GAA and
ACC, will continue to learn lessons from other industries and
will continue on the path of sustainability.
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Committee National Ocean Policy Study Subcommittee, June 8, 2006, available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/Keeney060806.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2006). 
15 United Nations Conference on Environment And Development, Rio de
Janeiro, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration On Environment and Development,
Principle 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (August 12, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006). 
16 UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION. GUIDELINES FOR
ECOLABELLING OF FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS FROM MARINE CAPTURE FISH-
ERIES 2005, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0116t/a0116t00.htm
(last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
17 About GAA, Global Aquaculture Alliance website, http://www.gaalliance.org
(last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
18 Choluteca Declaración (Oct. 16, 1996), available at http://darwin.bio.uci.
edu/~sustain/shrimpecos/declare1.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
19 The full standards, accompanied by guidance notes and auditing forms, are
freely available from the Aquaculture Certification Council, http://www.aqua
culturecertification.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
20 About ACC Mission, Aquaculture Certification Council website,
http://www.aquaculturecertification.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). 
21 Food and Agriculture Organization — Committee on Fisheries (FAO COFI),
Subcommittee on Aquaculture, Report of the Third Session of the COFI 
(FI-702-3) FAO COFI Subcommittee on Aquaculture, adopted New Delhi India,
Sept. 8, 2006.
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H
undreds of square miles1 of discarded plastic have
formed islands on the high seas, created by drifting
debris caught in the oceans’ currents. The islands are
held together at the points where these currents merge, produc-
ing massive, rotating vortexes of trash visible to the human eye
from afar. The largest of these islands, located in the Pacific
Ocean midway between Hawaii and San Francisco and known as
the “Eastern Garbage Patch,” is reportedly twice the size of
Texas and continuing to grow.2 The slightly smaller “Western
Garbage Patch” lurks off of the shores of Japan. Many more are
growing around the globe. Very little research has been com-
pleted, but the scant information that has been reported is cer-
tainly cause for worry. The populations of native species of birds
and other wildlife near the patches are plummeting, and resort
beaches throughout the Pacific are cluttering up with seasonal
plastic tides. It is estimated that four-fifths of this waste origi-
nates on land and is carried to the oceans by rivers.3 Existing
laws and international entities focus more on “traditional”
sources of ocean pollution, such as oil discharge from ships.
Currently, international law fails to specifically address this cri-
sis of mounting waste throughout the oceans.
Unlike other indirect, sometimes microscopic, causes of
harm that threaten our water, air, and land, these garbage patches
are visible, tangible, and persistent pollutants that threaten ocean
wildlife. While much of the waste can be traced back to specific
urban areas, such as the Los Angeles River in the case of the
Eastern Garbage Patch, the consequences are far-reaching. Forty
percent of the native species of albatross near the Eastern
Garbage Patch die within their first year, and most of those
deaths occur because the parent birds mistake the plastics for
food and feed the garbage to their young.4 The garbage patches
also purge plastic debris on a seasonal basis over many beach
areas and tourist hotspots throughout the Pacific. This far-reach-
ing problem promises only to become worse with time and
demands legal protection from the international community.
Annex V of the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”), under the United Nations
International Maritime Organization, addresses the problem of
garbage pollution from ships in the oceans. While MARPOL
considers plastic waste as “the greatest danger”5 of all the
garbage dumped in the ocean from ships, using this instrument
as a source of remedy is limited because the Convention only
applies to pollution from ships. Just one-fifth of the Eastern
Garbage Patch is estimated to have originated from ships,6
thereby answering only a portion of the problem. Furthermore,
Annex V is optional for member countries, and thus is rarely, if
ever, enforced. 
Although international action is far from satisfactory,
national initiatives are emerging. The U.S. House of Representa-
tives recently passed an amendment to a Senate Act to:
“establish a program within the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and the United States Coast
Guard to help identify, determine sources of, assess,
reduce, and prevent marine debris and its impacts on the
marine environment and navigation safety, in coordination
with non-Federal entities…”7
The Act even addresses “measuring and strengthening” its
compliance with Annex V of MARPOL, and, in addition, explic-
itly incorporates land-based sources of pollution in its program.8
The Act also provides for the establishment of an “Interagency
Committee on Marine Debris” to “coordinate… among federal
agencies, … non-governmental organizations, industry, universi-
ties, state governments, Indian tribes, and other nations.”9 This is
an extremely progressive approach to resolving the problem of
marine debris, but it is only the first step. It is unclear whether
this Act will directly affect the Eastern Garbage Patch, save
through possible prevention of further debris accumulation. An
international entity is surely needed in order to categorically
address those issues of marine debris that fall outside of national
jurisdiction. Islands of garbage are appearing all over the globe,
and responsibility for drifting garbage must also be clarified.
Otherwise, well-intentioned national plans could be wasted in a
maelstrom of legal actions to shift the blame.
Despite the current lack of international policy regarding
marine debris, there are possible trajectories for international
cooperation toward resolution of this serious issue. Key ele-
ments include raising public awareness of the problem on an
international level, encouraging international organizations
already in place to expand their reach and hold known polluter
countries accountable, and supplying short-term solutions such
as onsite mobile incineration clinics. It is imperative that we
combat this problem using these methods and others, or else our
plastic waste will become an increasing menace to our oceans, to
our wildlife, and to ourselves.
Endnotes:
1 See generally Kenneth R. Weiss, Plague of Plastic Chokes the Seas, LA
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, at A1.
2 Weiss, id.
3 Weiss, id.
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he cooperation of the coastal countries surrounding the
Baltic Sea provides an impressive example of regional
cooperation for marine protection. Exploring the evolu-
tion of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment of the Baltic Sea Area, an internationally legally binding
agreement (to protect the Baltic Sea), provides a basis for future
joint initiatives and actions around the globe.
NATURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BALTIC SEA
The Baltic Sea is a relatively young and rather small sea in
comparison to other bodies of water on Earth. It is unique in
many respects due its geographical, climatological, and hydro-
logical characteristics. These characteristics are important to
understand as they have had, and continue to have, a major influ-
ence on legal and political coop-
eration in the region.
The Baltic Sea1 is sur-
rounded by nine coastal coun-
tries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Sweden, and Russia. A
semi-enclosed sea, it is con-
nected to the North Sea and the
northeast Atlantic Ocean via the
narrow Danish Straits. Due to a
limited possibility for water
exchange, the total substitution
of the water in the Baltic Sea
takes up to thirty years. This
also means that polluting sub-
stances remain and accumulate
in the sea for long periods of
time.
The catchment area of the sea, and thus the area of potential
input of polluting substances, is four times the size of the sea
itself and densely populated, hosting a high level of agricultural
and industrial activities. Additionally, the outflows from more
than two hundred rivers enter the Baltic, bringing vast amounts
of fresh water to the sea, along with polluting substances. This
large volume of fresh water makes the Baltic Sea one of the
largest bodies of brackish water in the world. Thus, living condi-
tions are harsh for fauna and flora and not an ideal living envi-
ronment for marine or freshwater species.
The low salinity level in the Baltic Sea also means that a
horizontal layer develops between the upper, more oxygenated,
and the lower, less oxygenated, parts of the seawater. As a result,
deep basins in the Baltic Sea can be naturally oxygen deficient
and therefore devoid of life. Winter conditions can be hard, with
major parts of the Baltic Sea covered by ice for several months
each year. This in turn presents challenges for extensive naviga-
tion at sea — including the transportation of oil.
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
BALTIC COASTAL COUNTRIES
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that based
on an initiative of the Finnish Government, a cooperation was
established in the early 1970s among the then-seven2 countries
surrounding the Baltic Sea (and later joined by the European
Community). The resulting Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area of 1974 (the
“Helsinki Convention”) was both a follow-up to the UN Confer-
ence on the Human Environment,
held in Stockholm in 1972, and a
reaction to the deteriorating sta-
tus of the Baltic Sea.3
A legally binding obliga-
tion, the purpose of the Helsinki
Convention is to protect the
Baltic Sea marine environment
from all sources of pollution, be
it from land, air, or the sea itself.
The Helsinki Convention also
ensures rapid assistance and
cooperation in the need for
transnational response to acci-
dents at sea. The Helsinki Com-
mission (“HELCOM”) was
designated as the governing
body of the Convention.
POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
The Helsinki Convention paved the way for political coop-
eration in the field of marine environment protection policies
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during a time when many other issues divided the Baltic coastal
countries. With this political foundation, the scene was set for
major steps toward protecting the marine environment of the
Baltic Sea area. These steps naturally correspond to the more
than three decades of cooperation under the Helsinki Convention
— each of them epoch-making in their own way.
THE FIRST DECADE
A common understanding among Baltic coastal countries
was required to select the measures to protect the marine envi-
ronment of the Baltic Sea, including an identification of the
activities and pressures impacting its health. Thus, deciding
which parameters to measure in the sea, and how to measure pol-
lution loads coming into the sea from land-based activities was
the key focus during the beginning of HELCOM. 
Since the deteriorating health of the Baltic was obvious,
various measures were taken in the first decade to phase out the
use of certain hazardous substances. For example, one of these
decisions concerned phasing out the use of polychlorinated
biphenyls, or PCBs. These pollutants were targeted due to strong
indications that they were primarily responsible for the serious
decrease in the reproductive rate of seals and the decline in the
white-tailed eagle population in
the Baltic Sea region.4
From the very beginning of
the cooperation, the prevention
of pollution from shipping
activities was high on the
agenda. Arguably, shipping was
not, and still is not, one of the
biggest pressures on the Baltic
marine environment. However,
the already well-established
global forum for maritime activ-
ities5 created the possibility to
influence — from a Baltic perspective — new shipping regula-
tions,6 and ensured their harmonized implementation in the
region.
THE SECOND DECADE
The second decade of cooperation was characterized by the
revision of the Helsinki Convention,7 based upon developments
within environmental and maritime law. During this time, HEL-
COM embraced principles such as “the polluter-pays” and “the
precautionary principle” as well as the “best available tech-
niques” and “the best environmental practice.” At the same time,
the fall of the Soviet Union, the fusion of East and West Ger-
many, and the abolition of the area’s division into eastern and
western blocs increased cooperation among neighboring states.
The area protected by the Convention was expanded to include
internal waters,8 and the area of application was enlarged to
include the catchment of the Baltic Sea.9 HELCOM conse-
quently began to assess coastal waters as part of the coordinated
monitoring program on the health status of the Baltic Sea.
Another important step forward was the involvement of
international financial institutions (“IFIs”), which for the first
time coupled desired environmental improvements and neces-
sary funding. With the participation of the IFIs, a list of the most
polluting sites in the Baltic Sea catchment area was prepared
based on pre-feasibility studies. The involvement of the IFIs dur-
ing the identification phase ensured that it would later be possi-
ble to obtain funding for the remedial actions needed at the
sites.10
THE THIRD DECADE: THE START OF A
PARADIGM SHIFT?
The complexity of regulating marine environmental protec-
tion issues increased during the third decade due to the expan-
sion of the European Union (“EU”), leaving the Russian
Federation as the only non-EU contracting party to the Helsinki
Convention. The supra-national character of EU cooperation,
and thus the delegation by the member states of decision-making
powers to the EU in fields such as agriculture and fisheries,
emphasizes the need for HELCOM to act as the environmental
focal point and policy maker for the region, providing informa-
tion about the health of and trends in the Baltic Sea, and the effi-
ciency of measures to protect the sea. With regard to the specific
needs of the Baltic Sea, HELCOM works to ensure the adoption
of measures within other inter-
national organizations as well as
the strictest regional implemen-
tation of measures imposed by
other international organiza-
tions. Hereafter additional HEL-
COM recommendations are
adopted if needed.
In this new political arena,
the role of HELCOM as a cata-
lyst for regional and supra-
national policy making is
increasing, with HELCOM act-
ing as the “spokesperson” for the Baltic Sea, and also for non-
HELCOM countries in the catchment area, including Belarus,
Ukraine, the Czech and the Slovak Republics.11
At the same time, this decade sees a shift towards holistic,
quantifiable, and cost-efficient policy. This is motivated by
changes at the international level, where specifically, in 2002,
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg, South Africa, set the pace by stating that member states
shall, by 2010, implement the ecosystem approach to the man-
agement of human activities that impact the marine environ-
ment. This ecosystem approach was taken onboard HELCOM in
2003, and was followed in 2005 by the European community’s
adoption of a thematic strategy on the protection and conserva-
tion of the marine environment.12
The ecosystem approach advocates a comprehensive
approach to the understanding and anticipation of ecological
change, whereby the full range of consequences is assessed. This
assessment is then used as the basis for developing appropriate
management responses. Thus, while HELCOM has already
decided on needed reduction measures in pollution loads (such
as a 50 percent reduction in the nutrient loads reaching the Baltic
The role of HELCOM as a




Sea), the ecosystem approach takes as the starting point the cur-
rent health of the Baltic Sea and the changes that the Baltic
coastal countries would like to see in the future. Since stake-
holder involvement is one of the major components when apply-
ing an ecosystem approach, it is necessary to be able to quantify
the state of the Baltic Sea that is desired and what actions are
needed in order to reach that condition.
The initial step toward the application of the ecosystem
approach in the Baltic region was taken during the first stake-
holder conference, arranged by HELCOM in March 2006. The
stakeholders agreed that a HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan
shall be developed under the overall vision of a Baltic Sea with
all its components in balance, thus guaranteeing a diversity of
life and supporting a sustainable use of its resources. Further-
more, the stakeholders decided to develop the plan of action
according to four strategic goals: 1) a Baltic Sea unaffected by
eutrophication; 2) a Baltic Sea with life undisturbed by haz-
ardous substances; 3) a Baltic Sea with its biodiversity in favor-
able status; and 4) a Baltic Sea where maritime activities are
carried out in an environmentally friendly way. 
On the basis of the decided ecological objectives, HEL-
COM is now working to develop concrete actions with timeta-
bles that will eventually fulfill the strategic goals and overall
1 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, Apr. 9, 1992, 2099 U.N.T.S. 197 (defining the Baltic Sea Area as: “the
Baltic Sea and the entrance to the Baltic Sea bounded by the parallel of the
Skaw in the Skagerrak at 57 44.43’N”). 
2 Denmark, Finland, East and West Germany, Poland, Sweden and the Soviet
Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union the Baltic Republics Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania, together with the Russian Federation, also participated in the
cooperation.
3 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, Mar. 22, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter Helsinki Convention].
4 HELCOM Recommendation 3/3 concerning protection of seals in the Baltic
Sea Area, was adopted February 17, 1982. More than two hundred HELCOM
recommendations have been adopted, and are available at http://www.helcom.fi/
Recommendations/en_GB/front/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2006). 
5 The International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) is one of the specialized
agencies of the United Nations.
6 HELCOM countries have joined forces within the IMO to achieve a special
area status which requires stricter ship discharge regulations in the Baltic Sea.
This has been effectively implemented by the HELCOM Baltic Strategy. Fur-
thermore, HELCOM has based on IMO regulations requiring certain ships to be
equipped with Automatic Identification Systems, established a Baltic traffic
monitoring system surveilling ships in real time while they navigate in the
Baltic Sea. The implementation of specific regulations for navigation in ice con-
ditions, the first of its kind in the world, is another example of the regional
cooperation.
6 The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area, supra note 1, at art. 1.
7 Helsinki Convention, supra note 3 (“A Contracting Party shall, at the time of
the deposit of the instrument of ratification, approval or accession, inform the
Depositary of the designation of its internal waters for the purposes of this Con-
vention.”).
8 Helsinki Convention, supra note 3, at art. 6, § 1 of the Helsinki Convention
(“The relevant measures to this end shall be taken by each Contracting Party in
the catchment area of the Baltic Sea without prejudice to its sovereignty.”).
9 From the beginning, 132 pollution “hot spots” were designated. This approach
has been successful; today more than half of the “hot spots” in the region have
been eliminated.
10 Belarus has the fifth largest catchment area to the Baltic Sea. Recent studies
by HELCOM have shown that the nutrient and heavy metals input from
Belarus, Ukraine and the Czech Republic to the Baltic Sea are significant. 
Evaluation of Transboundary Pollution Loads, Helsinki Commission (2005),
http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/Publications/OtherPublications/Transboundary_
Poll_Loads.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006). 
11 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament, COM (2005) 504 with a proposal for an associated Directive now
being discussed. COM (2005) 505, 24 October 2005.
vision for the Baltic Sea. Identifying the most cost-efficient ways
to reach the goals is essential. All in all, this is an ambitious task;
the political importance of which is shown by the fact that the
HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan will be adopted on November
15, 2007 by the environmental and agricultural ministers from
all the Baltic coastal countries. 
CONCLUSION
For over three decades, HELCOM has demonstrated the
value of tailor-made solutions for addressing regional activities
that affect the marine environment. This is even more important
in an enlarged EU, where eight out of nine of the Baltic coastal
countries are now both members of the EU and have ratified the
Helsinki Convention. 
As HELCOM follows Johannesburg’s prescription of the
ecosystem approach, with the current and future status of the
Baltic Sea at the core, the need for the Helsinki Convention is
greater than ever. Not only does HELCOM possess information
on pollution loads and the status of and trends in the sea, but it
has also monitored the effects of previously-implemented regu-
latory measures. This knowledge, together with common objec-
tives for a shared sea, should be the basis for future joint
initiatives and actions in other international fora.
Endnotes: Case Study
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INTRODUCTION
W
hile the oceans are mostly out of sight, and therefore
mostly out of mind, they make up the majority of our
environment.1 They are a place where industrial food
production relies on hunting rather than farming. But industrial
food production relies on industrial equipment such as massive
bottom trawl nets and scallop dredges that scrape across the
seafloor. The use of these destructive tools has been compared to
using bulldozers for hunting squirrels in the forest.2 The result-
ing impact is comparable to clear-cutting forests — but could be
far more devastating.3 In 1998, scientists estimated that every
two years, destructive trawlers sweep an area equivalent to the
entire world’s continental shelf.4 This article examines one route
among many leading to the goal of conserving marine habitat:
using the statutory mandate directing regional fishery manage-
ment councils to protect essential fish habitat (“EFH”). 
CONGRESS PUTS HABITAT INTO THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT
When Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act in 1976, conservation was
not the concern. Congress wanted to “Americanize the fish-
eries,” by kicking foreign fishing vessels out of United States
waters.5 To regulate the newly Americanized fisheries, the Act
created eight regional fishery management councils composed
of fisheries stakeholders.6 The regional councils develop fishery
management plans and implementing regulations to manage the
fisheries.7 These plans and regulations are subject to only limited
federal oversight — the National Marine Fisheries Service may
disapprove a plan or regulation if it finds that the measure vio-
lates the law.8
From the beginning, the Magnuson-Stevens Act gave coun-
cils the authority to “designate zones where, and periods when,
fishing shall be limited, or shall not be permitted, or shall be per-
mitted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified
types and quantities of fishing gear.”9 This authority granted to
the councils all the power that they needed to protect marine
habitat. A council could prohibit all fishing in a sensitive habitat
zone or forbid all destructive fishing gears from fishing in that
zone. But most councils stood idle as the threat from destructive
trawling and other destructive fishing gear became apparent over
the years.10
From 1976 to 1996, the councils and the federal govern-
ment, aided and abetted by the fishing community, embarked on
an erratic series of policies that forced the marine ecosystem and
fishing communities through a cycle of environmental and eco-
nomic boom and bust.11 First, government subsidies would bloat
fishing capacity to an unsustainable level, after which regula-
tions would belatedly, but abruptly, pull the plug on fishing, leav-
ing environmental and economic chaos in their wake.12 By 1994,
with the collapse of the New England groundfish fishery,13
reform was politically possible.
Two years later, in October 1996, Congress enacted the Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act Amendments of 1996 to the Magnuson-
Stevens Act (“SFA”).14 The amendments required, inter alia,
that the regional councils incorporate habitat conservation meas-
ures into their fishery management plans.15 The intent of Con-
gress seemed plain, to take the “may protect habitat” already in
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and change it to a “must.” 
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OVERDUE GUIDANCE IGNORED BY
REGIONAL COUNCILS
THE FISHERIES SERVICE PROVIDES GUIDANCE
While the habitat provisions of the bill appeared strong,
vague language and lack of institutional reform sowed the seeds
of future problems. First, the bill protected EFH from “adverse
effects,” but did not define the term. Second, the bill qualified its
mandate, directing councils to “minimize” adverse effects “to
the extent practicable,” without explaining what “minimize” or
“practicable” meant. Third, and most damaging, the bill gave the
task of protecting habitat to the very institutions that had not
done it in the past: the regional councils.
Nevertheless, the law mandated actions and set deadlines. It
required the Fisheries Service to issue EFH guidance within six
months of enactment.16 In addition, the SFA required the Fish-
eries Service to provide specific EFH information and recom-
mendations to each council.17 The SFA also required the
councils to amend their fishery management plans within 24
months to designate and protect EFH.18
The Fisheries Service
termed its guidance, issued half
a year late, an “interim final
rule.”19 The interim guidance
spoke directly to the key issues
identified above. It broadly inter-
preted the term “adverse effect”
to include “any impact which
reduces quality and/or quantity
of EFH.”20 The definition made
clear that “adverse effects”
included direct physical disrup-
tion to habitat21 — seemingly
guaranteeing that destructive
trawling and dredging would be
deemed to have adverse effects.
In addition, the interim guidance included a completely
unhelpful, if not actively counter-productive, discussion of the
term “practicable.”22 The Fisheries Service advised that in con-
sidering practicability, councils should consider the adverse
effects of the fishing activity, the long and short-term costs to the
fishery and its EFH, and other appropriate factors, including the
statutory command that regulations should, where “practicable,”
minimize costs and unnecessary duplication.23 Thus, the agency
told the councils to consider everything, but provided no guid-
ance on how to make a decision. 
To further fulfill its mandate to provide guidance to the
councils, the agency commissioned a review of the scientific lit-
erature on the effects of fishing gear on habitat.24 The review
found that “[f]ishing is one of the most widespread human
impacts to the marine environment.”25 More disturbingly, the
study also found that “systems are being fished to the point
where recovery is delayed so long that the economic conse-
quences are devastating.”26 We are currently seeing this pattern
in many fisheries around the world. Mindful of the eventual eco-
nomic and ecological cost of destroying the habitat on which
commercial fishing depends, the review advised that “managers
bear the responsibility of adopting a precautionary approach
when considering the environmental consequences of fishing
rather than assuming that the extraction of fish has no ecological
price and therefore no feedback loop to our non-ecologically
based economic system.”27
THE COUNCILS DENY ADVERSE EFFECTS
While the Fisheries Service was initially responsive to the
Congressional mandate, the regional councils rejected it. One
council contended that it had already addressed all habitat prob-
lems and refused to take any new steps.28 Two other councils
determined that they would defer actually protecting habitat to
the future, rather than complying with the Congressional 24-
month deadline.29 None of the six councils that had neglected
habitat in the past adopted new management measures in
response to the new legislative command.30 In an interesting
twist, even though the interim guidance contained a strong defi-
nition of “adverse effect” and a weak discussion of “practicabil-
ity,” the councils justified their
failure to promulgate new man-
agement measures by the
alleged inability to establish that
there were any adverse effects.31
The Fisheries Service
approved all but one of the
plainly deficient fishery man-
agement plan amendments sub-
mitted by the councils.32 Marine
conservation and fishing groups
filed suit concerning the five
regions where plans were
approved.33 In an initial blow to
the enforceability of the new
EFH provisions, the District
Court did not heed the indis-
putable evidence that destructive gears physically disrupt the
seafloor, causing adverse effects as defined by the interim guid-
ance.34 Instead, the District Court deferred to the council conclu-
sions that there was not enough evidence to determine the effects
of trawling and dredging on habitat.35 But the District Court did
not let the Government off the hook. Instead, it ruled that under
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Government was
required to develop the information necessary to determine
whether there were adverse effects.36 As a result of the ruling,
the Government agreed to develop environmental impact state-
ments (“EISs”) around the country to reevaluate protecting EFH
from fishing gear.37
IN THE INTERIM — THE COURTS PUNT
Neither fishing nor the issuance of new fisheries regulations
stopped while the EISs were under development. Conservation
groups brought cases concerning the Atlantic sea scallop fishery
and the golden tilefish fishery in the Mid-Atlantic to protect EFH
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afoul of the judicial reluctance to give weight to the crucial
words of the EFH provision.
The golden tilefish case, NRDC v. Evans, concerned the
impacts of destructive trawling on seafloor habitat, as golden
tilefish live in burrows in the seafloor,38 presenting an ideal
example of a species in need of protection. Moreover, there was
undisputed evidence that bottom trawls physically disrupted
seafloor habitat by plowing over tilefish burrows and by leaving
scars on the seafloor.39 Yet the Mid-Atlantic Council refused to
adopt any protective measures, arguing accurately that there was
no scientific study one way or another as to the impacts on tile-
fish of having their burrows buried.40 NRDC v. Evans thus
repeated on a smaller scale the argument in the initial EFH case
as to whether a showing of physical disruption, as specified in
the interim guidelines, was enough to show an adverse effect, or
whether courts could not act unless conservationists could pro-
duce scientific evidence linking impact on habitat to injury to a
commercially-fished species. This is what has been called the
“dead body” standard. The tilefish court followed AOC v. Daley
and adopted the “dead body” standard over the physical disrup-
tion standard found in the agency’s regulations.41 As a result, the
litigation route to establishing
adverse effects stalled.42
Conservation Law Founda-
tion v. U.S. Department of Com-
merce was the principal case
brought in the Atlantic sea scal-
lop fishery. It concerned a rule
governing scallop fishing for the
2001 and 2002 fishing sea-
sons.43 The New England Coun-
cil considered three options for
closing areas of the fishery to
allow scallops to mature.44 The
Council’s analysis ranked the
three options as to how well they protected EFH and evaluated
their short-term cost and long-term cost to the fishery.45 A clo-
sure in New England’s Great South Channel was ranked as hav-
ing the greatest benefit to habitat, the highest short-term cost,
but possibly the highest long-term benefit to the fishery.46 The
Council rejected that alternative.47 Given the analysis, the case
presented an opportunity to test the enforceability of the require-
ment to protect EFH “to the extent practicable.” Unfortunately,
the First Circuit declined to attribute any force to the practicabil-
ity requirement. Instead, the court declared: “We think by using
the term ‘practicable’ Congress intended rather to allow for the
application of agency expertise and discretion in determining
how best to manage fishery resources.”48
WINNING THE BATTLE ON ADVERSE EFFECTS
As the EISs and rulemakings recommenced, the councils
and the Fisheries Service revisited the issue of adverse effects.
This time, with relatively little struggle, the EISs documented
the scientific consensus that destructive trawling and dredging
adversely affect seafloor habitat. In fact, every single remand
EIS found adverse effects. 
Two events stand out. First, the Fisheries Service requested
the National Academy of Sciences to investigate the effects of
bottom trawling. The study unequivocally found adverse effects,
concluding, for example, that “[t]rawling and dredging change
the physical habitat and biologic structure of ecosystems and
therefore can have potentially wide-ranging consequences.”49
Second, the North Pacific Council stood alone in issuing a
draft EIS that refused to find adverse effects.50 But a peer-review
by independent scientists noted in polite academic language that
it “is premature to conclude that the current level and pattern of
fishing activity has minimal or temporary effects on the habitat
. . .” and that in any case, the draft EIS was “at odds,” with the
overall conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences
report.51 The peer review forced the North Pacific Council to
reverse course. It appears that adverse effects will no longer be a
battleground.
TRYING TO PROTECT HABITAT
THAT IS BEING FISHED
As mentioned earlier, the political impetus for the conserva-
tion reforms that established EFH came out of the collapse of the
New England groundfish fish-
ery. More than ten years later,
cod is still in severely bad shape.
Over the years, scientists have
thoroughly documented the
dependence of young cod on a
certain kind of rocky or gravelly
seafloor habitat with living
structure such as sponges.52 This
habitat is continually pounded
by destructive trawling. Oceana
and other conservation groups
vigorously worked to include
alternatives for protecting cod
habitat in the New England
EISs. Unfortunately, the political situation was not yet ripe. The
EISs did not take a scientific approach to identifying alterna-
tives, but instead only examined alternatives based on historical
closures enacted for other reasons.53 As a result, these alterna-
tives left most cod habitat unprotected. 
Eventually, the New England Council adopted one of the
alternatives — a small step forward in recognizing the necessity
of closures to protect habitat, but not enough to protect ground-
fish.54 Oceana sued, seeking to compel the Council to consider
more scientifically designed and more protective alternatives.55
The court denied the claims, relying heavily on the First Circuit’s
holding that the EFH provision gave the Government vast discre-
tion.56
But the process continues as the evidence grows and the
philosophy and composition of the councils evolve. The New
England Council is now seriously considering a proposal to pro-
tect juvenile cod EFH in the Great South Channel — the same
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FREEZING THE FOOTPRINT OF BOTTOM
TRAWLING: PROTECTING HABITAT THAT IS
NOT YET BEING FISHED
As the New England example shows, advocating that fisher-
men stay out of areas that they already fish is difficult. Advocates
with Oceana developed the innovative, although controversial,
idea of taking the path of least resistance.57 To understand the
new strategy, it is necessary to understand that fishing is not a
static activity. If one area is fished out because it is overex-
ploited, vessels explore and move to new areas.58 So although it
is very important to protect areas that are already subject to fish-
ing, it is also valuable to protect areas that no one is fishing yet.
Acting on this insight, Oceana and other conservation
groups in Alaska and the Pacific coast began gathering data on
where vessels fished, and where they did not. Their enterprise
was further bolstered by the discovery in 2001 of astonishingly
beautiful gardens of deep-sea coral off Alaska’s Aleutian
Islands.59 Conservation groups also identified other special areas
off Alaska and in the Pacific, including deep-sea underwater
mountains, or seamounts, that also supported special and beauti-
ful ecological communities. Proposals based on restricting the
expansion of destructive fishing and protecting special places
succeeded in protecting submarine canyons in the Atlantic,60
more than half a million square miles61 of marine habitat off the
Aleutian Islands62 and in the Pacific63. 
CONCLUSION
The work to protect marine habitat from destructive trawl-
ing continues. Oceana is developing a comprehensive approach
to halting the expansion of destructive trawling in the Atlantic.
In the meantime, Oceana is advancing specific proposals to pro-
tect more deep-sea canyons and seamounts to the New England
Council and Oceana is supporting the South Atlantic Council’s
development of a broad-based ecosystem management plan that
will protect areas of coral from North Carolina to Florida. 
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INTRODUCTION
F
or the past two years the governments and the affected
peoples of Argentina and Uruguay have been in conflict
over the potential environmental hazards that the con-
struction of two mega paper pulp mills would bring to the
Uruguay River and neighboring area. Pursuant to a jurisdiction
provision in a treaty bearing on the matter, Argentina filed suit in
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to resolve the dispute
and requested that the construction of the mills be enjoined 
until a decision was rendered.
On July 13, 2006, the ICJ denied
Argentina’s request for provi-
sionary measures without preju-
dice to the decision on the
merits. 
Nonetheless, with construc-
tion on one mill abandoned and
the other mill temporarily sus-
pended, Argentina may get its
way regardless of the outcome
on the merits of the ICJ case
because of heavy public protests,
political pressure, and the tena-
cious public-interest litigation of
a non-government organization
(“NGO”) called Center for
Human Rights and Environment (“CEDHA” by its Spanish
acronym). 
LEGAL BRIEF: INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE CASE
According to Argentina, Uruguay authorized the Spanish
company ENCE to construct a pulp mill project near the city of
Fray Bentos in October of 2003. In February of 2005, Uruguay
sanctioned yet another paper pulp mill, this time to be operated
by a Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia AB (“Botnia”), also
near Fray Bentos. Argentina claims that both mills were author-
ized without complying with the procedure prescribed by the
1975 Statute of the River Uruguay. Argentina further argued that
the two mills were being built in the “worst imaginable” place in
terms of protection of the river, that there is “a very serious prob-
ability” of environmental damage, and that the damage would be
“irreparable.”1 Uruguay replied that the mills will apply the
“highest and the most appropriate international standards of pol-
lution control” and will meet its obligations under the 1975
Statute.2
On July 13, 2006, the ICJ denied Argentina’s request for
provisionary measures without prejudice on the merits. In its
decision, the Court focused on
the fact that provisional meas-
ures may be granted only if
Argentina can prove that “the
construction of the mills poses
an imminent threat of irrepara-
ble damage to the aquatic envi-
ronment of the River Uruguay
or to the economic and social
interest of the riparian inhabi-
tants of the Argentine side of
the river,”3 [emphasis added].
The Court then reasoned that
Argentina did not persuade the
Court that mere construction of
the mills would cause imminent
or irreparable harm the environment. None of the prior ICJ cases
involved a request to shut down or halt the construction of an
industrial project.4
While a decision on the merits is scheduled to be rendered
in August 2007 for the Botnia mill and June 2008 for the ENCE
mill,5 the combination of protests, roadblocks, diplomatic pres-
sure, and legal action may make the decision on the merits moot.
LITIGATION UPDATE
THE URUGUAY PAPER PULP MILL DISPUTE: 
HIGHLIGHTING THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF NGOS AND PUBLIC PROTEST
IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
by Michael K. Lee*
* Michael K. Lee is an LLM candidate, 2006, at American University, Washington
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On September 21, 2006, ENCE’s president, Juan Luis Arrigui,
announced that construction would not continue, explaining that
“there cannot be two [cellulose] plants in Fray Bentos.”6 Mr.
Arrigui did add, however, that there are plans to move the plant
to another part of Uruguay.7 And, as for Botnia mill project,
while the project is in more advanced stages and employs
approximately 4,500 workers, the management decided to tem-
porarily suspend construction “due to lack of guarantees… and
until the conditions required for the development of this project
are re-established.”8
PROTESTS, ROADBLOCKS, & POLITICS
Large-scale protests were essential in speeding diplomatic
and litigation efforts surrounding the paper mills. On April 30,
2005, a protest rally of forty thousand participants, mostly 
residents of the Argentine city of Gualeguaychú, blocked the
Libertador General San Martín Bridge, the main bridge between
Gualeguaychú and Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos.9 On February
3, 2006, members of an environmentalist group called
Gualeguaychú Environmental Assembly led a long-term 
blockade of Route 136. On February 16, 2006, the Colón Envi-
ronmental Assembly started a long term blockade of Route 135
and the bridge that links Colón
(which lies approximately one
h u n d r e d m i l e s n o r t h o f
Gualeguaychú) to the Uruguayan
city of Paysandú.10 Nearly con-
tinuous road blocks persisted on
Route 135 and 136 until May of
2006. On April 30, 2006, nearly
100,000 people participated in a
protest on the Libertador Gen-
eral San Martín Bridge.11 After
nearly a four-month lull, large
public protests stirred again on
September 11, 2006 and Sep-
tember 25, 2006.13
Uruguay felt the economic impact of the roadblocks. As
early as December 26, 2005, the Uruguayan Chancellor publicly
announced that the blockades were a violation of the Mercosur
Trade Agreement and brought a formal complaint against
Argentina on August 9, 2006 to the Ad Hoc Tribunal created
through Mercosur.14 Uruguay requested an award of U.S. $400
million for Argentina’s failure to remove citizen roadblocks, but
on September 7, 2006, the Ad Hoc Tribunal rejected Uruguay’s
claim because it found Argentina acted in good faith to dissuade
road blocks.15
The protest soon moved politicians into action and escalated
diplomatic efforts. From May of 2005, the governor of Entre
Rios, the province in which the proposed mills are to be located,
stated his support for the protesters. In July of 2005, Argentine
Chancellor Rafael Biela traveled to Gualeguaychú to meet with
residents there. Despite these efforts, the matter escalated and on
January 25, 2006, Jorge Busti, governor of Entre Rios, and
Nestor Kichner, president of Argentina, announced that
Argentina would be filing an ICJ complaint, which would be
filed March 4, 2006.16
CEDHA’S PUBLIC-INTEREST LITIGATION
While the effectiveness of the public protests, roadblocks,
and diplomacy should not be underestimated, the NGOs, partic-
ularly CEDHA were just as critical to the campaign against the
pulp mills in Uruguay. Founded in 1999, CEDHA has a perma-
nent staff of just ten persons. However, its founder Romina
Picolottii not only served as the legal advisor to the Gualeguay-
chú Citizens’ Assembly17 but lead CEDHA on a tenacious cut-
ting-edge public-interest litigation campaign against the paper
pulp mills.18
A large measure of the nearly two billion in financing was to
come from the World Bank Group and through its members, the
International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).19 CEDHA petitioned
the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (“CAO”), the organiza-
tion responsible for compliance review of IFC/MIGA, and the
CAO agreed to conduct a “compliance audit” of the IFC’s stud-
ies.20 Eventually, the IFC decided to conduct another Cumula-
tive Impact Study (“CIS”) in June of 2006 an act which tacitly
acknowledges the deficiency of prior studies.21 At present, the
IFC is still processing the loan
requests for the mills with a
decision scheduled for October
2006,22 making the mill owners
nervous.23
Concurrently, CEDHA also
launched a campaign against the
co-financiers of the mills by fil-
ing what CEDHA calls “Equator
Principles Compliance Com-
plaints.” The Equator Principles
are a voluntary initiative pro-
moted worldwide by the IFC.24
By adopting the Principles,
financial institutions undertake
to finance only those projects whose environmental and social
risk comply with the criteria.25 These Principles, however, are
not legally binding restraints on financial institutions, rather they
are a species of “soft law” that is prevalent in the area of interna-
tional environmental law. Soft law is based on international
diplomacy, customs, and principles such as those espoused in the
1992 Rio Declaration. It is dependent on moral suasion or fear of
diplomatic retribution rather than legal action. Because govern-
ments and corporations dislike negative publicity, one soft law
stratagem favored by activists is the so-called “name and shame
game.” For instance, CEDHA used the Equator Principles to
send detailed and technical complaint letters that read like a civil
complaints to finance companies ING Group of the Netherlands
and BBVA of Spain. Subsequently, the ING Group sent a letter
to CEDHA on April 12, 2006, stating that it would withdraw its
finance consideration of the mills.26 Similarly, CEDHA also
filed a series of Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) specific instance complaints against
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would build and operate the mills — for alleged violation of
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.27
CONCLUSION
When discussing the enforcement of international environ-
mental laws, the World Bank notes that “NGOs often play the
role of self-appointed ‘watchdogs’ over national governments,
and can thus help in the enforcement of international law
through political means or public-interest litigation, to ensure
that governments maintain their environmental commitments.
The individual in the international arena also deserves mention.
With the increasing emphasis on public participation and provi-
sion of access to environmental information in international dis-
course, the individual’s role in ensuring international environ-
mental compliance is becoming increasingly relevant.”28 The
muted tones and the technical language used by that World Bank
makes one wonder to what extent the statements are, in fact,
true. The enforcement of law is quintessentially a state function.
However, recent events highlighted in the Uruguay paper pulp
mills dispute point to the growing importance of NGOs and indi-
vidual participants in the enforcement and, possibly, the creation




iven the increasing scarcity of water resources, com-
pounded by environmental degradation, urbanization,
and industrialization, the need to rethink water
resources management has been pushed to the top of national
and global agendas. Cognizant of this trend, Salman M. A.
Salman and Daniel D. Bradlow recently released a book entitled
Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A
Comparative Study that aims to
provide a toolkit for countries
that are preparing water legisla-
tion or revising existing legisla-
tion. To accomplish this goal,
the authors present a description
of the regulatory frameworks of
sixteen countries and examine
how each addresses the use,
development, management,
allocation, and protection of
water resources. Drawing from
these regional practices, as well
as from declarations and resolu-
tions of international confer-
ences,  the authors  provide
policymakers and experts with a
list of elements the authors con-
sider essential to the creation of effective regulatory frameworks. 
Salman and Bradlow begin by observing that as water has
become an increasingly scarce resource, many states have
started to adopt legislation to address a variety of issues facing
the water sector. Based on a state’s legislative response, the
authors place it into one of three categories: (1) countries that
have adopted comprehensive water statutes; (2) countries that
are struggling to agree on a comprehensive statute; and (3) coun-
tries that have addressed water issues in provisions that are scat-
tered throughout different laws and regulations. Despite their
supreme position in the hierarchy, the authors note that even
countries in the first category have a tendency to give insufficient
attention to major water resources issues like ownership, protec-
tion, and accessibility.
Salman and Bradlow note many reasons for this failure.
First, existing legislation is often complex and permits an unde-
sirable fragmentation of responsibilities between different enti-
ties within the government.
Second, water legislation tends
to lag behind modern manage-
ment practices. Additionally, the
authors consider legislation
adopted not flexible enough to
accommodate future changes in
priorities and perspectives. In
order to cure these problems, the
authors offer a roadmap for
experts and policymakers to fol-
low when creating or revising
water legislation. The authors
suggest that the first step in the
legislative process be a review
of existing rules and regulations
to ascertain areas of weaknesses
and strengths. Next, they recom-
mend the creation of a paper outlining the main policies, princi-
ples, and procedures to be included in the draft law. As
conceived by Salman and Bradlow, this paper and the resulting
legislation should address a number of basic principles, such
as ownership of water resources, underlying principles and pri-
orities, regulation of water uses and water infrastructure, protec-
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Rather than follow a
specified model form or
blueprint, the authors
provide an exhaustive 
list of issues for experts
and policymakers 
to consider. 
75 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
tion of water resources, institutional and financial arrangements,
enforcement of regulations, and dispute settlement. 
Salman and Bradlow expound upon these basic principals in
their book. For example, the authors advocate that when legisla-
tors consider the principle of water ownership, they weigh the
benefits of state ownership of surface and groundwater versus
the benefits of awarding rights based on the historical doctrines
of riparian rights and prior appropriation. Under the same basic
principle, they urge legislators to devise a clear licensing scheme
that would allow individuals or entities to establish water sys-
tems or to dig wells. Correspondingly, the authors stress the need
for governments to devise rules for the transfer, suspension, and
revocation of licenses. Finally, Salman and Bradlow remind leg-
islators to discuss how they might verify and regularize water
uses that existed before the legislation was revised or created.
In regards to the basic principle of institutional arrange-
ments, the authors encourage legislators to specify which entity
has the explicit responsibility of regulating and managing water
to avoid duplication and overlapping of responsibilities. They
also devote a significant amount of text to the notion that institu-
tional arrangements should reflect decentralization of decision
making and public participation. Salman and Bradlow suggest
two ways to accomplish this goal: (1) to appoint river basin
authorities to play a role in the management of water, and (2) to
provide for water user associations to represent the interests of
users.
Though Salman and Bradlow emphasize that regulatory
frameworks need to take into account the socioeconomic and
cultural setting of each state, rather than follow a specified
model form or blueprint, the authors provide such an exhaustive
list of issues for experts and policymakers to consider. It is not
inconceivable that a government could successfully draw up a
legislative template using the book’s many concepts. For this
reason, Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Manage-
ment: A Comparative Study is an excellent resource for readers
who wish to understand the relevance and importance of water
legislation to the proper management and protection of water
resources.
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ASIA
CHINESE PROVINCIAL REPORT HIGHLIGHTS
WIDESPREAD POLLUTION IN MAJOR FISHERY
An August 2006 report by China’s Zhejiang Provincial
Environmental Bureau (“ZPEB”) highlights continuing damage
from petrochemical waste, heavy metals pollution, and overfish-
ing to the Zhoushan fishery in the East China Sea.1 The
Zhoushan fishery is among the largest in the East China Sea,2
and home to more than three hundred fish species, more than
eighty shrimp and crab species, and more than 125 varieties of
algae.3 The fishery accounts for ten percent of China’s total
annual fish catches4 and fifty percent of total catches for the Zhe-
jiang Province.5 The ZPEB study indicates that 81 percent of the
20,800 km2 Zhoushan fishery earned a category four pollution
rating, with a highest pollution rating of five, up from 53 percent
in 2000.6 During approximately the same period, from 2001 to
2005, total catches in the Zhoushan fishery decreased from 1.3
million tons to 0.98 million tons,7 with a concurrent decrease in
the quality of fish caught.8 China has been the world’s largest
producer of fish since 1990, with total production reaching
approximately 40 million tons in 1999, accounting for thirty per-
cent of the world total.9 Despite the continued growth of aqua-
culture, which has, in fact, replaced capture fishing as China’s
major fishery activity,10 a continued environmental decline of
the Zhoushan fishery may have various significant implications
to China’s food security and the economic viability of its fishing




On August 31, 2006, Wal-Mart announced the immediate
availability of ten fish products certified as sustainable by the
Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”),11 a UK-based fishing
advocacy group founded by the multinational corporation
Unilever and the conservation organization World Wildlife Fund
(“WWF”).12 Identified by the blue MSC logo, the MSC certifica-
tion indicates that a source fishery is “well-managed and sustain-
able,”13 judged by the condition of fish stocks, the impact of the
fishery on the environment, and fishery management systems.14
The move received considerable attention from sustainabil-
ity-oriented news outlets.15,16 While organizations such as
Greenpeace have questioned MSC certification criteria,17 MSC
Chief Executive Rupert Howes believes the move will “encour-
age other fisheries to join the MSC. . . and provide a powerful
new route for consumers to support sustainable fishing.”18 Even
Wal-Mart Watch, a group aiming to “reform” the world’s largest
retailer, voiced support, calling the announcement a “positive
move.”19
Wal-Mart Watch also suggests that Wal-Mart go even fur-
ther, calling for the retailer to “source and label the origin of. . .
sustainable products, including meat and poultry.”20 Wal-Mart
may in fact go this route, as Wal-Mart Seafood’s vice president,
Peter Redmond, claims that this move is but a part of “Wal-
Mart’s continued commitment to offering sustainable products at
affordable prices to our customers.”21
AFRICA
DEADLY TOXIC WASTE DUMPING IN IVORY COAST
In what one reporter dubbed “a dark tale of globalization,”22
a tanker dumped waste materials, apparently containing hydro-
gen sulfide, around the city of Abidjan, Ivory Coast causing sev-
eral deaths and tens of thousands of injuries.23 The ship is
Greek-owned, flagged by Panama, and leased by Trafigura Bee-
her BV (“Trafigura”), a private Dutch oil trading company.24
Violent protests erupted throughout Abidjan as thousands sought
medical attention for ailments connected to the toxic sludge and
“noxious fumes” that saturated the air.25 The toxic dumping and
ensuing violent protests forced the Ivory Coast cabinet to resign,
save a few key ministers, though most cabinet members were
reinstated a few days later.26 Analysts estimate that the waste
could have been disposed of safely in Europe for approximately
U.S. $300,000.27
Trafigura insists that the gasoline waste dumped in Abidjan
did not contain any toxic hydrogen sulfide and was only regular
“chemical slops.”28 However, U.N. tests of waste found in Abid-
jan revealed “toxic levels of hydrogen sulfide,” though this waste
was not conclusively the Trafigura waste.29 Trafigura addition-
ally maintains that it gave the cargo of the ship to Compagnie
Tommy (“Tommy”), a local waste disposal company, to safely
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remove the “chemical slops.”30 Before the ship sailed to the
Ivory Coast, Amsterdam Port Services, the waste processing
company that originally handled the waste, found inconsisten-
cies between the waste amount Trafigura said was on the ship
and the amount actually on the tanker.31 Amsterdam Port Ser-
vices additionally reported that a number of its workers com-
plained of illnesses.32
Ivory Coast authorities arrested ten persons in connection
with the dumping, including two Trafigura executives who
entered the country to assist in the cleanup process.33 While the
Ivory Coast sought to have the responsible tanker detained by
Estonian officials, environmental activists blockaded the ship,
preventing it from leaving an Estonian port.34 Following detain-
ment of the tanker, slop sample tests from the ship revealed trace
amounts of “environmentally dangerous, poisonous chemi-
cals.”35 In Amsterdam, Greenpeace has begun filing complaints
against Trafigura, Amsterdam Port Services, and Dutch environ-
mental authorities in connection with the dumping.36 Experts
have expressed further concerns about possible long-term effects
in the Ivory Coast from the toxic waste.37 In reaction to these
ongoing events, Trafigura reported that it has begun legal pro-
ceedings against Tommy in connection with Tommy’s involve-




In September 2006, the World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) pre-
sented data to the European Parliament’s Fisheries Committee,
which is responsible for, among other things, conservation of
EU fishery resources,39 noting dramatic decreases in wild
bluefin tuna populations in the Mediterranean Sea.40 Declines
were particularly striking in the western Mediterranean near
Spain’s Balearic Islands.41 The report, prepared for WWF by the
independent consultancy Advanced Tuna Ranching Technolo-
gies, SL (“ATRT”), indicates recent bluefin tuna catches in the
Balearic Islands area amounted to only fifteen percent of catches
ten years ago, decreasing from approximately 14,700 metric tons
in 199542 to 2,270 metric tons in 2006.43 The WWF alleges the
decrease has been caused, in part, by significant illegal, unregu-
lated, and/or unreported bluefin catches in the Mediterranean
and Eastern Atlantic, in some cases perpetrated by prominent
contracting parties to the International Commission for Conser-
vation of Atlantic Tunas,44 including France, Libya, and
Turkey.45 ATRT alleges that those parties may be “greatly
exceeding . . . quotas and deliberately failing to report much of
their massive catches.”46 Tuna farming, the process of catching,
confining, and fattening wild bluefin tuna in net cages,47 driven
primarily by Japanese market demand for sushi,48 puts addi-
tional pressure on the already strained Mediterranean stock
because juvenile fish sometimes are farmed, preventing them
from breeding to replace the wild population.49 WWF also notes
that increased farming capacity encourages industrial fleets to
extract even more bluefin tuna,50 and that farming may spread
disease from exotic feed fish, posing an additional threat to the
already strained wild bluefin tuna population.51
MIDDLE EAST
DAMAGES DEMANDED AFTER
SUEZ CANAL OIL SPILLS
In the aftermath of recent oil spills in the Suez Canal, the
Egyptian government is pursuing monetary compensation from
the responsible tankers for damages caused.52 The government
released an impounded Liberian tanker, the Grigoroussa I,
which spilled 3,000 tonnes of oil into the canal in February, after
the tanker’s owners agreed to a stipulated payment of U.S. $3.4
million in compensation damages.53 Two million dollars of the
damages will be paid to the canal, one million dollars will go to
the Egyptian environmental agency, and four hundred thousand
dollars will be issued to businesses affected by the spill.54 The
Grigoroussa I will further be required to pay U.S. $1.39 million
to reimburse maritime services that were provided to the
tanker.55 In connection with an oil spill that occurred in Septem-
ber, the Egyptian environmental agency, local fishermen, and
affected businesses are asking for over U.S. $8.7 million in dam-
ages from the responsible Liberian tanker, the Anna P.C.56 The
Anna leaked over 600 tonnes of oil into the canal when it hit the
canal bank attempting to avoid hitting another tanker that had
run aground.57 In addition to the oil spills, several other acci-
dents involving ships have occurred recently at the Suez Canal,
including the one that led to the Anna discharging crude oil, call-
ing into question the safety measures in place at the canal.58
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